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IV 
Anu Leinonen ABSTRACT 
IS IT DEMOCRATISATION? 
The Rule of Law and Political Changes in Jordan since 1989 
This dissertation examines the role of the rule of law in democratisation. The aim 
here is to identify whether the political changes in Jordan since 1989 can be 
correctly understood as indicating a process of democratisation. This is done 
through examining all elements essential to democratisation: embedded rule of law 
and transfer of power. 
Democracy is understood here in procedural sense following the definitions by 
Schumpeter and Dahl, as a democratic system of governance of a modern state. 
The essential elements of a modern political democracy are electing governmental 
officials, free and fair elections, universal suffrage, free press and political rights of 
the citizenry. The rule of law, defined in formal terms, is seen as an inseparable 
part of modern political democracy. Therefore it is argued here that modern 
political democracy is not possible without embedded rule of law practices, 
although the rule of law is independent of political system. The main idea of 
modern political democracy is not only provide the citizens with the right to 
participate in legislating, but also protecting them from arbitrary behaviour of the 
ruler, and from each other. 
Through an examination of constitutionality, the independence of the judiciary and 
political participation I demonstrate that no significant changes have occurred 
within the political system in Jordan. No significant transfer of power from the ruler 
to the ruled has occurred. The political elite are still in charge of the law-making, 
yet they are themselves not subordinate to legal system. Furthermore, the 
independence of the judiciary is not achieved in Jordan. Thus the predictability of 
socio-political affairs has not improved, nor is the citizenry better protected from the 
arbitrary behaviour of the state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Purpose of the Study 
Studying systems of governance, and systemic transformations, has always been an 
interest of Political Science. Why does a system of governance start to change? 
What triggers the change and is there a pattern to be found? Currently the systemic 
changes focused are the ones leading to the establishment of democratic regimes. 
Democratisation began, argues Grugel, in the twentieth century, but the roots of the 
"contemporary democratisation" can be traced in the 1970s, when signs of 
democratisation were observed in the Southern Europe. ' The scholarly interest was 
then revived, and soon encouraged by similar occurrence elsewhere: in the Eastern 
Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and in China. Since a great deal of 
scholarly efforts has been devoted to examine the dynamics of contemporary 
democratisation processes. 
This dissertation is no different; it is interested in a contemporary political system 
showing signs of political changes. The political changes of interest here have been 
taking place in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan since the late 1980s. These 
changes are not only significant at the national level but also in relation to changes 
simultaneously occurring outside the Jordanian borders. The aim of the study is two- 
fold. First it aims at participating in the discussion on the pre/requisites to 
democratisation. It is argued here that the rule of law is an essential element of 
modern political democracy. Thus there cannot be democratisation without 
embedded rule of law. The second aim is to contribute to the literature on the role of 
the rule of law in democratisation: is the rule of law embedded prior to 
democratisation or does it occur simultaneously with democratisation process. The 
aim is to examine the political changes if they can correctly be identified as 
democratisation. This is done through examining the rule of law in Jordan together 
with aspects of political participation. The objective is to assess whether the rule of 
law is embedded and whether a significant degree of transfer of power has occurred 
in Jordan. 
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k 
c 
2. The Structure of the Dissertation 
The Arab Middle East has remained a region hardly touched by the global trend of 
democratisation. Explanations have been sought for the incompatibility, and later for 
the compatibility, of democracy and Middle Eastern culture, Islam and economic 
structures. The aim of Chapter One is to introduce the literature on Arab Middle 
Eastern `exceptional ism' in order to find out whether there are any components 
which may contribute to this study. Another objective is to identify the special 
challenges facing the student when studying political systems of the Arab Middle 
East. The central arguments of the exceptionalism debate will be presented in this 
chapter. The arguments have divided into essentialist and developmentalist ones, as 
suggested by Zubaida. Essentialist arguments, discussed here, will cover aspects of 
political culture covers such as Islam and Arab culture. The developmentalist 
literature is more focused on socio-economic structures and their possible 
peculiarities in the region. 
The aim of the Chapters Two and Three of this study is to introduce and assess the 
utility of the current academic discourse on democracy and on democratisation. It is 
worthy of stressing here that although part of the same body of literature, 
'democracy' and 'democratisation' are different concepts. Democracy is a political 
system and democratisation is process or processes through which a non- 
democracy becomes a democracy. Undoubtedly both theories of democracy and of 
democratisation are ultimately tackling the fundamental question of the democracy 
discourse: how to define democracy. Nevertheless, theories of democracy are 
focused on the elements of the system and have (traditionally) been more normative, 
while theories of democratisation emphasise how those systems are constructed. 
These two inter-related concepts are discussed here separately: democracy in the 
second chapter and democratisation in the third one. The aim of Chapter Two is to 
review the contemporary literature on democracy in order to define the key concepts 
used within this study and locate the relevance of the concept of the rule of law. The 
most common definitions of democracy are presented, as well as the difficulties of 
' Grugel, 2002,37 and 44. 
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finding the definition of (modern political) democracy due to the existing "conceptual 
chaos". The object of the study is a modern state (the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan), 'democracy' in this study equates with a democratic system of governance 
of modern state. Therefore, pre-modern democratic practices and entities are 
excluded from the review, as well as democracies in entities larger, or smaller, than a 
state (e. g. factory democracies, global democracy). The second part of the second 
chapter will focus on the concept of the rule of law. The rule of law is here seen as 
an integral part of the modern political democracy. The most common 
understandings of the rule of law are presented in the chapter, as well as the linkage 
between the rule of law and democracy. The foundation of the main argument of the 
dissertation will be laid: the rule of law is a necessity for democracy. Modern political 
democracy guarantees the citizens' right to participate in collective decision-making, 
yet this is not possible without a legal system that supports the implementation of the 
legislation. 
The latter part of the second chapter presents the literature on the rule of law in the 
Arab Middle East. This literature can roughly be divided into two groups. Some 
studies are focused on the debate over the term itself, while others examine the 
actual functioning of some (or all) elements of the rule of law, or elements seen as 
essential to the rule of law. The research on the elements of rule of law in the Middle 
Eastern context is concentrated on two aspects: constitutionalism and the judiciary. 
Constitutionalism and the judiciary are the main elements of the rule of law, in a 
formal sense, that cannot be ignored anywhere. Islam is naturally a factor that 
cannot be ignored when studying legal matters in the Arab Middle East. Although the 
literature on the rule of law, or rather legal development, in the Arab Middle East has 
devoted a considerable amount of effort to human rights, this will be excluded from 
this review, as the definition of the rule of law adapted here does not include 
substantial requirements. The compatibility of Islam and 'universal' human rights is 
seen by some as a part of the debate on exceptionalism. The distinction between the 
judiciary and constitutionalism are not clear-cut, as the constitutional courts can be 
seen belonging to both elements. The aim of this chapter is to find out what is 
already known about legal-political development in the region, and to identify the 
elements that will be useful for the purposes of this thesis. 
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In Chapter Three the focus is moved to approaches to the study of democratisation 
in order to identify the challenges of studying transforming political systems. The aim 
of the chapter is to present the achievements of the current literature and identify the 
possible weaknesses. It is worth noting that the objective here is not to provide a 
comprehensive review of literature on democratisation, not least since this would be 
a massive task. The objective is to present the central elements and main 
contributors, as well as the main differences between the three principal approaches. 
The approaches to the study of democratisation will be introduced using the 
classification of David Potter. Potter's classification was chosen, as Potter is 
concerned with factors explaining the construction of democratic systems. There are 
classifications based on the modes of research or on a crude distinction between 
structuralist theories and others. According to Potter, approaches are divided into the 
modernisation approach, the structural approach and the transition approach. It is 
also relevant for the purposes of this study to examine how the different approaches 
have perceived the role of the rule of law in the democratisation process, if at all. 
The empirical part of the dissertation examines the political changes in Jordan since 
1989. This is done through analysis of three elements identified through the 
discussions so far central to modern political democracy: constitutionality, the 
judiciary and political participation. Before examining the three elements, the object 
of this study - the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan- will be introduced in Chapter Five. 
The chapter aims to provide a brief introduction to Jordan. This is done to familiarise 
the reader with the political context (the political elite and the challenges they face), 
and to provide a background to the context of this study. The chapter aims to enable 
the reader to understand the relevance of the recent political changes in Jordan, in 
relation to the political elite in particular. How have the political changes that have 
taken place since the late 1980s made the political setting different? The latter part of 
this chapter discusses the interpretations of the political changes offered in the 
existing literature. How have scholars perceived the political changes taking place in 
Jordan, and how have they reached their conclusions? 
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The constitutional framework, as described by the constitution, will be examined in 
Chapter Six. The first step to examine the rule of law is to define the legal framework: 
state powers, powers granted to them and the relationship between state powers 
and the citizenry. This is done by analysing the constitution, a written 9-chapter 
document, describing the ground rules of the kingdom. Does the constitutional 
framework support the principles of the rule of law and political democracy? In the 
case of Jordan it is significant to acknowledge that the constitution - albeit 
promulgated in 1952 - has been amended several times since the 1950s. How have 
the contents of the constitution changed since promulgation, and how have the 
amendments altered the constitutional framework in the country? It is also relevant to 
this research to identify what events and individuals initiated in amendments and the 
actors who benefited from the amendments. 
A constitution here is not seen as an instrument automatically constraining the rulers, 
or a guarantee of democratic governance, but rather as a charter for the government. 
It is relevant for this thesis to examine whether these principles (democracy and the 
rule of law) are included in the constitution. It is worth noting that constitutions, like 
any other documents, can include contradictory elements. Thus, if included in the 
constitution, how does the structure of the constitutional framework support 
realisation of these principles? In addition to analysing the constitutional text, the 
realisation of the constitution is analysed, in this chapter and in the rest of the 
dissertation. Is it justified to see Constitutionalism as being part of the Jordanian 
political system? It is important to define whether constitutionality has been part of 
the system prior to 1989 and after. Have the stipulations of the constitution been 
respected even during the unexceptional circumstances any state will experience? 
The latter part of the chapter will examine the role of temporary laws in the Jordanian 
legislation in order to establish whether their usage compromises any constitutional 
stipulations. 
Chapter Seven analyses the independence of the judiciary in Jordan. The aim of the 
chapter is to assess whether the constitution and the existing institutions provide the 
judiciary with a working environment in which the judges are free from interference 
and pressure. It intends to discover, through interviews and analysis of the current 
5 
legislation, whether the judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction in all judicial matters in 
Jordan. The United Nations' Basic Principles for the Independence of the Judiciary is 
used here to help to approach the vast and complex object. The Basic Principles 
approaches the independence through six categories, which enables us to highlight 
those elements with any possible shortcomings. Due to the complexity of judicial 
independence another distinction will be used here; analysis of the 6 categories of 
the Basic Principles will be done in two sections. The analysis will be based on the 
distinction of structural and decisional independence. The chapter starts with 
presenting the existing legal system, in order to find out whether the structure of the 
legal system enables the independence of the judiciary, then moving on to 
examination of the decisional independence. 
Chapter Eight examines political participation in Jordan between 1989 and 2003. The 
focus is on parliamentary elections, political associations and press freedoms. 
Political participation will be approached through existing legislation, the constitution 
included, and implementation of the legislation. How has the legislation changed 
since 1989, if at all? Have there been any changes in citizens' participation and even 
in their perceptions of the possibilities offered to them? 
The aim of final chapter is to provide a detailed answer to the research question: can 
the political changes be understood as democratisation. Chapter Nine aims to offer a 
summary of the political changes and their impact on the political system in Jordan. 
Has the political system really changed since 1989? If the political system has been 
changing, can the process rightly seen as political liberalisation or even 
democratisation? Has transfer of political power occurred in Jordan, and if has what 
has been the role of the rule of law in this process? It is argued here that there have 
been no significant improvements in the rule of law situation in Jordan. Neither has 
transfer of political power occurred since 1989. Therefore, the only conclusion to 
draw is to say that the political changes in Jordan are not democratisation. 
The data used in this study has been collected in Amman, Jordan during the spring 
2003. The primary data was collected mainly by interviewing key actors: legal 
experts, politicians, journalists and civil society actors. The interviews were 
6 
conducted in English, with the exception of the interviews of Farouq Kilani and 
Ahmad Shunnaq. The full list of interviews conducted can be found in the 
Bibliography. Both the Bibliography and footnotes are composed in accordance with 
the University of Durham Library's Guidelines. When analysing the pieces of 
legislation English translations are used, including the 1952 constitution and the 
constitution in force. With the exception of the Press and Publications law, the legal 
documents used are official translations. The Press and Publications law was 
translated by Sae'da Kilani. Also some articles in Arabic, which were received from 
interviewees, have been translated into English. 
The transliteration of Arabic terms is done following the modified Encyclopedia of 
Islam system. 2 The macrons and dots are omitted from personal names, names of 
political parties and organisations and titles of books. For example, the names of the 
Hashemite kings used within the study are Hussein and Abdullah. The exceptions to 
the above-mentioned transliteration rules are place names with accepted English 
spellings and names of political leaders and cultural figures, which are spelled in 
following English norms. Also the words listed in unabridged English dictionary are 
written without indication of 'ayn or hamza. It is worth noting that all the sources used 
are written using the Roman alphabet, thus hardly any transliteration was required as 
such. Furthermore, when reviewing the existing literature this study is using the 
terms as transliterated by the authors. In the case of several authors transliterating 
the same terms in different ways, the most common transliteration is used. The 
names of the interviewees are written according to the preferences of the 
interviewees themselves. 
2 Following this transliteration system qaf is written as q (not k), jim as j (not dj), the roman double 
letter consonants are not underlined, and the letter I in the definite article al is not assimilated into the 
word it is defining, to marbuta is indicated as a instead of ah. 
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1. STUDYING POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 
Introduction 
Since the late 1980s a fair deal of scholarly work has been produced on the political 
changes associated with the third wave of democratisation. The only island in the 
developing world untouched by the great waves of democratisation is the Arab 
Middle East (AME). Contemporary political life in the Arab Middle East has been 
characterised as an "uninterrupted rule of authoritarian leaders". 3 The continuity of 
authoritarian rule has been possible through family succession, the foundation of 
which was established in the early post-colonial years. Some of the Arab dynasties 
were deposed later, but a majority of the ruling dynasties have since been able to 
consolidate their power. 4 The rulers have succeeded in doing this primarily by 
concentrating the power in hands of a few, a small ruling elite. 5 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Arab states have not been at the centre of the 
contemporary democracy discourse. According to a majority of writers reviewing the 
recent major research projects on democratisation, the Middle East6 has gained 
relatively little attention. 7 Brynen (et al) claims that throughout the 1980s transition 
theorists and comparativists ignored the Middle East, as did Western area specialists 
and the Middle Eastern scholars. Western scholars saw nothing worthy of research, 
and scholars within the region were preoccupied with other topics or considered 
democracy too risky a topic to tackle. 8 Since the early 1990s, however, there has 
been a growing academic interest in the Middle East. Middle Eastern exceptionalism, 
3 Salame, Small is Pluralistic: democracy as an instrument of civil peace(2001), p. 1. 
4 Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State(1993), p. 124. 
5 Owen, State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East(1992), p. 46. 
6 The term 'Middle East' is used here when referring to a region sometimes referred as 'Middle East 
and North Africa'. The definition of Middle East therefore includes the Arab countries in North Africa 
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) but excludes Sudan. Iran and Turkey, the non-Arab 
states in this dissertation are not included, as the focus here is on the Arab countries of the region. 
Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy? (2001), p. 325; Tessler, Islam and Democracy in the Middle 
East(2001), p. 5; Addi, Political Islam and democracy: the case of Algeria(1997), p. 105; Brynen, Rex 
and Korany, Bahgat and Noble, Paul, Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalization 
and Democratization(1995), p. 5. Majority refers to the 'world-wide' research projects on 'transitions' 
by O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies(1986) and by Diamond, Larry and Marks, Gerry (eds. ), Re- 
examining Democracy: Essaus in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset(1989) 
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the alleged immunity (or hostility) of the region to democratisation has drawn 
mounting attention. The debate on exceptionalism is something that cannot be 
avoided when studying political developments in the Arab Middle East. In the 1980s 
and the 1990s demands and hopes for democratisation increased both 
internationally and domestically while democratisation processes were occurring in 
other developing countries. However, while the developments elsewhere bred 
optimism, the most striking event in the political field in the Arab Middle East was the 
emergence of the Islamic revivalism, and particularly the Iranian Islamic revolution in 
1979.9 
This chapter aims to present the central arguments for the exceptionalism followed 
by the responses given. Regarding the critique directed at the exceptionalists, only 
the general lines will be presented here, as a detailed critique would be beyond the 
scope of the chapter. The purpose of the chapter is not to provide a detailed list of 
the weaknesses of each individual piece of work, but a general idea of the 
exceptionalism debate. This is done in order to find what this literature can offer to 
this study and if there is something exceptional that has to be taken into account 
when studying the Arab Middle East. The body of literature will be here approached 
with the help of Sami Zubaida's classification. According to Zubaida, there are two 
types of positions among exceptionalists: cultural and historical "essentialism" and 
"developmental ism"' 0. Essentialists view that there is something unique in the history 
and/or the culture in the Arab Middle East determining the cause of political 
development. The developmentalist position considers that there are certain 
historical processes and stages of development, linked to international developments 
that will take place in all societies. " The essentialist arguments are presented first, 
followed by the developmentalist ones. 
8 Brynen et a/ (1995), p. 5. 
9 Sadowski, The orientalism and the democracy debate(1997), p. 34; Bakhash, The Prospects for 
Democratization in the Middle East(1993), p. 157. Brynen (et al) remark that 'exceptional ism' in 
relation to the lack of democratisation has not been limited to the Middle Eastern context; there are 
similar arguments presented regarding other religions/cultures (e. g. Catholicism, Confucianism). 
Brynen et al (1995). 
10 Zubaida (1993), p. 122. 
" Zubaida (1993), pp. 122-123. 
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1.1. Essentialist Arguments 
Political culture as an explanation for the Arab Middle East is lack of democracy, 
whether moulded by Islam or Arab culture, or both, emphasises the ideological 
(ideational) side of political behaviour. This body of literature examines idea(l)s more 
appealing to Arabs than democracy (whether originating from Islam, Arabism, 
tribalism), thus assuming values to be primary driving forces in political life. Some 
scholars argue that the resistance of democratic ideas in the Arab Middle East is due 
to certain values, beliefs and attitudes predominant in the Arab and/or the Islamic 
culture. Regarding the current debate, those values and beliefs are considered 
antithetical to democratic principles. 12 
The main essentialist argument is the incompatible nature of Arab culture with 
democracy. Arabs are seen as irrational ("rude, proud and ambitious and eager to be 
the leader")13, and Arab culture is being plagued by a conspiratorial mentality and 
primordialism, in contrast to modern or post-modern characteristics of the residents 
of established democracies. 14 Kedourie, among others, assumes that, due to the 
nature of the Arab culture, a vibrant civil society is not possible in the Middle East. 15 
Claims of Arab culture's non-democratic nature are often based on a "trans- 
historical"16 view of Arab politics: traditions are seen to be to determining factors in 
political life. Values and attitudes uncongenial for democratic developments have 
been evolving through history. It is argued that history has made Arabs consider 
dictatorship as a norm: taught them to play according undemocratic rules and also 
expect others to do so. " Talbi claims that Oriental Despotism, an age old tradition in 
the Arab world, differs from the despotic governance elsewhere as it has not yet 
been replaced by democratic procedures. 18 Ayubi argues, however, that the 
historical Islamic state was a direct democracy of a kind. However, over time the 
12 Brynen et al (1995), p. 6; al-Suwaidi, Arab and Western Conceptions of Democracy(1995), pp. 85- 
86. 
13 Patai, the Arab Mind(1973), p. 20. 
14 Brynen et al (1995), p. 7. See also Hudson (1995a). 
15 Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture(1992), p. 15. See also Milton-Edwards, 
Contemporary Politics in the Middle East(2000), p. 156. 
16 Salame (2001), p. 4. 
17 Salame (2001), p. 4. 
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system was transformed, as first the practice of shura (consultation) was abandoned 
and the other elements (bay'a, `aqd) not long after. 19 Therefore, scholarly efforts 
should be focusing, suggests Ayubi, on the reasons why the system of the state was 
turned into a despotic state. 20 Esposito and Voll point out that the Middle Eastern 
countries have common characteristics, but also each one of them has a unique 
history. 21 
Some authors have aimed to offer explanations as to why traditional culture has 
proved resistant in the Arab societies. It is worth noting that, for the majority of 
contributors to the exceptionalist debate, Islam is a/the main explanatory factor in the 
`evolution' of Arab culture. Thus the Islam versus democracy debate is at the centre 
of the essentialist literature. Elie Kedourie claims that democracy is alien to the 
Middle East, as "there is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world - which 
are the political traditions of Islam - which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, 
the organising ideas of constitutional and representative government". 22 The 
arguments claiming Islam to be the main or the sole contributor to the immunity of 
the Arab countries to democratic principles, or modernity in general, are based on 
what is seen as the `essence' of Islam or on particular precepts of Islam. Some, 
mainly classical orientalists, see Islam as an all-encompassing philosophy, a way of 
life. 23 According to Mehran Kamrava, Islam is the only ideology that "meticulously 
constructed a social and cultural, as well as political, universe of its own". 24 Kamrava 
argues that in the Muslim Middle East "Islam is reality" with the result that Islam 
"naturally lends itself to political expressions". 25 Some see the universalism of Islam 
as the root of its incompatibility with Western values. The faith of Islam is not 
confined to a certain group of followers or to a certain territory, but to all and 
18 Talbi, A Record of Failure. Arabs and Democracy(2000), p. 59. 
19 The tri-partite principle of shura consisted of `aqd (ruler-ruled contract) and bay'a (oath of 
allegiance). Ayubi, Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab Worid(1997), p. 13; Leca (2001), p. 
60. 
20 Ayubi (1997), pp. 347-348. 
21 Esposito & Voll, Islam and Democracy(1996), p. 4. 
22 Kedourie (1992), p. 5. 
23 Bill and Springborg, Politics in the Middle East(2000), p. 34; Huntington (1991), pp. 307-309. See 
also Kamrava, Democracy in the Balance(1998). 
24 Kamrava (1998), p. 170. 
25 Kamrava (1998), p. 171. Kamrava refers to the studies by Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society(1981); 
Bassam Tibi, Islam and Cultural Accommodation of Social Change(1990) and Max Thornburg, People 
and Policy in the Middle East(1964). 
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everywhere regardless of race, nationality and place of origins. All believers belong 
to the same polity, the community of believers (umma al-lslamiyya). Thus the 
concept of umma contradicts the Western idea of nation-state, making Islam 
incompatible with nationalism. In this respect, Zionism, Bill and Springborg argue, 
has "a clear advantage over Islam". 26 According to Samuel Huntington, the 
comprehensiveness of Islam excludes one of the key elements of modernisation: the 
separation of church and state. Islam makes no distinction between the political and 
religious spheres, as Islam is seen both as a religion and a state (al-Islam din wa- 
dawla). 27 
There seems, however, to be no consensus on the exact impact of Islam on political 
life. The older generation of orientalists argued that Islam has made the Arab 
societies too weak and the states too strong. Islam, a religion calling for submission 
of the believers, has promoted a culture of 'quietism', silent acceptance of 
authoritarian rule. 28 Nevertheless, the Iranian revolution in 1979 elucidated that the 
societies were not as weak, or as submissive, as assumed. The neo-orientalists 
reversed the argument: it is not the state that is too strong, but the society. "Tribes, 
mullahs and mamluks" are too powerful in relation to the state, which is getting 
weaker and weaker due to growing economic problems. 29 
One of the main problems with the essentialist arguments on the significance of 
Islam is the "assumption of univocality". 30 Huntington, for instance, refers to the 
Islamic doctrine, as do Bill and Springborg ("the organization of Islam, like its political 
26 Bill and Springborg (2000), p. 33. 
27 Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century(1991), p. 307. 
Huntington has been criticised making too far-reaching conclusions based on a study measuring 
correlations between religions and democratic governing systems. Another weakness is the limited 
use of sources: only one reference was used when defining the 'Islamic doctrine', a one by 
acknowledged orientalist. Huntington himself, however, has since modified his widely criticised views 
about Islam's antidemocratic nature, and now argues that there could be elements incompatible and 
compatible to democracy. Despite the shortcomings of his (early) work, Huntington's impact on the 
exceptionalism debate has been remarkable; his work are the 'best-sellers' of contemporary political 
science and widely cited outside the academia. 
28 Sadowski (1997), p. 35. See also Kamrava (1998). A classical Islamic scholar al-Ghazali (d. 1111) 
is often cited to back the claim of orthodox Islam promoting 'queitism'. According to al-Ghazali, a 
despotic ruler is better than anarchy. 
29 Sadowski (1997), pp. 40-41. 
30 Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations"(2000), p. 44. 
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doctrine"). 31 As Western Christianity has been multivocal in relation to democracy, it 
would not be logical to examine other religions in a different manner. 32 Even those 
scholars who focus on particular precepts of Islam when explaining the 'immunity', or 
`hostility', of Islam to modernisation fail to recognise the diversity within Islam. There 
are fundamental disagreements among Islamic scholars, and among Islamist 
movements, on how political life should be organised. There is no consensus among 
Islamic scholars, classical and contemporary, on any formula for political 
governance, thus there can be no agreement on democracy and its compatibility with 
Islam either (or democracy's desirability). 33 Islam has been used to justify several 
forms of governance: democracy, dictatorship, republicanism and monarchy. 34 
Furthermore, the contemporary (self-claiming) `Islamic states' differ from each other 
and do not recognise each other's Islamic nature. 35 
This study is in an agreement with scholars who are claiming that the doctrinal 
foundation of Islam, or any other religion, does not matter as much as assumed. It is 
argued that Islam, or any other religion, cannot seen as pro- or anti-democratic, as 
no religion takes sides on political matters. The ways Islam is interpreted matter and 
the use of religious concepts ought to be the focus of (further) studies. 36 Esposito 
and Voll remark that in Western Europe the "reconceptualization of premodern 
institutions"37 was at the core of the democratisation processes. There are concepts 
once of `pre-modern' nature that have `democratic' meaning today. Therefore, it 
cannot be assumed that some parts of the world would be totally immune to 
democracy (idea and practice). What matters are the ways various actors interpret 
the concepts (indigenous dimensions interact). 38 
31 Huntington (1991), p. 307; Bill and Springborg (2000), p. 36. 
32 Stepan (2000), p. 44. 
33 Ayubi (1997), p. 349; Esposito and Piscatori, Democratization and lslam(1991), p. 434. 
34 Esposito and Piscatori (1991), p. 434. 
35 Esposito and Voll (1996), pp. 45-50; Ayubi (1997), p. 356. See also Kamrava (1998) and Addi 
Q 1997). 
6 Esposito and Voll (1996), pp. 23-27; Kamrava (1998), p. 22; Engineer, The Islamic State(1994), p. 
86; Binder, Exceptionalism and Authenticity: The Question of Islam and Democracy(1998), p. 48-49. 
When considering democratisation in Southern Europe, Huntington stressed the significance of 
transforming Catholicism, which he saw as the main obstacle. 
37 Esposito and Voll (1996), p. 22. 
38 Esposito and Voll (1996), p. 22. See also Abed, 1995,119. Abed stresses that transformation of 
concepts by Islamic scholars have occurred before. 
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The notion of secularism as being a central requirement of democracy has been 
criticised for several reasons. There are some who see secularisation as a historical 
process that has already transformed the Arab societies. Ansary-Filaly argues that 
the term `secularisation' has a negative connotation in the Arab Middle Eastern 
context, as it is associated with atheism. Yet, it does not mean that secularisation is 
a process unknown in the region. According to Ansary-Filaly, signs are there: Islamic 
law has been replaced by positive law, new modern institutions have been adopted 
and the values of the people have been transformed. 39 It is also argued that 
democratisation does not necessarily require secularisation. There is not enough 
empirical evidence from the established democracies supporting the claim of the 
necessity of secularism and the separation of church and state for democratisation. 
In some European democracies there are established churches, and nearly in every 
4o EU country there are (at least de facto) religious parties. 
Furthermore, studies conducted in North America and in Western Europe on the 
relationship between normative beliefs and political behaviour have produced mixed 
results. In the North American context religious values have shown a connection to 
political conservatism and support for militarism, whereas some European studies 
have found a link between religious values and internationalism and support for 
development aid. Regarding the Middle East, there have been only a few attempts to 
examine the impact of religious values on political behaviour. Mark Tessler argues, 
after conducting studies on the relationship between (religious) values and political 
behaviour in Algeria, Morocco, Palestine and Egypt, that religious (Islamic) values do 
not have as great an impact as has been assumed. Tessler claims, however, that 
secular societies might differ from non-secular ones. He thinks that in religious 
societies religious values do not seem to have a connection with political 
conservatism, unlike in secular societies. Therefore, comparisons with the Western 
countries might not be appropriate. There is still not enough empirical evidence on 
the impact of religious values (or normative beliefs in general) on political behaviour, 
not from other regions and especially not from the Middle East. 41 However, it is worth 
39 Filaly-Ansary, 1999,19-20 and 24. See also Salame (2001), p. 7. 
40 Stepan (2000), p. 40. 
4' Tessler, Islam and Democracy in the Middle East(2002), pp. 5-6. 
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noting that the studies on values as being the factor responsible for the 
incompatibility of Islam with democracy seem to be suggesting that values are 
permanent. Currently it is widely recognised within social science literature that 
values are transformable. 
The normative literature on the compatibility of Islam with democracy, Binder argues, 
is concentrated on doctrinal questions. Some see that there are no reasons to 
discuss the possibility of democracy, others view the proving of the compatibility of 
Islam with democracy as the only necessity. Either way, assuming that democracy is 
`Islamic' or Islam `democratic', does not say much as to how democratisation may be 
possible. The majority of scholars have been basing their claims on an assumption 
that normative beliefs do drive politics. This leads to the question of the foundation of 
normative beliefs. According to Binder, the assumption of normative beliefs as a 
driving force of politics is based on an idea of normative beliefs as "product of acts of 
cognition and states of consciousness"42. Yet there is an alternative view of 
normative beliefs being shaper by "strategic interaction". 43 In either case normative 
beliefs are not God-given or permanent constructs, but merely products of conscious 
human intervention. 
There are also "essentialists" who agree that political changes have taken place in 
the Arab Middle East, but that the impact of the changes has been unique. Hisham 
Sharabi argues that modernisation in the region has not, unlike in Europe, replaced 
traditional, patriarchal structures, but strengthened them. 44 The reason for this is a 
stalled course of development that has stopped half way between traditional and 
modern. 45 According to Sharabi, Arab societies can be characterised as neo- 
patriarchal: societies with some modern (material) trimmings yet with traditional 
values. 46 Neo-patriarchal societies are decentralised, the people being dependent on 
smaller social entities like clans, tribes and families. 47 Sharabi considers the secret 
police that exists alongside the "military-bureaucratic structure" to be the most 
42 Binder (1998), p. 41. 
43 Binder (1998), p. 41. 
as Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: a theory of distorted change in Arab society(1988), pp. 4-5. 
45 Sharabi (1988), p. 8. 
46 Sharabi (1988), p. 9. 
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developed institution in the Arab states. The petty bourgeoisie is "incapable of 
carrying out the tasks either bourgeoisie or proletariat". 48 The processes of capitalism 
unique to the Middle East have led to the emergence of neo-patriarchal societies. 
Sharabi assumes, influenced by Marx and Weber, that capitalism is the force 
required for transforming societies. Unfortunately for the Middle East, the world 
market is a western dominated sphere, hindering the positive developments and 
departures from neo-patriarchies witnessed elsewhere. 49 
Sharabi is not alone; others (e. g. Pryce-Jones, Bill and Springborg) have 
emphasised the patriarchal structures of the Arab societies. Anderson considers, 
however, patrimonialist theory to be insufficient in explaining the impacts of current 
trends of migration and population growth in the Arab societies. 50 The theory of neo- 
patriarchy acknowledges that Arab societies are capable of transforming themselves. 
It is not Arabs, or the local culture, stopping or distorting the course of development 
but the structures of the world economy. Therefore, it can be suggested that only 
changes in the world economy would bring some winds of change to neo-patriarchal 
systems. Whether such changes would take place one day is another matter. More 
importantly, it is stressed here that Arab societies are thus not utterly static, as some 
signs of transformations have already been observed. Thus, it is logical to assume 
that when the appropriate conditions are met, Arab societies will change. If the 
structure of the world economy is seen as the main factor hindering the development 
in the Middle East, as Sharabi and others suggest, it should have the same effect on 
the other developing countries. 
Despite the numerous efforts to examine the lack of democratisation in the Middle 
East the results have not been encouraging, and many questions are unanswered. 51 
Many of the studies are "riddled with logical flaws and methodological 
obscurantism"52, some even with ethnocentrism and racism. 53 The literature on Arab 
47 Sharabi (1988), p. 7. 
48 Sharabi (1988), p. 9. 
49 Sharabi (1988), p. 5. 
50 Anderson (1995b), pp. 84-85. 
51 Brynen et al (1995), p. 6; Esposito and Piscatori (1991), p. 428; Zubaida (1993), p. 122. 
52 Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World(1997), p. 9. 
53 Krämer, Islam and Pluralism(1995a), p. 113; Ghadbian (1997), p. 3; Hudson (1995a), p. 61 
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culture is criticised for several weaknesses: reductionism, ethnocentrism, "gross 
overgeneralisation", "crude Orientalism", "Eurocentric chauvinism", "anthropologic 
reductionism" and "media sound-bites". 54Furthermore, some notions are "vulgarised" 
and used for political purposes, like those presented by Kedourie and Pryce-Jones. 55 
Lisa Anderson accuses the literature of "violating the ordinary conventions of social 
science methodology". For instance, Anderson refers to a work by Pryce-Jones 
primarily based on "anecdotal evidence". 56 
In spite of the various shortcomings of the existing body of literature, some writers 
call for the revival of studies of political culture. Michael Hudson refers to the 
weaknesses of political economy pointing out that values have an impact on rational 
choice and economical considerations. 57 For Hudson, political culture might function 
as the "indispensable linking concept" between political science and area studies. 58 
Bearing in mind the earlier caveats, students of area studies should be aware that 
political culture is not only horizontal and vertical (mass, sub and elite cultures), but 
also multi-layered (formal ideologies, individual opinions and attitudes, collective 
values). This places certain methodological requirements, aiming at more 
multifaceted use of methods: texts, interviews, survey data, historical narratives. 59 
However, the critical question is still the unscientific nature of political culture. 
Measuring tradition, or the impact of religion on attitudes, is challenging when 
dealing with another cultural reality. As Lisa Anderson points out, political culture 
cannot be ignored, but yet methodological problems are still evident. 60 Most of the 
scholars participating in the debate on exceptionalism see that no conclusive results, 
however needed, have been reached. 61 The significance of the debate, as suggested 
by Milton-Edwards, is that important themes that need further attention have 
emerged. 62 More importantly, there is no disagreement on the insufficient quantity of 
54 Hudson (1995a), p. 61. 
55 Hudson (1995a), pp. 61- 66. 
56 Anderson (1995b), pp. 78 and 82. 
57 Hudson (1995a), pp. 64-65. 
58 Hudson (1995a), p. 65. 
59 Hudson (1995a), p. 73. 
60 Anderson (1995b), pp. 89-90. 
61 Ghadbian (1997), p. 3. 
62 Milton-Edwards (2000), p. 147. Milton-Edwards suggests six themes: Arab/Islamic civilisation, 
political liberalisation, economic liberalisation, civil society, Islam and the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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research on the factors hindering (or preventing) and promoting democratisation in 
the Middle East. 63 
63 Brynen et al (1995), pp. 8-9; Deegan, Middle East and Problems of Democracy (1993), pp. 13-14: 
Tessler (2002), pp. 3-4 and p. 9; Hudson (1995a), p. 69. 
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1.2. Developmentalist Arguments 
Developmentalist explanations stress the significance of structural and economic 
factors for the lack of political development in the region. 64 This group of arguments 
does not see values as the primary driving force for human behaviour. It is not the 
degree of economic development achieved that matters, but the processes of 
economic development, and their consequences on the structures of society. A 
primary aim is to discover the elements essential for political development that are 
absent in the Arab Middle East. The focus has been on two elements: class 
structures and the primary sources of income for national economies. 
The absence of the "entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, 65 in Arab societies is considered by 
some to be the reason for the stability of the authoritarian systems. This argument is 
based on the view of the order of the development in the established democracies. 
Democratisation in Europe was largely due to the activism of the entrepreneurial 
bourgeoisie. In the Middle East all the groups historically essential for 
democratisation are significantly different, as they are tied to the state. 66 
Furthermore, the structure of the society as a whole differs remarkably from that of 
the `Western European model'. There are "state bourgeoisies" and "state 
intelligentsias", as well as fragmented private bourgeoisies. 67 Members of Arab 
middle classes are (financially) dependent on the state and thus have vested 
interests in maintaining the domestic status quo. According to Roger Owen, the 
entrepreneurial classes are more likely to use their influence on the government to 
secure their own interests than to pressure for political developments. 68 The 
ambiguous stance of the middle classes towards democratisation is not unique for 
64 Sharabi's neo-patriarchy is related to this debate, as he has examined the impact of the 
development processes (stalled modernisation processes) on the 'mentality' of the people. However, 
developmentalist arguments are interested in the structures of societies. 
65 Waterbury, Democracy without Democrats?: the potential liberalization in the Middle East(2001), p. 
28. 
66 Harik, Pluralism in the Arab World(1996), pp. 280-283. 
67 Waterbury (2001), p. 27. 
68 Owen, Socio-economic Change and Political Mobilization: the case of Egypt(2001), p. 192. 
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the Middle East. Exceptional is, stresses Waterbury, the dependency of middle 
classes on the state compared to the other `democratising' regions. 69 
Co-optation of the middle classes has been possible through external rents received 
by states. The role of the state in a rentier state70 differs fundamentally from a 
conventional modern (Western) state. The citizens of a rentier state are unlikely to 
make demands for political representation, as long as their (material) needs are 
fulfilled. " In a rentier state "only a few are engaged in the generation of this wealth, 
the majority being involved only in the distribution or utilization of it". 72 A crucial 
element of rentierism is the productivity of its citizens. A state with a high degree of 
import revenues does not qualify as a rentier state, as the majority of citizens are 
involved in generating the revenues. 73 The form of accruing revenues creates a 
"rentier mentality". This mentality differs from conventional "work-reward" logic, as 
rewards are "situational or accidental". 74 The role of oiI75 has been central to the 
theory of rentierism. In the Middle Eastern oil states external rents cover 90 to 95 
percent of state budgets. Also, only 2 to 3 percent of the labour force is involved in 
creating the rents. 76 Nevertheless not all Middle Eastern states are rentier states, 
currently only the Gulf states are justified in carrying the label. Furthermore, the 
economic diversity among the Arab states is remarkable. Yet there are rentier 
economies receiving rents as workers remittances or as foreign aid from the oil 
states. " 
69 Waterbury (2001), p. 27. 
70 The pioneering study on renterism in the Middle East was conducted by Mahdavy, and later 
modified by Beblawi and Luciani. See Anderson (1995c, ) p. 29fn; Ross (2001), p. 329. 
" Luciani, The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization(2001), p. 132. 
72 Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World(1988), p. 51. Beblawi stresses that defining rentier 
state is not straightforward, as there is no `pure' rentier economies. However, a distinction between 
rentier state and economy is clear: in rentier state the state is the principal recipient of the external 
rents while in a rentier economy the minority creating the revenues enjoys the revenues. 
73 Beblawi (1988), p. 51. A class earning major part its income as domestic rents can be considered 
as rentier class, yet the state cannot be seen as a rentier state. 
74 Beblawi (1988), p. 52. 
75 Michael Ross' quantitative and statistical analysis shows a strong correlation ("valid and statistically 
robust") between lack of democratisation and oil. Ross stresses that the findings prove not to be a 
Middle Eastern feature: it is not only oil, but also "nonfuel mineral wealth" in general that obstructs 
political development. Ross (2001), p. 356. 
6 Beblawi (1988), p. 53. 
'' Luciani, Resources, Revenues, and Authoritarianism in the Arab World: Beyond the Rentier 
State? (1995), pp. 212-214. 
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The question of taxation is an integral part of this debate. Lisa Anderson, among 
others, argues that the absence of political representation can be explained by the 
absence of taxation. Historically states' increased reliance on taxing the subjects has 
led to increased political representation. In the Middle East, on the contrary, with 
external rents being the main source for government's revenues, there is little need 
for (heavy) taxation. Once the state is economically supporting the citizens, there is 
little justification, and few demands, for accountability. 78 Waterbury, however, 
disputes this explanation. There are states in Asia with heavy taxation and very little 
representation. Furthermore, compared to the rest of the developing world, the 
citizens in the Middle East are not more fortunate to be less taxed. On the contrary, 
the rates of taxation in many countries in the region are higher than elsewhere in the 
developing world. The Middle Eastern states are, however, undertaxed compared to 
European states. 79 An important element of Anderson's argument, Waterbury points 
out, is the nature of taxes. Indirect taxation contributes the biggest share to the tax 
revenues in many states in the region. Therefore, citizens by and large might be 
8° unaware of the taxes they are paying. 
The necessity for taxation in the Arab states, given financial realities, is changing. 
The golden age of rentierism started to wane in the mid-1980s, shifting the focus of 
the scholarly debate to the future of rentier economies. 81 Many Arab states are facing 
fiscal crises with the declining revenues and "over-dependence on unearned oil- 
based incomes". 82 As rentier economies have a cyclical nature, the rentier 
economies are prone to fiscal crisis. Fiscal crises are hitting hard, particularly on the 
states relying on indirect rents. 83 Fiscal crises are considered as potentially providing 
an opening for democratisation. When states are facing severe financial problems 
and fear a degradation of their legitimacy, there are three ways to tackle the fiscal 
crises. States can choose between cutting expenditures, increasing taxation or 
relying on deficit spending. The last option has proved the most attractive. Yet the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been promoting policies of 
78 Anderson (1995a), p. 64. See also Beblawi (1988), pp. 53-54, Waterbury (2001), p. 29. 
79 Waterbury (2001), p. 29. 
80 Waterbury (2001), p. 30. 
81 Sivan (1997), p. 104. 
82 Ehteshami and Murphy (1996), p. 759. 
83 Luciani (1995), p. 214. 
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structural adjustments. Luciani claims those fiscal crises are closely connected to 
structural adjustments. 84 This situation has inspired some scholars to figure out 
possible solutions. El Sayid points out that democratisation has often co-incidenced 
with fiscal crises. Citizens are hit hard by the deteriorating economies, their views of 
current regime are changing, and they are demanding reforms. 85 Another peculiarity 
in the Middle Eastern is the durability of these structures. In other `developing' 
countries, however, the structure did not prove persistent. 86 
84 Luciani (1995), pp. 211-213. 
85 Leca, Democratization in the Arab World: uncertainty, vulnerability and legitimacy. A tentative 
conceptualization and some hypotheses(2001), p. 61. 
Brumberg, Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World(1995), p. 229. 
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Summary 
Contributors in the exceptionalism debate have been looking for either something 
that exists only in the Arab Middle East or something that exists everywhere else but 
not in the Arab Middle East - whether these elements are attitudes, mentalities, 
socio-economic development processes or sources of state revenue. Not a great 
number of these studies have succeeded in making great discoveries. On the 
contrary, some of the studies are even worryingly ignorant of some common 
principles of the social sciences. Not only have many writers failed to define the basic 
concepts used (e. g. democracy, secularism), but some also appear to have been 
ideologically motivated. The role of secularism in democratisation is a good example. 
Some authors seem to focus merely on finding `evidence' to back their arguments, 
whether to prove the existence, or the absence, of secularism in the Arab Middle 
East. Often signs for secularism, or lack of them, are described, although there is 
little, or even no, explanations on the (in)significance of secularism. 
This chapter was looking for anything that can be used for the purposes of this study, 
not to find answers for the alleged exceptional nature of Arab Middle East per se. 
Will studying Islam, political culture or rentierism in Jordan reveal the nature of the 
political changes since the late 1980s, and their significance to the kingdom's 
political development? Disappointingly, the reviewed literature offers very little: the 
theory of rentierism seems most relevant in this context. The significance of socio- 
economic factors is acknowledged also outside the Arab Middle East. Furthermore, 
Jordan is a classic semi-rentier state; the rents consisting of expatriate earnings, 
foreign financial assistance and small-scale oil production. 87 The dependence on 
external rents is remarkable, but the central government is not the direct recipient of 
the rents, unlike in rentier states (such as the Gulf oil-producers). 88 However, as 
mentioned earlier, the economic reality in the Middle East has been changing since 
the mid-1980s and the theory of the rentier state has been losing some of its 
strength. 
87 Brynen, The Politics of Monarchial Liberalism: Jordan(1998), p. 72. 
88 Brand, Economic and Political Liberalization in a Rentier State: The Case of Jordan(1992), p. 168; 
Schlumberger, Transition to Development (2002a), p. 226. 
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It is not argued here that political culture does not deserve the scholarly attention 
called for by Hudson and others. The findings of this study will hopefully contribute to 
the future studies on Jordanian political culture, which is here seen not only as a 
wider subject but also somewhat different topic to be studied. However, it is stressed 
here that the argument of Islam as the blockage for political development is not 
sustainable, as many scholars have shown. When examining the impact of 
normative beliefs on the political sphere, it is believed here, the most essential 
question is the origins, or the source, of beliefs. Islam as a belief system, as 
mentioned earlier, is not univocal. Islam has been seen as the opinions of the clergy, 
the opinions of the believers, or as behaviour of the either of these groups, or of the 
political rulers of Muslim societies or of the followers of Islamist movements. Thus, 
there are a number of actors significant in constructing `Islam', as a belief system 
and, perhaps more importantly, as a political force. The history of the Arab Middle 
Eastern societies, as well as the observation/s of contemporary `Islamic' politics, has 
shown that religious concepts have been a matter of `innovative' reading. Again it is 
highlighted that studying normative beliefs is not the primary object of this 
dissertation; the aim is not to study the attitudes of Jordanians, but political changes 
within the political system in the country. This is, nevertheless, not to argue that 
normative beliefs have no significance in politics. 
It is suggested here that the focus when examining political development should be 
on elements more `political'. Students searching for the prospects for 
democratisation in the Middle East should thus be focusing on the `political game', as 
suggested by Leonard Binder. The same applies when studying political life in 
Jordan. When scholars studying political developments elsewhere have examined 
political actors and the structures and functioning of political systems, a great 
number of scholars focusing on the Arab Middle East have been examine 
significantly different elements. The major research projects examining the third 
wave of democratisation studied the main actors and the structures of the political 
systems. 89 In the Arab Middle East a great deal of scholarly attention has been 
devoted in studying beliefs and attitudes, and belief systems. Thus Jean Leca's 
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suggestion to bring the Arab Middle East back to the comparative studies of 
democratisation sounds more than necessary. 90 The basic requirement again is to 
study the same elements that are studied elsewhere. This is not to argue that there 
have been absolutely no significant studies made on the Arab Middle East. 91 Yet 
these cannot be seen as the cornerstones of the exceptionalism debate, but rather a 
very welcome addition to the Middle Eastern Studies. 
Politics, understood here as the pursuit of power and the use of it, is more or less a 
human driven process. Normative beliefs are not God-given, but products of 
intentional human intervention and thus not permanent constructions. If concepts are 
seen as tools of persuasion, more accurate questions are ones asking who is 
interpreting the central concepts and why. It is thus suggested here that the focus 
should be on the political system in question, the main actors within the system in 
particular. In the case of Jordan, it will be noteworthy to see whether any changes in 
the power structures have taken place since 1989 and whether the relationships 
between the main actors have altered. Bearing in mind what has been argued about 
the role of Islam within the literature on exceptionalism it will be interesting to see 
whether religious rhetoric or religious actors have had a role in the political changes 
in the Hashemite kingdom. 
To avoid conceptual vagueness, a sin too many have committed, is one of the aims 
of this dissertation. Thus defining the key terms used within this study is a very 
important task and will be done next, prior to moving on to the study of the changes 
themselves. The next chapter will search for a working definition of democracy and 
the rule of law, as well as discuss the linkages between these two terms. 
89 O'Donnell et al (1986) and Diamond et a/ (1989). 
90 Leca (2001), p. 75. 
91 Brynen (et al), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab 
World(1998) Volumes 1 and 
2. Salame (ed. ), Democracy without Democrats. The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World(2001). 
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2. DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature on democracy in order to define the 
key concepts around which this study will be constructed. This review will bring to the 
reader's attention the relevance of the concept of the rule of law when defining 
democracy itself, and the importance of establishing the precise nature of the 
relationship between the two concepts. The first part of the chapter focuses on the 
contemporary discourse on democracy by studying the challenges faced in defining 
the term, while the second part of the chapter identifies the role played by the rule of 
law and the relationship between the concepts. 
Owing to the popularity of `democracy', there is a massive body of literature to 
review. Therefore, it is not possible, or relevant, to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the existing literature. The same also applies to the discourse on the rule of law. 
Thus, instead of one body of literature, there are two vast bodies of literature to 
review. The aim in both cases is to focus on the most commonly applied definitions 
to identify their weaknesses and strengths, to help us to find workable definitions of 
democracy and the rule of law for the purposes of this study. 
It is worth remembering that the object of the study is the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan: a modern92 state in the "non-originating" world. Hence the emphasis here is 
on definitions understanding democracy as a political system of modern state. 
Furthermore, the objective is to find definitions appropriate to be applied in the 
context of "non-originating" countries, in which political systems are not established 
democracies, often not even democracies at all. Also, the latter part of this chapter 
aims is to identify the state of the studies on the rule of law in the Arab 
Middle East. 
92 The word `modern' here is used to refer "the period in history 
from the end of the Middle Ages to the 
present", to stress the contemporary nature of the political system studied 
here. Collins, Concise 
Dictionary(1996). This is done to emphasise the structural differences between the 
democratic 
systems of the Greek city states and the contemporary political system. 
Contemporary states are 
facing challenges that differ fundamentally of those of the 
Greek city states in degree and nature. 
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The objective is to summarise what is known, and what not, about the rule of law in 
the Arab Middle East, in Jordan in particular. 
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2.1. Modern Political Democracy 
Finding a working definition of democracy for the purposes of this study is a 
challenge. Despite the consensus on the desirability of democracy among 
contemporary Western scholars there is no consensus on the definition of 
democracy. 93 W. B Gallie termed democracy "the appraisive political concept par 
excellence". 94 It is argued by some that the post-War period is "the age of confused 
democracy". 95 Democracy has become a "diffuse, multifaceted" term. 96 It is even 
claimed that democracy has been turned into a meaningless concept. 97 
Not only has the word `democracy' been used in the last 2500 years to describe 
different political systems, but, as Tatu Vanhanen argues, to describe "very different, 
even contradictory states of affairs". 98 Democracy is used to refer both to systems of 
government and to "other social relationships"99, to various social entities, both within 
a framework of state and beyond it. '00 Besides using the term democracy with 
reference to social entities other than political systems, there is another cause for 
confusion: the attachment of attributes and other qualifiers to the term. A recent 
dramatic increase in the number of democratic regimes, as well as the increase in 
the number of regimes claiming to be democratic, has stimulated this tendency. 101 
There are hundreds of "subtypes" of democracy based on classification by Collier 
and Levitsky (e. g. pseudo-democracies, semi-democracies, electoral democracies, 
93 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation(1999), pp. 2-7; Held, Democracy: From 
City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order? (1992), p. 10; See also Fierlbeck, Globalizing Democracy. 
Power, Legitimacy and the Interpretation of Democratic Ideas 1998). 
94 Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts(1956), p. 184. 
95 Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited(1987), p. 6. 
96 Sartori (1987), p. 3. 
97 Holden, The Nature of Democracy(1974), p. 1. See also Birch, Concepts and Theories of Modern 
Democracy(2001), p. 71. 
98Vanhanen (1990), p. 7. 
99 Birch (2001), p. 72. 
100 One of the best-known other 'democracies' is social democracy, which is commonly associated 
with Alec de Tocqueville and the idea of social equality. Social democracy does not only entail political 
equality (the basis of liberal democracy), but also social and economic equality. Sartori (1987), pp. 8- 
10 and p. 386. There are 'democracies' designed for smaller communities (e. g. universities, churches, 
industrial plants), as well as for entities larger than state (cosmopolitan democracy), even 
'democracies' inspired by the advance of modern technology (teledemocracy). See Sartori (1987); 
Birch (2001); Parry, Types of Democracy(1992). 
101 O'Donnell, Democratic Theo and Comparative Politics(2000b), p. 5; Collier and Levitsky, 
Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative 
Research(1997), p. 431. 
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tutelary democracies). 102 There have been attempts to use "standardized" concepts, 
but the proliferation of terms and concepts used to "precise" the concept is causing 
more confusion and miscommunication. 103 
A few clarifications are in order here before competing definitions of democracy are 
discussed in further detail. This also helps to narrow down the amount of literature to 
be reviewed. The term democracy is used here to refer to modern political 
democracy. 104 According to Sartori, "political democracy" (democratic system of 
governance of a state) is a "macrodemocracy", whereas the other democracies are 
"microdemocracies", subordinate to political democracy. Political democracy is the 
"superordinate sovereign democracy" in the world of sovereign states, and therefore 
"the requisite condition" for microdemocracies. 105 It is acknowledged here that there 
are differing perceptions too. Held argues that in the contemporary world an 
international democracy is a requisite for democracies at national level. 106 The 
requirement for international democracy is easy to adopt as a political ideal, yet the 
aim here is to find a workable definition to be used for the purposes for the study. It is 
argued here that it is more useful to refer to `political democracy' as it exists at a 
national level. Political democracy at a national level is a possibility (evidence found) 
with or without international democracy and is thus the meaning referred to within 
this study when using `political democracy', not to mention that the object of this 
study is a national political system, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Also political democracy in this context (and in most cases within the contemporary 
democracy discourse) is equivalent to modern political democracy, limiting the term 
to the contemporary political reality (as distinct from any previous historical contexts). 
Political democracy is a modern invention made in Western industrialised countries, 
102 Collier and Levitsky (1997), p. 431. See also Markoff, Waves of Democracy. Social Movements 
and Political Change(1996), p. 104. 
To' Collier and Levitsky (1997), pp. 430-431 and pp. 447-449. 
104 Huber and Rueschemeyer and Stephen, The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, 
Participatory, and Social Dimensions(1999), p. 169; Diamond, Is the Third Wave of Democratization 
over? (1996b), p. 1. 
105 Sartori (1987), p. 11. The "other democracies" referred to by Sartori are democracies designed to 
be implemented at a state level. It does not exclude the idea of superordinate nature of political 
democracy, as the current world still is state-centred. 
106 Held (1992), p. 11. 
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in a contrast to democracy whose roots can be traced to the Ancient Greece. 107 
Sartori, among others, believes comparing different concepts of democracy to be a 
pointless exercise: "Modern democracy does not simply consist of the Greek ideal 
plus some subsequent additions". 108 The language and ideals of politics have 
changed, as well as the "historical settings". 109 Above all, the political system under 
scrutiny here is a modern state: the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Thus the 
qualities of ancient democracies have very little relevance when the changes within 
this political system are examined. 
107 Held (1992), p. 11. 
108 Sartori (1987), p. 290. 
109 Sartori (1987), pp. 278-279. According to Dahl, the 
differences are mainly related to the 
fundamental changes in the nature of polities (increased number 
of participants, size of territory and 
diversity). Dahl, Democracy and its Critics(1989), p. 19. 
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2.1.1. Procedures or Substance? 
Narrowing the scope down to modern political democracy still leaves us with a great 
deal of literature to study, as there is no single (uncontested) definition of modern 
political democracy. After considering a large number of definitions it is decided here 
to use a Schumpeterian-Dahlian definition of democracy. It is believed that the 
definitions by Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl are the most appropriate ones for 
the purposes of this study, as they are currently standard definitions of political 
democracy, the definitions used as such or as a basis for new definitions. 110 
Therefore, in the case of "non-originating" "' country a basic definition is a good 
analytical starting-point. 
Schumpeter defines democracy as: "the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power 
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote". 112 According to 
Schumpeter, the main elements of political democracy are political parties, autonomy 
of the elected political elite from the state, independent bureaucracy, political culture 
of tolerance and compromise, and the existence of opposition and of civil society. 113 
Dahl's definition, which could be seen as one elaborated from Schumpeter's 
definition, is as follows: "a unique process of making collective and binding 
decisions", a process which "produces - or at least tends to produce - desirable 
solutions". ' 14 Dahl's polyarchy is based on the following elements: elected officials, 
free and fair elections, universal suffrage, right to run for office, freedom of 
expression, alternative information and associational autonomy. 115 Both of the 
definitions emphasise institutional elements required to guarantee the fairness and 
effectiveness of collective decision-making. Political participation in Jordan will be 
110 Burton, Michael and Gunther, Richard and Higley, John, Introduction: elite transformations and 
democratic regimes(1995), p. 1; Collier and Levitsky (1997), p. 431. See also Kamrava (1998), 
Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization. A comparative study of 147 states, 1980-88(1990). 
"' The term "originating" countries have been borrowed from Guillermo O'Donnell. With "originating" 
countries O'Donnell refers to the countries where modern political democracy originates. In this paper 
the term is also used to refer to the origins of the rule of law principle, as both political democracy and 
the rule of law have their roots in the same countries. See O'Donnell (2000b), p. 13. 
112 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy(1959), p. 269. 
113 Schum peter (1959), pp. 268-270. 
114 Dahl (1989), p. 5. 
115 Dahl (1989), p. 221. 
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assessed in this study through analysing the six elements suggested by Dahl. Dahl's 
list does not differ fundamentally from Schumpeter's, but it is a well-structured 
approach to study of political participation which requires no further definitions. 
Choosing a Schumpeteria-Dahlian definition of democracy is a conscious decision to 
favour procedural definitions over substantial ones. The fundamental difference 
between the two disparate types of definitions of democracy is their perceptions of 
equality. What is the most important dimension of equality: political or socio- 
economic? Does equality encompass all dimensions of equality, or is one of the 
dimensions a pre/requisite of the other? Is political equality possible without social 
and economic equalities, and vice versa? ' 16 Substantive definitions are rooted in a 
Tocquevillean idea of social democracy: to "redistribute power" to increase social 
equality. ' 17 The very essence of democracy, it is argued, is not mere political 
contestation, but something broader. Democracy, as a "system that can meet the 
demands of ordinary people", does not contain only democratic institutions, but also 
democratic politics. Democratic institutions are above-all products of democratic 
politics. 18 This definition is based on a view that political equality is not possible 
without social equality. 119 Examples of substantive definitions are not easy to find, as 
procedural definitions are predominant in modern democratic literature. 120 
It is not argued here that social equality is an irrelevant, undesirable element in a 
modern political democracy, but rather that political equality (the minimum) is the 
foundation for more advanced political democracies (aiming at eliminating all types of 
inequalities). This decision is made while acknowledging the criticism directed at 
procedural definitions. Within the contemporary democracy discourse Schumpeter's 
116 Holden (1974), p. 19. The main elements of the latter tradition are 'popular will' and the 'common 
good', while the former is primarily interested in democratic decision-making procedures and routines. 
Paloheimo and Wiberg, Politiikan perusteet(1996), p. 138. There are other classifications of definitions 
of democracy. Przeworski makes a distinction between "participationist" and "contestationist" views of 
democracy. Participationist view is predominant in Western Europe where universal suffrage has 
considered a more important goal than government's accountability. Przeworski, Democracy and the 
Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America(1991), p. 10. 
117 Luckham, and Goetz, and Kaldor, Democratic Institutions and Politics in Contexts of Inequality, 
Poverty, and Conflict. A Conceptual Framework(1998), p. 10. 
Luckham, and Goetz, and Kaldor (1998), pp. 9-11. 
119 Luckham, and Goetz, and Kaldor (1998), p. 12. 
120 O'Donnell (2000b), pp. 8-10. O'Donnell shows that majority of scholars have chosen minimalist 
definition, including the most prominent research projects. 
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and Dahl's definitions are labelled as "minimalist" definitions (or "procedural", or 
"formal") focusing on the processes and procedures of democratic governance (a 
method of governing) instead of the substance of the policies produced 
(outcomes). 121 Procedural definitions are sometimes criticised for encouraging purely 
formalistic approaches. 122 Focusing on processes is seen as dangerous, as it might 
lead to "electoral fallacy", to equal democracy with free elections. 123 It is worth noting 
that it is easy to examine elections empirically, whereas other dimensions of political 
democracy are not that simple to measure. According to Collier and Levitsky, the 
"expanded minimum" was born as a response to the criticism. While a "procedural 
minimum" contains free and fair elections and guarantees of civil liberties, an 
"expanded minimum" adds an effective power of government to guarantee to the 
Iist. 124 Also, Guillermo O'Donnell argues that it is not justified to consider 
Schumpeter's definition as minimalist, or proceduralist. Schumpeter does not, 
stresses O'Donnell, limit democracy to a mere method: other elements are required 
in addition to competitive elections, such as basic freedoms (e. g. freedom of press). 
Elections are not viewed as a "one-shot event", but rather as a long-term process 
where elections are institutionalised. 125 Based on this argument, O'Donnell claims 
that Schumpeterian definitions are not minimalist, but "realistic" definitions, as it is 
possible to assess them empirically. 126 There are, argues O'Donnell, also definitions 
"purporting" to be realistic without succeeding: characteristics included can neither 
be assessed empirically nor be found in any existing democracy. Prescriptive 
definitions, on the other hand, which suggest what democracy should be, are also 
121 Diamond (1996b), pp. 1-2. Some view that a third category of definitions should be added: 
"intermediate" definitions, definitions between the minimalist and substantive ones. According to 
Huber, and Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, minimal ("formal") democracy is a primitive form of 
democracy, a requisite of social democracy. Diamond (1996b) p. 3; Huber, and Rueschemeyer, and 
Stephens (1999), p. 169; Tilly, Roads from Past to Future(1997), pp. 198-199. 
122 Beetham, Conditions for Democratic Consolidation(1994), pp. 158-159. 
123 Linz and Stepan (1996a), p. 4. 
124 Collier and Levitsky (1997), pp. 432-434. 
125 O'Donnell, Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics(2000a), pp. 7-8. 
126 Realistic definitions have been presented by Adam Przeworski, Samuel Huntington, Larry 
Diamond, Juan Linz, Seymor Martin Lipset, Di Palma, Rueschemeyer, Huber, Stephens, and Robert 
Dahl, all of whom are the most distinguished scholars in the 
field of democratic theory today. 
O'Donnell (2000a), pp. 8-9. On the contrary Collier and Levitsky define 'minimal' definition of 
democracy as one that entails smallest possible number of attributes. 
Collier and Levitsky (1997), p. 
433. 
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problematic. They do not entail how to treat existing systems or to narrow the gap 
between realistic and prescriptive definitions. 127 
Following O'Donnell's clarification of the procedural definition of political democracy, 
it is acknowledged here that free and fair elections are not an independent political 
event, but something closely related to the existence and functioning of other state 
institutions. The other elements listed by Dahl are equally important for democracy 
and for free and fair elections. Being aware of the critique directed at the procedural 
definition of modern political democracy, it is nonetheless considered here as the 
most appropriate definition available for the purposes of this study. In the case of 
"non-originating" countries, a minimal definition of democracy (excluding social 
equality) is a good starting point. It is not too broad, albeit including all the required 
elements of modern political democracy. The procedural definition is not limited to 
analysing elections alone, thus it is not minimal in the sense of political institutions. 
As O'Donnell rightly stresses, modern political democracy (even) in a procedural 
sense is so much more than free and fair elections. Guaranteeing the freeness and 
the fairness of electing representatives, universal suffrage, associational autonomy, 
free press and alternative information requires the existence and competence of 
(other) state institutions. According to Dahl, "the democratic process must somehow 
be actualized in the real world - in actually existing procedures institutions, 
associations, states and so on". 128 Therefore, attention here needs to be shifted to 
another term, independent as such, yet an integral part of modern political 
democracy: the rule of law. To start with, a working definition of the rule of law is 
sought, after which the connection between the two terms is discussed. 
127 O'Donnell (2000b), pp. 8-10. 
128 Dahl (1989), p. 117. 
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2.2. THE RULE OF LAW 
2.2.1. Another Confused Concept 
Like democracy, `the rule of law', or the Rule of Law129 as preferred by some, is a 
contested but nevertheless popular concept in the contemporary world. The concept 
of the rule of law is currently everywhere: "One cannot get through a foreign policy 
debate these days without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the 
world's troubles". 130 The rule of law, as a solution to the problem of controlling the 
power of political authority, has been part of the legal tradition of Western 
countries131 for centuries, but the current global desirability of the term has been on 
increase since the Second World War. 132 
Finding a definition of the rule of law for the purposes of this study is not a 
straightforward task. There is no definition of the rule of law that is widely accepted, 
rather there is a "centuries-old" debate about the possible meanings. 133 Bearing in 
mind the extensive history of the rule of law and its current popularity, it is not 
surprising that there are many definitions of the concept. It must be also remembered 
that the core idea of the rule of law principle (to protect citizens from despotism) has 
been implemented in various ways in the "originating" countries. 134As Grote points 
129 de Walker, The Rule of Law. Foundation of Constitutional Democracy(1988), p. 1. Some prefer the 
Rule of Law (instead of the rule of law), as a legal and political ideal including certain agreed 
principles, to make a distinction from legal rules in other contexts. 
13o Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival(1998), p. 95. See also Craig, Formal and Substantive 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework(1997), p. 467. 17T The rule of law is a "venerable part of Western political philosophy" (Carothers (1998), p. 95), often 
associated with the Western liberal thought. The rule of law is seen as a necessity for liberalism, an 
"institutional realization of liberal ideas". Thus many consider the rule of law inseparable from ideas of 
democracy and market economy. Li, What is Rule of Law? (1999), p. 5; Scheurmann, The Rule of Law 
under Siege: selected essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto K(1996), p. 1. 
The first revival occurred in the wake of the peace movement of the 1940s which made the rule of 
law a widely recognised principle in "western liberal democracies". Later, at the beginning of the 
globalisation era, "the age of transitions" made the idea a universally recognised, and politically 
desirable aim outside the established democracies. Although the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights was among the first efforts 'globalise' the rule of law, it is argued that during the age of 
transitions, the third wave of democratization, for the first time states outside the 'Northwestern' 
sphere are aiming to implement the principles of rule of law. 
13 Shapiro, The Rule of Law(1994), p. 4; O'Donnell, Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin 
America(1998), p. 5. 
the rule of law principle (or its applications) has vaned from country to country. The British 
concept, influenced greatly by the work of A. V Dicey, is based on the unwritten constitution, while the 
American counterpart on a written one. In many Western European states there were already well- 
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out, the very definition of the concept depends on how the terms 'law' and 'public 
authority' are defined. As the meanings of neither of these terms are permanent, the 
definition of the rule of law cannot be unchanged either. 135 Furthermore, the 
expansion of democratic practices (e. g. elections, multipartyism) has placed new 
challenges for the concept of the rule of law. A principle originally implemented in a 
non-democratic system has been adopted by democratic and democratising 
countries. 136 Also, international investors are calling developing countries to build 
rule of law systems to improve the accountability, transparency and predictability of 
their economies. 137 This situation resembles the context where the early version of 
the rule of law emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The demands for 
legal and political reforms were also inspired by commercial interests. The difference 
is that in those early days developments were taking place within the boundaries of 
the states, while today the impetus for change comes partly from outside the state. 
established bureaucracies which were more concerned with welfare issues than the British 
government. The American version of the rule of law principle inspired by the Enlightenment consists 
not only of the constitution, but also of the Montesquieuan idea of the separation of powers. In the 
American system congress is, unlike in Britain and in the continental Europe, a legislature, not a court. 
The German Rechtstaat like the American counterpart was inspired by the Enlightenment, however in 
the German case based mainly by the writings of Kant. Yet Rechtstaat does not include the idea of 
separation of powers. In France the Etat de droit on the other hand includes the principle of separation 
of powers, but no real mechanisms to implement it. 
135 Grote, Rule of Law, Rechtstaat and "Etat de droit"(1999), p. 304. 
136 Grote (1999), pp. 284-286; Kirchheimer, The Rechtstaat as Magic Wall(1996), pp. 245-246. 
137 Carothers (1998), p. 98; Sachs, The Global Capitalist Revolution(1998), p. 2. 
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2.2.2. Source or Contents, Democracy or Not? 
There are two questions to be answered when assessing the usefulness of different 
definitions of the rule of law for the purposes of this study. These questions are about 
the main elements that concern political and legal theorists striving to provide a 
satisfactory definition of the rule of law, or to classify the various definitions: the 
question of the defining property ('law') and the system of governance necessary to 
the realisation of the principle ('rule'). 138 
To start with it must be stressed that regardless of the competing definitions of the 
rule of law there are certain basic qualities of law that are included in almost all the 
definitions. It is also not possible to understand the concept of the rule of law without 
defining the fundamental characteristics of law and the legal precepts derived from 
it. 139 The common denominator to most definitions is the legal liberty of the citizens, 
protection from the political authority and from each other. The equality of the 
citizens is stressed as well as the prospectivity of the law. Clarity, generality, 
predictability and prospectivity are also the basic qualities of law. Law has to be 
applied equally in every case, regardless of the social or political status of the 
citizens. The subjects of the law have to be aware of the laws in advance. 140 The 
main rule of law principle is the idea of the superiority of the law above men. While 
`men' are seen as impartial, irrational and liable to error, `law' is considered as 
something opposite to those characteristics, "reason without passion 041 Law aims at 
protecting individuals (subjects of law) from arbitrary behaviour of men (in power), 
bringing the element of predictability into the lives of citizens. 142 The great paradox, 
argues Ingram, is that the law is created by men. However, the superiority of law 
stems from the requirement that law must be created according to certain standards 
138 de Walker (1988), p. 3. 
139 Craig (1997), p. 467. 
140 Flathman (1994), p. 303; Li (1999), p. 4; Sejersted, Democracy and the rule of law: some historical 
experiences of contradictions in the striving for good government(1988), pp. 134-135; Carothers 
1998), pp. 96-97; de Walker (1988), pp. 23-30. 
41 "Reason without passion" is expression used by Aristotle. Flathman, Liberalism and The Suspect 
Enterprise of Political Institutionalization: The Case of the Rule of Law(1994), p. 302. 
TTT The early contributors, from the Greek philosophers to medieval lawyers and Montesquieu, were 
first and foremost concerned with limiting political power and authority, not with the form or method of 
governance. In the early ('pre-democratic') days when citizens had no access to political power the 
emphasis was on 'law'. Flathman (1994), pp. 302-303. 
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and procedures. The idea of laws as independent rules is the foundation of the rule 
of law. Laws must both "endure and bind" the subjects. 143 According to Ingram, the 
fundamental requirement for the rule of law is that it has "to be followed to a 
significant extent". 144 The citizens have to be obedient to the law and there must be 
regular punishment for disobedience. 145 
The first question is not about the qualities of law but about the substance of the law. 
Formal conceptions are interested in the source of the law, the clarity of the laws and 
their temporal dimensions. For substantive definitions of the rule of law it is essential 
not just to create laws, but specifically to create (morally) good laws. 146 Both formal 
and substantive definitions include basic requirements for the law as a normative 
rule. The substantive definition simply places additional requirements on the term. As 
this study examines the rule of law in the context of modern political democracies, it 
is believed here that the substance of laws is not relevant as such. It is argued here 
that in a modern political democracy the citizens, subjects of the law, are the ones 
making judgements on the legislation. In a world where different belief systems exist 
it is not justified to expect a set of universal rights to be automatically part of the 
legislation of any state. Human rights will, for example, be included in the legislation 
in a modern political democracy only if so decided by its citizens. For the purposes of 
this study, how laws are passed and implemented is of more interest. It is also worth 
noting that it is not any easier to maintain system where all procedures are followed 
than to produce morally good laws. 
The second matter to consider is the institutional, or structural, requirements for the 
rule of law. What are the elements that are needed to the rule of law to be 
embedded? This study is adopting a juristic understanding of the rule of law, as it 
places fewer requirements on the system of governance. 147 It is argued here that the 
143 Ingram, Maintaining The Rule of Law(1985), p. 361. 
144 Ingram (1985), p. 375. 
145 Ingram (1985), p. 361. 
146 Craig (1997), p. 467. 
147 There are, however, differences among the various juristic definitions of the concept. In the 
narrowest sense the concept of the rule of law is understood as referring only to 'law and order' 
in a 
society, as opposed to an anarchic state with no (or a few) rules. This 'limited' view is based on the 
idea of peaceful settlement of disputes, but it ignores the (liberal) idea of political rights. Subjects of 
law do not choose the executive, nor do they have much (or any) impact on the legislation. Courts are 
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rule law can exists, and has existed, in various political systems. de Walker argues 
that, regarding Islam for instance, it "would be hard to find a worldview more different 
from the guiding principles of modern secular Western society. But it would be wrong 
to conclude that a recognizable form of the rule of law could not exist in a strictly 
Islamic society". 148 This understanding of the rule of law can thus be applied, at least 
in principle, in a theocratic, socialist or communist state. Very often scholars who see 
substantive qualities such as political and civil liberties as being inseparable from the 
rule of law, place more attention on state institutions beyond the judiciary, many even 
on the system of government. 149 When seen as a political ideal, the ideal context for 
the rule of law is a "liberal democratic free-market economy". 150 While no special 
attention within this dissertation is placed on the substance of the laws, it is also 
believed that the rule of law is possible in any form of governance, requiring that all 
the basic requirements are fulfilled. This does not mean, however, that the juristic 
understanding of the concept adopted here has no institutional requirements. Juristic 
conceptions stress the significance of both the legislative body and the courts, 
whereas the rule of law as a political principle is focused only on the government 
officials (as understood narrowly). 
Juristic definitions focus on governmental procedures; stressing the significance of 
legality and constitutionality. 151 Constitution as the superior law defines the legal 
framework for all the actors. In a democracy, for instance, elected representatives 
have a mandate to pass laws, providing that they do not contradict the constitution. 
The constitution itself is not static, nor permanent; there are ways, yet restricted and 
publicly known, to amend the constitution. 152 The authority of the rulers must be 
based on legislation and the legislation must be passed through pre-known 
procedures. Any member of the society has also the right to challenge the legality of 
a governmental action. With a regard to the legality of the system there is one more 
not independent; thus they settle mainly disputes between citizens. Disputes involving governmental 
officials are tried only when allowed by the executive. Bradley and Ewing, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law(1997), p. 105; de Walker (1988), p. 3. 
148 de Walker (1988), p. 12. 
149 Carothers (1998), p. 96-97. 
150 de Walker (1988), p. 13. 
151 The rule of law and the idea of constitutionality have been related since the 19`h century. 
152 Horn, The Fundamental Characteristis of the Rule of Law as Laid Down in the Basic Law(1997), p. 
38. 
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condition; all citizens must be equally subject to law. In a system with truly 
embedded rule of law, the government, like any other actor, is subordinated to the 
law. This is not the reality in the "rule by law" systems. In a system characterised as 
"rule by law", law places limits on the actions of the people, not on the government 
itself. 153 The courts as guarantors of legality must have a certain degree of 
independence from the legislative bodies. The procedures to prosecute 
governmental officials vary, yet they all aim to serve the same purpose. In the British 
system ordinary courts have the responsibility to test the legality of the government's 
actions, whereas in Germany and France there are special administrative courts for 
this purpose. 154 
There is one requirement for the rule of law regardless of the form of the system of 
governance, or the governing ideology. The majority of the citizens have to accept 
the form of governance existing, as the realisation of the concept is possible only 
when the subjects of the law accept its existence to a certain degree. The rule of law 
requires obedience to the law not only from governmental actors, but also from 
ordinary citizens. 155 
As this study considers the rule of law to be an integral yet independent element of 
modern political democracy, the focus here will be on those definitions that see the 
rule of law and democracy as inseparable. It is worth noting that, theoretically and 
historically, the rule of law can exist, and has existed, in governing systems other 
than political democracy. Next a closer look will be paid to literature that examines a 
(fundamental) connection between modern political democracy and the rule of law. 
The aim is not only to present definitions, but also perceptions of the relationship 
between these two. 
153 Carothers (1998), p. 97. 
154 Bradley and Ewing (1997), p. 105; de Walker (1988), p. 4. See also Sartori (1987), p. 321. 
155 de Walker (1988), pp. 10-13. See also Allan, Legislative Supremacy and The Rule of Law 
Democracy and Constitutionalism(1985), pp. 113-114, Kenyon, Democratisation and the Rule of Law. 
Evaluating Ethical Significance(1997), pp. 23-24. 
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2.3. The Conceptual Connection between Democracy and the Rule of Law 
The two terms central to this chapter, the idea(l) of modern political democracy and 
the rule of law are currently two political idea(l)s that dominate the discourse on 
power in a society. According to Ferejohn and Pasquino, modern political democracy 
and the rule of law are "both desirable attributes of a political system". ' 56 These two 
concepts are currently seen as inter-related, at least when talking about the 
contemporary meaning of the concepts. 157 The aim here is to present the way the 
two terms are connected to each other and to show how they are both essential to 
the understanding of modern political democracy adopted here. 
Historically speaking, the rule of law and political democracy were not considered as 
related concepts. The rule of law and democracy were seen as two different ways of 
"overcoming the contradiction between state and society". 158 Francis Sejersted 
argues that the early rule of law theorists, "constitutionalists" saw a fundamental 
contradiction between democracy and the rule of law. As state-building was seen as 
a necessity, the power of the state was at the same considered as a threat to the 
society. Whereas the rule of law was aimed at curbing the state authority, 
democracy's goal was to mobilise the society to defend its interests against the state 
power. The principle of the rule of law served the interests of newly-emerged middle 
classes. The early conception of the rule of law was more about negative liberty 
(controlling the power) than about positive liberty (seizing the power). 159 
The rule of law as an element of social and political order has, however, existed 
longer than liberalism, or political democracy. As mentioned earlier, the origins of the 
word democracy can be found in the Ancient Greece, but democracy became 
political reality in the twentieth century, after the emergence of liberalism. 160 
Therefore, it is justified to say that conception of the rule of law is part of wider 
156 Ferejohn and Pasquino, Rule of Democracy and Rule of Law(2003), p. 242. 
157 Stankiewicz, In Search of a Political Philosophy: ideologies at the close of the twentieth 
centu (1993), p. 109. 
Sejersted (1988), p. 132. 
159 Sejersted (1988), p. 131. 
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politico-philosophical tradition: the debate about the political freedoms, which in its 
turn is focused on the significance of laws. Liberalism is one of the outcomes of this 
debate. 161 Thus, as O'Donnell points out, it is essential to note that the construction 
of the individual as a legal person is "the legacy of capitalism and of state-making, 
not of liberalism or political democracy"162, as capitalism and nation-state building are 
older phenomena. In addition to capitalism and state-building, the emergence of 
territorially-bound markets contributed to the development of subjective rights that 
were profoundly embedded in the "originating" countries well before the advent of the 
liberal democratic ideas. 163 
The question of the linkages between the rule of law and democracy naturally 
depends on the definitions of the two concepts. As both of them are contested 
concepts, it is not surprising that there is a considerable degree of disagreement 
among the scholars about the matter. According to a political definition of the rule of 
law, as mentioned earlier, modern political democracy is the only appropriate context 
for the rule of law, while the juristic definitions of the conception do not place any 
requirements regarding the system of governance. '64Yet, scholars who define the 
rule of law in substantive terms consider it as incompatible with democracy. For 
those scholars the supremacy of law clashes with the supremacy of the majority will. 
The people making decisions according to the majority principle will not guarantee 
that laws produced fulfil the requirements set for the law. 165 According to Peter 
Ingram, to combine law-making with the rule of law distorts the true meaning of the 
concept: political processes cannot be "part of the rule of law, or more nominally 
subject to it". 166 
Scholars who consider the rule of law to be a juristic principle defined in formal 
terms, on the other hand, see no contradiction between democracy and the rule of 
160 Sejersted (1988), pp. 131-132; Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions. International Law, 
Democracy and the Critique of Ideology(2000), pp. 30-31; Li (1999), pp. 5-6. 
71 Sartori (1987), pp. 306-307. See also Allan (1985), p. 112. 
162 O'Donnell, Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics(1999), p. 38. 
163 O'Donnell (2000a), p. 38. 
164 Rose and Mischler and Härffer, Democracy and its Alternatives. Understanding Post-Communist 
Societies 1998), p. 33; Carothers (1998), p. 96. 
165 Shapiro (1994), p. 2; Eskridge and Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law(1994), p 
266. 
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law. The principle of the formal rule of law places requirements only on the legality of 
the law, not on the contents. Fundamental to formal definitions of the rule of law is 
that the laws are created according to the constitutional standards, regardless of the 
contents, and the government and citizens alike obey the laws. 167 T. S. Allan 
considers the rule of law as "a standard by which legal order can be measured and 
assessed". 168 According to this view, legal order consists of both the parliament and 
the courts; thus they are the bodies responsible for the functioning of the legal 
order. 169 Furthermore, argues Allan, it is a misconception to think that the judiciary 
would be totally subservient to the legislative body. The duty of the courts is to 
guarantee the legality of statutes according to the "recognised and publicly 
articulated constitutional standards". 170 Therefore, courts are seen as mediators 
between the state and the citizens. "' Sartori sees liberty and legality as originally 
"extraneous" to democracy, but yet incorporated by the modern democracy. He 
points out that the principle of legality is the guarantee of citizens' liberties in modern 
(democratic) societies, and it is this principle that places "a limit and a restriction on 
pure and simple democratic principles". 172 Therefore, for Sartori, the liberties are best 
protected through the rule of law, not through democracy. Nevertheless he sees no 
reason for democracy to clash with the rule of law. 173 
The most influential democratic theories, the contemporary classics, do not pay 
much attention to the concept of the rule of law. 
174 They either do not explicitly stress 
the significance of the rule of law (or the legal system) to democracy, or they ignore 
the concept altogether. The rule of law is not included in the definitions of 
democracy, nor has the rule of law been object of research. Timothy Kenyon argues 
that procedural definitions of democracy are currently associated with 
the rule of 
166 Ingram (1985), p. 381. 
167 Allan (1985), pp. 122-123; de Walker (1988), p. 3. 
168 Allan (1985), p. 114. 
169 Allan (1985), p. 114. 
170 Allan (1985), p. 124. 
"' Allan (1985), p. 124. 
172 Sartori (1987), p. 310. Italics added 
173 Sartori (1987), p. 310. 
174 O'Donnell (2000a), p. 59. See also Dahl (1989). 
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law. 175 However, neither of the classical procedural definitions mentions the rule of 
law nor includes any requirements for the legal system as such. 
It is argued here that Schumpeter's and Dahl's definitions of political democracy can 
be seen as being based on the same underlying ideas as the concept of the rule of 
law. Both of the procedural definitions rely on the ideas of equality and separation of 
powers. These definitions include the aim of curbing the power of state and 
preventing the state's interference in the non-political aspects of social life. 
Schumpeter states it more clearly: the independence of the decision-makers and 
bureaucracy from the state, whereas Dahl's polyarchy is concentrated on the 
elements of elective democracy. Moreover, the definitions are based on a 
presumption of the existence of political freedoms. 176 These freedoms (or 
"guarantees"), O'Donnell points out, are legally defined: "assigned by the legal 
system". "' Therefore, democracy defined in procedural terms is not possible without 
a legal system that defines the freedoms and guards their realisation. 178 Thus the 
most common (procedural) definitions of democracy do not exclude the principle of 
the rule of law (at least when seen in formal terms), even if the concept of the rule of 
law as such does not appear that frequently in the classical writings. 
Though the concept of the rule of law has gained less attention from the democratic 
scholars than from the legal theorists, there are some political scientists who 
explicitly see democracy as being inseparable from the rule of law, and the number 
of those theorists has been lately increasing. 19 According to Domingo, the rule of 
law has come to the "forefront" of academic discourse due to the democratisation 
and economic liberalisation that has taken place since the late 1980s. 
18° Guillermo 
175 Kenyon (1997), p. 23. 
176 Rose et al (1998), p. 33. 
177 O'Donnell (2000a), p. 19. 
178 O'Donnell (2000b), p. 53. 
179 Schmitter and Karl, What Democracy Is... and Is Not(1996), p. 55; Handelman and Tessler, 
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O'Donnell is a scholar whose name is often mentioned in connection to democracy 
and the rule of law. 181 
For O'Donnell, the rule of law is more than a mere collection of legal rules: it is 
"legally-based rule of democratic state"182. Therefore, O'Donnell sees the rule of law 
and political democracy as part of the same package. According to O'Donnell, there 
are four fundamental features of political democracy (or polyarchy) that distinguish it 
from other governing systems. Essential for a democratic regime are competitive and 
institutionalised elections, and the existence of a collective wager. In democracy a 
political citizen has a right to vote in the elections and to be elected. Only in a 
political democracy is there an "institutionalised, universalistic, and inclusive 
wager". 183 In all other systems the wager is either restricted or suppressed. With a 
wager O'Donnell means a "legally enacted and backed institution to which everyone 
is expected to acquiesce within the territory delimited by a state". 184 Citizens are 
aware of their rights but also of the fact that every one else has the same rights. 
Thus the outcome of democratic processes is always uncertain. The rights and 
duties guaranteed by the political citizenship, O'Donnell stresses, are not matter of 
choice, but something that is automatically applied to all citizens. 185 The two other 
fundamental features of democracy are requirements directed at the legal system. 
The democratic legal system guarantees the rights and freedoms of all citizens. 
Furthermore, there can no one acting outside the legal system (as de legibus 
solutus). Citizens' political freedoms are part of a wider set of rights and obligations 
attached to a legal person. '86 Besides the civil and political rights O'Donnell's idea of 
the rule of law requires that the "networks of responsibility and accountability" are 
well-defined. 187 
O'Donnell's conception of the rule of law resembles a formal (or juristic) definition of 
the rule of law that is also adopted here. Nevertheless, it has to be stressed here that 
181 Handelman and Tessler (1999), p. 24. See also Rose et al (1998). 
182 O'Donnell (1998), p. 14. 
183 O'Donnell (1999), p. 30. 
184 O'Donnell (1999), p. 31. 
185 O'Donnell (2000a), pp. 29-31. The characteristics of law referred by O'Donnell are defined by Raz. 
See O'Donnell (1998), p. 13. 
186 O'Donnell (2000b), p. 53; O'Donnell (1998), p. 6. 
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O'Donnell's understanding cannot be seen as a pure formal concept, as O'Donnell's 
rule of law includes moral standards. He claims that moral standards can be locally 
defined (in a constitution) or they can be universal (human rights). ' 88 It is currently 
not uncommon to find these hybrid definitions of the rule of law, formal definitions 
with a substantive touch, in a contemporary discourse and practice. They do not 
deny the formal elements of the rule of law, but also a certain minimum requirement 
for the substance of the laws is included. This minimum requirement very often 
consists of human rights. This study, as expressed earlier, includes moral standards 
only in the form of constitutional requirements. It is expected that whatever the 
substance of the laws passed their form and contents cannot compromise the 
constitution of the country. Therefore, this study agrees with the arguments 
presented by O'Donnell about the necessity of the rule of law for a modern political 
democracy, but not fully with his understanding of the rule of law. 
There is, however, one element to O'Donnell's rule of law that is seen here as 
essential to the debate. O'Donnell stresses that his definition of the rule of law, unlike 
the common English expression, is used to refer to state agencies other than the 
court/s, as it includes the entire state apparatus. 189 For O'Donnell, democraticness 
refers to qualities of a state, not merely of a regime. Instead of focusing on the 
regime (e. g. elections and political rights), more attention should be paid at the 
various "non-elected" bodies of the state, such as the police, the judiciary, the 
bureaucracy and the security forces. The significance of these bodies to the 
functioning of the elected bodies, and thus to functioning of democracy, has not been 
fully understood by democracy theorists. Democracy would be meaningless if the 
laws were passed according to the will of people, but the police, the bureaucrats and 
the military force would act outside the law. 190 As Timothy Kenyon describes: 
"Nevertheless, even granting that democracy bears a contingent and not necessary 
relation to the rule of law, there is a strong case for believing that democracy is in 
187 O'Donnell (1998), pp. 14-15. 
188 O'Donnell (1998), p. 13. 
189 O'Donnell (1998), p. 14. 
190 O'Donnell (2000b), p. 52; Grugel, Democratization. A Critical Introduction(2002), p. 76. 
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poor health, a sickly child in the case of newly-founded democracies, if the rule of 
law is either absent or precariously founded". 191 
As the term rule of law is central to this study, it is essential to find out what is known 
about the rule of law in the context of the Arab Middle East, and Jordan in particular. 
Is there something that is of particular significance when examining the rule of law in 
this context? Furthermore, it is also important for the purposes of this study to 
identify the areas not yet examined in detail. 
19' Kenyon (1997), p. 26. 
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2.4. THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 
Perhaps the global wave of democratisation has not truly hit the Arab Middle East, 
but the principle of the rule of law is certainly not an alien concept in the region, at 
least not at the official level. The rule of law is a principle included in the constitutions 
of most Arab countries. 192 Whether the principle is being implemented is another 
matter. In spite of being a constitutional principle, argues al-Mukhtar, the rule of law 
cannot be found in the Arabic law books. 193 To determine whether the rule of law is 
more than in a principle in the Arab Middle East is a true challenge, not least 
resulting from the shortage of systematic scholarly work on the rule of law in the 
region. Currently the workload on the rule of law relies on a few research projects 
and even fewer scholars. 194 It must be acknowledged, however, that legal studies as 
such are not absent and since the late 1990s there has been a growing interest in 
the rule of law. 195 Furthermore, in spite of the scarcity on studies on the rule of law in 
the Arab Middle East, there are studies focusing on some elements of the rule of 
law. 196 
When studying developing countries, it is often argued, the classical theories on 
political development are inappropriate. In the case of the Arab Middle East this 
argument seems relevant. The existing legal systems in the Arab world are truly 
modern creations, in contrast with the legal systems in established democracies. 
Furthermore, Nathan Brown points out that the creation of the modern legal systems 
192 Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World. Courts in Egypt and the Gulf(1998), p. 241; Ray, 
Human Rights Protection and the Rule of Law: Case Studies in Israel and Egypt(2000), p. 43. 
'3 Al-Mukhtar, The Rule of Law in Iraq: Does It Exist? (2000), p. 74. 
194 Brown, Accountability Through and Within Arab Judiciaries(2001). Nasr and Brown, Criminal 
Justice and Prosecution in the Arab World(2004). These studies are prepared for the United Nations 
Development Programme (Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, POGAR). See 
www. pogar. org. Brown, Arab Administrative Courts and Judicial Control of the Bureaucracy(1997); 
Cotran & Sherif, Democracy, the Rule of Law and lslam(1999); Cotran & Sherif, The Role of the 
Judiciary in the Protection of Human Rights(1997). For comparative legal studies, see Forte, The 
Comparative Lawyer and the Middle East(1978), p. 306. 
195 estern observers have been interested in the structures and functioning of the legal systems in 
the Arab Middle East and Islamic Law since colonial times. The early systematic studies on the Middle 
Eastern legal systems produced `guidebooks' for colonial administrators in the nineteenth century. 
The majority of the studies, particularly the early ones, are descriptive, explaining the structures and 
elements of the various legal systems. Thielman, A Critical Survey of Western Law Studies on Arab- 
Muslim Countries(1999), p. 47. 
Thielman (1999), p. 41. 
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in the Arab world occurred in a relatively short period of time. 197 Therefore, it is 
obvious that the course of legalo-political development differs fundamentally from 
that of the established democracies in Western Europe, where legal institutions were 
embedded before the beginning of democratisation. 
It is also worth noting that there is a considerable degree of diversity among the 
Middle Eastern legal systems and practices. Scholars have started to acknowledge 
the diversity only recently, although the roots of the diversity go back to the pre- 
colonial times. Even in the Ottoman Empire the procedures (and rules) varied from 
one administrative unit (Sarjak) to another. 198 The differences among the legal 
systems in the Arab Middle East have been explained by many factors, such as the 
degree of external influence or the role of Islamic Law. Many early Western 
observers considered the legal systems in the region as a unified `Middle Eastern 
Legal System' equating it with Islamic law and tradition. However, nation-building in 
the Arab Middle East has resulted in national legal systems differing from each other, 
regardless of the fact that Shariah had a central role in each. 199 Later the colonial 
powers contributed to the differing development in the Arab countries. The legal 
systems under the British colonial rule resemblance the British legal system, while 
the legal systems in former French colonies are similar to those of colonial 
occupier's. 200 Therefore, it seems more that obvious that each one of the legal 
systems in the Arab Middle East deserves scholarly attention, and in relation to the 
rule of law an increase in the degree of the attention is also welcome. 
Bearing in mind the space of legal development and diversity of the legal systems it 
is not justified to use the `Western model' as a measure for the legal developments in 
the Middle East. 201 Furthermore, scholars examining the legal development argue 
197 Brown (1998), p. 2. 
198 Mallat, Introduction - On Islam and Democracy(1993). The origins of the modern legal systems in 
the Middle East are found in the Ottoman Empire, particularly the reforms (the Tanzimat movement) 
made in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the legal reforms did not have the same effect on all 
arts of the Empire. Brown (1998), p. 2. 
99 Amin, Middle East Legal Systems(1985), p. 1. 
200 Sherif, Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Constitutional Democracies: The 
Egyptian and American Expenences(1999), p. 28. Egypt is an exception, as there the British influence 
can be seen in other areas, while the legal sphere was left largely alone. 
201 Amin (1985), p. 1. The classical scholars on Middle Eastern Law; Schact, Noel Coulson, Milner, de 
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that the influence of foreign forces on the legal systems in the Arab Middle East has 
been exaggerated. Brown argues that his studies on the courts in Egypt and in the 
Arab Gulf states show that the most significant factor (or actor) in judicial 
development has been the ruling elite. 202 Ideologies based on the rule of law, like 
stressing the importance of the independent judiciary, have been used primarily only 
as a tool to gain legitimacy: "support for the officially sanctioned order". 203 Brown's 
studies led him to conclude that it is not justified to see codified law, centralised 
courts systems and independent judiciaries as universal, nor "western 
innovations". 204 
202 Brown (1998), p. 237. 
203 Brown (1998), p. 237. 
204 Brown (1998), p. 239. Enid Hill's analysis of the creation of the administrative courts in 
Egypt 
seems to support Brown's views, at least partly. According to 
Hill, the administrative courts were 
constructed using the French Counseil d'Etat as a model, but the 
Egyptian counterpart was never a 
"carbon copy". The administrative courts in Egypt were constructed to adapt 
to the Egyptian context. 
Hill, Mailis al-Dawla: The Administrative Courts of Egypt and Administrative Law(1993), p. 
208. 
50 
2.4.1. Arab Judiciaries 
The role and the significance of the Middle Eastern judiciaries have gained perhaps 
more attention than any other topic of legal research among western scholars. This 
is not surprising, as the role of the judiciary is often seen as an elementary part of the 
rule of law, indeed as the cornerstone. Once the judiciary has gained enough 
autonomy to fulfil its role effectively, the implementation of the rule of law can expand 
to other elements such as to the review of constitutionality. 205 Studies on the Arab 
judiciary are scarce; no systematic attempts have been made to analyse all the Arab 
legal systems, or even some of the central elements. It is justified to say that the 
Egyptian judiciary, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in particular, has gained 
far more attention than any other judiciary in the region. 206 
According to Cotran and Yamani, the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt is "the 
only effective and active constitutional court in the Arab world". 207 The decisions 
made by the Supreme Constitutional Court are closely observed in other Arab 
countries. Hence the unbalanced attention is at least partially justified when 
considering the importance of the SCC beyond the Egyptian borders. Egypt is also 
often considered as the Middle Eastern country that has come closest to 
implementing the rule of law, regardless of its flaws. It is has to be said, conversely, 
that many of the contributors to the discourse on the Middle Eastern rule of law are 
Egyptian legal professionals, many even members of the SCC. Perhaps partly for 
this reason, the studies on the Egyptian judiciary have generally been optimistic, 
205 Rosberg, Roads to the Rule of Law. Emergency of an Independent Judiciary in Egypt(1998), p. 19. 206 EI-Morr, Judicial Sources for Supporting the Protection of Human Rights(1997), p. 229; Bälz, 
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stressing the importance of the Supreme Constitutional Court and its significance in 
promoting the rule of law and (thus) political development. 208 
It seems evident that the judiciary is not solely in charge of the legal development. 209 
Studies are suggesting that the development of legal systems in the Arab Middle 
East has been very closely connected to the deliberate strategies of the rulers to 
strengthen their power . 
210 Thus it is not only the judiciary itself that is of interest when 
studying the rule of law reality, or simply the effectiveness of a legal system, but the 
relationship between the judiciary and other state powers, the executive in particular. 
Needless to say that it is very unlikely for a ruler to face external or internal 
opposition when announcing intentions to build an effective and centralised legal 
system. The primary aim, however, has not been pleasing audiences home or 
abroad, but to build a legal system to function as a tool to monitor and control the 
citizenry and the state apparatus. 21 In a closed society where the political rights are 
oppressed there are no alternative sources of information. At the same time it is 
crucial for the ruler to monitor his subjects, particularly the potentially dissident 
citizens, closely. 212 
It has to be acknowledged, nevertheless, that although being the primary actor the 
executive has not been able to fully manipulate all the developments within the legal 
system. Studies suggest that despite the hidden agenda of the executive, the 
judiciary in Egypt has been able to use the changing circumstances to their own 
benefit. Rosberg claims that the Egyptian judiciary has increased its autonomy and 
independence since the 1970s. 213 According to Brown, courts in Egypt and the Arab 
Gulf appear to be relatively effective. 214 In addition, there are also factors outside the 
208 EI-Morr (1997), p. 239 and p. 245; Hill, Establishing the Doctrine of Judicial Review in Egypt and 
the United States(1997), pp. 312-313; Gabr (1997), p. 278-280; Khalil, The Judicial Review on the 
Constitutionality of Legislative Apportionment in Egypt: A Comparative Study(1999), pp. 306-307. 
707 Rosberg (1998), p. 12. 
210 Brown (1998), pp. 237-238. 
211 Brown (1998), p. 237. 
212 Rosberg (1998), pp. 10-12. Rosberg has classified three ways of the presidency gaining 
information in Egypt. First, the citizens were allowed to make formal complaints about civil servants. 
The courts could monitor the police and security forces, while the constitutional court's duty was to 
guarantee that contents of the laws are in line with the intentions of the law-maker 
13 Rosberg (1998), p. 9. 
214 Brown (1998), p. 16. 
52 
state apparatus that have an impact on the legal systems, at least indirectly. 
According to Brown, Cairenes consider the legal forum only as one way of solving 
disputes, "simply one tool among many". 215 Thus it is not surprising that the rulers 
and the ruled perceive courts in a "very different but quite complementary" way. 216 
Citizens evaluate (and use) the courts based on their usefulness, not according to 
the fairness of the judgements made. Thus both rulers and ruled judge the courts 
based on (personal) benefits gained, regardless of `justice' or `fairness'. So, can it be 
argued that the positive developments can be partly coincidental? Or are the other 
actors able to `exploit' the situation for their benefits? 
215 Brown (1998), p. 238. 
216 Brown (1998), p. 238. 
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2.4.2. Arab Constitutions 
Constitutions are not recent phenomena in the Middle East, yet studying the 
contemporary constitutional law by western scholars is. 217 According to Nathan 
Brown, the study of constitutions has been unjustifiably neglected for a century owing 
to cynicism both among the scholars and lay men and women. 218 This is not, 
stresses Brown, exceptional for the Arab Middle East. According to Brown, 
constitutions are actually more frank and less hypocritical than assumed. 219 Studying 
constitutions is important not only to define the relationships between the main state 
actors, but also in order to see whether the constitutional design enables and/or 
supports the rule of law. Implementing constitutions according to the spirit of the 
constitution (as they were meant to be enforced) does not guarantee the realisation 
of the rule of law as long as the elements required are missing from the constitution. 
In the Arab countries the constitutions have rarely been vehicles of 
constitutionalism. 220 This is what distinguishes the Arab constitutionalism from its 
western counterpart. In the West constitutions were constructed to answer the 
competing demands from different political groups, both ruler and the ruled. 
Constitutions in the developing world, argues Nathan Brown, are outcomes of 
different development processes and are born in more divergent historical contexts 
than the constitutions of established democracies. The constitutions from the colonial 
era, more or less imposed by the colonial powers, were created to protect the 
interests of the external powers, not primarily the interests of the subjects of the 
constitution. In addition, in some cases the colonial actors were not subject to local 
legislation at all. 221 
217 Vogel, Conformity with Islamic Shari'a and Constitutionality under the Article 2: Some Issues of 
Theory, Practice, and Companson(1999), p. 525. The western interest in the constitutionality and the 
contemporary laws began in the 1990s, while the first constitutions in the Middle East were drafted in 
the nineteenth century. Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World(2002), p. 16. The very first 
written constitution in the Arab world was created in Tunisia in 1861. The other Arab countries wrote 
their constitutions when gaining independence in the twentieth century. Brown (2002), p. 54. 
218 Brown (2002), p. 3. 
219 Brown (2002), p. 6. Research on Soviet and Nazi systems can be seen at least as a partial 
explanation for the scarcity of research on constitutionalism. The Soviet and Nazi constitutions were 
found to be relatively useless when explaining the political 'reality': constitutions were seen as pure 
faýades. 
22 See Brown (2002), p. 93. 
221 Brown (2002), p. 62. 
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In the case of the Arab Middle East there seem to be only one main function of 
constitutions. Since the colonial times constitutions have been used to augment 
political authority: to guarantee the autonomy of the state structures and to define the 
relationships among the rulers. It could be also justified to perceive some 
constitutions in some cases as expressions of newly-gained sovereignty, depending 
on the contents and the timing of the documents. However, there is little to show that 
the Middle Eastern constitutions have been used to make grand ideological 
statements, unless considering the Iranian constitution as such. 222 The early 
`independent' constitutions were created to promote fiscal and political reforms seen 
as necessary by the executive. The more recent constitutions were promulgated to 
define the political structures, processes and succession mechanisms. Instead of 
constraining political power and empowering citizens, Arab constitutions have been 
aiming at clarifying the power relations and the chain of command among the 
members of the ruling elite/s. Consequently constitutions do not necessarily have 
anything to do with democratisation of the regime, but with the political realisation of 
the workings of the regime. 223 The aim has been more to "force rulers to live by rules 
they make for themselves". 224 This gradual movement is possible as long as the 
rulers do not feel (too) threatened and see it as a stabilising force. 225 
Thus political democracy and constitutionalism are not part of the same historical 
movements. Combining the two has been a result of more recent developments. 226 
Therefore, it is justified to assume here that democratisation processes that have 
taken place in (pre)industrialised Western-Europe and in the post-modern "non- 
originating" countries have (at least) some fundamental differences. Once again it 
would be logical to argue that theories founded on the developments in one part of 
the world, or over different historical period might not be appropriate explaining 
(predicting) developments in all contexts and all periods. Perhaps in the case of the 
222 Brown (2002), pp. 10-12. Constitutions in the Arab Middle East, argues Brown, are generally 
designed to serve one of these three purposes: to augment political authority, pursue constitutionalism 
or serve as a symbol of sovereignty or an ideology. 
223 Brown (2002), pp. 195-196. 
224 Brown (2002), p. 197. 
225 Brown (2002), p. 197. 
226 Brown (2002), p. 198. 
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Arab Middle East, like the rest of the developing world, the `one-size-fits-all' 
approaches should be abandoned. 
Arab constitutionalism, argues Nathan Brown, has made parliaments and judiciaries 
in the Arab countries constitutionally weak. The two other state actors are not 
guaranteed those institutional elements essential for their autonomy as parts of 
political democracy. Brown, nevertheless, believes that some steps have been taken 
on the "constitutionalist path", albeit relatively modest ones. 227 The basic requirement 
is guaranteeing the autonomy of the legislative and judicial powers in order for the 
three powers to place constitutional checks on each other. The conclusions made by 
Brown contradict the conclusions presented earlier regarding the success of the 
Egyptian judiciary in promoting the rule of law and democracy. According to Brown, 
in Egypt, and regardless of the consistent attempts of the SCC to promote the rule of 
law there is no effective check on the government, nor is there a mechanism of 
constitutional accountability. 228 
When studying the Arab Middle East, as shown in the previous chapter, one cannot 
escape the debate on the role of Islam in socio-political life. The same applies to the 
constitutionalism discourse. The debate on Islamic constitutionalism229 is, or has 
been until recently, more or less theoretical. The primary aim has been to analyse 
the compatibility of Islam as a foundation of a constitutional order. Islam, as stated 
earlier, is not of primary interest here. It is assumed here that theocracy, Islamic or 
other, does not exclude constitutionalism. Furthermore, the interest here is more on 
existing political systems than on theoretical (or theological) possibilities. 
Recent trends to islamicise constitutions, however, are of interest here. In Egypt the 
constitution was amended in 1981 to alter the role of Shariah from being a source to 
the source of legislation. It is argued that by amending the constitution the political 
227 Brown, Islamic Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice(1999). 
228 Brown (1999), p. 505. 
229 Nathan Brown stresses that there are fundamental differences between Western constitutionalism 
and Islamic constitutionalism. In the West the source of the constitutional texts is human beings and 
the foundation of the constitutions is the sovereignty of the people. Islamic constitutionalism stresses 
that all law, including the constitution, the superior state law, is God-given. Furthermore, western 
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elite sought support from the religious groups. 230 There is no disagreement over the 
executive's involvement in the islamisation, but the impact of the amendment on the 
independence of the judiciary is another matter. Some scholars argue that, 
regardless of the intentions of the rulers, the strengthened position of the Sharjah 
has given the Supreme Constitutional Court more freedom to interpret the Islamic 
law through #tihad, independent reasoning. Others have reached different 
conclusions. Murray and El-Molla consider the Shariah to be a dominant force in 
shaping the SCC's decisions. 231 According to Brown, Iran and Egypt, the states 
experimenting with islamisation of constitutions, have not borrowed enough from 
Western constitutionalism. Brown claims that the failures to limit the power of the 
executive using the Shariah are caused by an excessive focus on the substance at 
the expense of the procedures. The Egyptian constitution has not defined what are 
the appropriate legal procedures within the Islamic law. This has not restricted the 
rulers, but rather left them with space to (freely) manoeuvre. In Iran, on the other 
hand, there is a body of religious scholars monitoring the implementation of the 
divine laws. 232 Thus, once again `Islam' does not have a fixed, easily predicted 
impact on either legal or political system. 
It would be fair to say that so far there has not been a vast number of studies on any 
elements of the rule of law in the Arab Middle East. Therefore, it is easy to claim that 
studies on any element of a legal system in any given state in the region are 
welcome. This is particularly true in the case of the object of this study. While Egypt, 
and the SCC, has gained most of the scholarly attention, there is hardly anything 
written about legal developments in Jordan, not to mention a shortage of work on the 
rule of law in Jordan. It is not claimed here that this study alone can fill the vacuum. 
On the contrary, more systematic approaches to study the `rule of law reality' in the 
Arab Middle East, Jordan included, are needed. 
Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that when examining constitutions in the 
context of democratisation, there is not necessarily a definitional relationship 
constitutionalism has been procedure-centred, whereas Islamic constitutionalism is more concerned 
with the substance of the laws. Brown (1999), p. 492. See also Brown (2002). 
230 Brown (1999), p. 504. 
231 Murray and EI-Molla, Islamic Shari'a and Constitutional Interpretation in Egypt(2000), p. 523. 
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between constitution and democracy, or between a constitution and human rights. 
Contemporary democratic discourse sees constitutions as essential for democracy, 
but constitutionalism does not need democracy. 233 
232 Brown (1999), p. 504. 
233 Brown (2002), pp. 8-9. Brown defines 'constitution' as "the basic legal framework for governing" 
and 'constitutionalism' as "ideologies and institutional arrangements that promote the limitation and 
definition of means of exercising state authority" 
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Summary 
Democracy and rule of law are currently both popular but disputed concepts; thus 
they are among those terms that require the strictest of definitions. The terms have 
been part of political reality only in a majority of states so far, yet both terms are 
currently widely used. There is a great demand for democracy and the rule of law 
among non-scholarly actors, such as politicians and international development 
agencies. There is presently no shortage of projects and programmes aimed at 
fostering democracy and/or the rule of law. Thus for sake of clarity it is essential to 
provide a clear definitions of the terms used for the purposes of this study. 
The aim of this chapter was not to solve the problem of competing, and sometimes 
conflicting, definitions, but rather to find working definitions for the purposes of this 
study. As the body of literature on democracy is massive, and ever growing, it must 
be noted that only the very key elements were presented here. `Democracy' in this 
study equates with `modern political democracy', a system of political governance of 
a modern state. Therefore, literature on other socio-political entities is not central for 
the purposes of this study, neither is the literature on non-modern democracies. It is 
assumed, following Birch and Sartori, that comparing the differences between 
democracies of different periods is not only very hard, but makes little sense when 
examining the elements of modern political democracies. 
Furthermore, this study has adopted the Schumpeterian-Dahlian definition: first and 
foremost democracy is a system providing the citizens the right to participate in 
public decision-making. This definition includes electing governmental officials, free 
and fair elections, universal suffrage, availability of information other than official and 
political rights provided to the citizens. These elements establish requirements for 
the entire state, not just for the legislative body. For citizens there is very little use in 
having the right to (indirectly) pass laws, if there is no body guaranteeing 
implementation of the laws passed. Thus modern political democracy is not only 
`electoralism' (electing representatives); a functioning legal system embodying the 
rule of law is required as well. 
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Here the rule of law will be defined in formal terms, including only juristic 
requirements. Qualities of laws (distinguishing laws from other collective norms) are 
important but the substance of laws as such is not. The contents of laws, like human 
rights, are thus excluded: whether laws are morally good is irrelevant to this 
understanding of the rule of law. It is believed here that in a modern political 
democracy the right to cast critical judgements on the laws is primarily reserved for 
the citizens of that particular state. The substance of laws will become a matter of 
interest only if they are in contrast to the central legal principles (e. g. being 
unconstitutional). Although the formal definition places no requirements for the 
substance of the laws, the definition is based on certain ideas of `law'. It is important 
that all citizens are obliged to obey the laws regardless of their social status; law 
being the same for all. A law has a number of other qualities: clarity, prospectivity, 
and generality. Furthermore, the practice of the rule of law is seen to include certain 
legal principles, such as rights to open access to court and fair trial. Legality is the 
foundation of this understanding of the rule of law. The laws are to be followed in 
every sphere of the socio-political life, both by ordinary citizens and the state actors. 
This study aims to stress the significance of the rule of law to modern political 
democracy. Therefore, it would be tempting to see `rule' purely in democratic terms. 
Yet here the rule of law is understood as something independent, a juristic principle 
able to exist without the `higher' (or the `highest') form of governance. Modern 
political democracy, on the other hand, is here seen as a political system of a 
modern state that cannot exist without an embedded practice of the rule of law. 
Therefore, it is assumed here, following de Walker, that the rule of law is 
independent of the system of governance, modern political democracy in this case. 
In the case of democratising countries, the existence of rule of law is a useful 
indication of democratisation. It must, nevertheless, be remembered that the rule of 
law is a significant, but not a sufficient element of political democracy. The mere 
existence of the rule of law is not enough to make a state democratic, but without the 
rule of law the state will not be democratic either. The legality in a modern political 
democracy is guaranteed when law-making - electing of representatives, passing 
laws and implementing them - is done without violating pre-known procedures. 
In 
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many systems there is a superior law, a constitution, to draw the lines for the legality 
of that particular system establishing what the procedures to be followed are. When 
considering the rule of law as something central to democracy, it must be seen as 
essential to the process/es of democratisation. Therefore, the literature on 
democratisation needs to be analysed, including the attention reserved for the rule of 
law within that literature. 
It is acknowledged that the rule of law and democracy can be seen in extremes as 
contradictory principles. The rule of law to some equates at worst with the monopoly 
of the judiciary ("rule of judges" )234, while in a modern political democracy the power 
should be in the hands of the citizens. The general aims of the two terms are, 
however, compatible, when viewed in proceduralist and formal terms. It is worth 
noting that the definitions of the terms are particularly significant to this debate. 235 
The rule of law aims at reducing arbitrariness in the governance to provide autonomy 
for the subjects (citizens), whereas, broadly speaking, modern political democracy is 
providing the subjects with the right to participate in governing (making laws). The 
original aim of the rule of law, obeying laws not masters, was to introduce laws as 
methods of protecting the citizens from the political authority and each other, while 
democracy (rule by many) is about expanding the governance to all except the few 
(or one). 
There are some further challenges when studying the rule of law in the Middle 
Eastern context. The legal developments have been different in the Middle East (and 
elsewhere in the "non-originating" world) in comparison with the developments in the 
"Northwest". The pace of the emergence of the modern legal systems has been 
faster, and the role of external influence has been greater, (although, as some 
stress, the foreign influence has not been as profound as assumed). Furthermore, in 
the western context constitutionalism and human rights were connected to the wider 
political movements aiming at improving the status of citizens. 
" Maravall and Przeworski, Introduction(2003), p. 12. 
235 See Maravall and Przeworski (2003). 
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The role of the different cultural context cannot be wholly ignored. Yet, contributors 
sometimes rush into conclusions regarding the role and significance of Islam. The 
research on the rule of law and Islam can be seen as a part of a wider political 
discourse, the discourse on the Middle Eastern exceptionalism. Once again the 
western orientalists claim the incompatibility of Islam and the rule of law (seen as 
sovereignty of secular law), and the Middle Eastern scholars and younger generation 
of western academics aim to prove otherwise. It has to be remembered that there is 
no monolithic Islam. Furthermore, Egypt, the country seen as most progressive in 
relation to the rule of law, has a constitution that stresses the role of Islamic law as 
its guiding force. Not only has that been a goal mentioned in the text of constitution, 
but it has also been consistently enhanced by the decisions of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court. 
The existing literature on the rule of law in the Arab world has focused on the 
Egyptian judiciary. This is also the reason why in the latter part of this chapter Egypt 
has received more attention: the literature on the rule of law is simply unbalanced. 
This can be justified when considering the significance of the Egyptian example 
beyond its borders, and Egypt's role as a progressive Arab country. Nevertheless, 
other Arab Middle Eastern countries cannot be ignored due to the lack of legal 
positive developments. It would be in actual fact useful to examine why countries 
sharing same cultural beliefs (broadly defined) and similar historical background 
(colonialism, under-development) have turned out to be so different regarding the 
rule of law. Therefore, the incompatibility-compatibility debate seems irrelevant and 
unnecessary. Furthermore, democratic scholars working on the Arab Middle East are 
not different from the main stream democratic scholars: both have neglected the role 
of the rule of law (and the role of the legal systems) in relation to the 
democratisation. The main academic projects on democratisation in the Middle East 
have paid little, or no, attention to the legal matters. 236 To conclude, there is still not 
enough evidence on the legal developments in the Arab Middle East that far- 
reaching conclusions could be made. Therefore, shifting some of the attention to the 
legal institutions when examining the political developments it is argued here might 
236 Brynen et a/ Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab Worid(1998); Ghassan, 
Democracy without Democrats(1994). 
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make the existing literature a significant contribution, particularly when examining 
democratisation. 
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3. DEMOCRATISATION 
Introduction 
The working definitions of `democracy' and the `rule of law' were identified in the 
previous chapter. It is now time to move on to the next challenge. In spite of all the 
conceptual challenges of defining democracy it is still far easier to find a definition of 
democracy than to identify requirements for democratisation. One reason for the lack 
of consensus within the contemporary democratisation discourse might be the recent 
nature of democratisation as a global phenomenon. Modern political democracy, as 
Birch points out, is a relatively recent phenomenon: the earliest democracies were 
constructed in the nineteenth century Europe. 237 Furthermore, democracy remained 
a Western phenomenon until the very end of twentieth century. 238 The so-called third 
wave of democratisation has inspired a remarkable number of scholars and 
undoubtedly provided them, if nothing else, with a fair deal of material to be studied. 
This chapter aims to present the approaches to the study of democratisation. The 
literature of democratisation is examined in order to identify the challenges of 
examining democratisation, as well as achievements and shortcomings of the current 
literature. There are a few classifications of democratisation, of which David Potter's 
classification was chosen here. According to classification by Potter, there are three 
main approaches to the study of democratisation: the modernisation approach, the 
transition approach and the structural approach. Potter's classification is used here, 
as Potter is concerned with factors explaining the construction of democratic 
systems. There are other classifications based on direction of development (top- 
down vs. bottom-up) or a crude distinction between structuralist theories and 
others. 239 
237 Birch (2001), p. 72. 
238 Linz, Transitions to Democracy(1990), p. 143; Held (1992), p. 10. 
239 Potter, Explaining Democracy(1997), p. 10. There are also other classifications, some of which do 
not differ much from Potter's classification. For instance, Jean has classified three approaches into 
modernisation theory, historical sociology ("sometimes called structuralism") and the transition school. 
Grugel (2002), p. 46. Brynen et al (1995), p. 3. See Sannerstedt, Teorier om Demokratisiering(1994), 
p. 58; Hadenius, Democracy and Development(1995), p. 21; Waterbury, Fortuitous Byproducts(1999), 
p. 261; Rueschemeyer and Stephens and Stephen, Capitalist Development and Democracy(1992); 
Tilly (1997), p. 193. 
64 
It is important to note that the terms of democratisation and liberalisation describe 
differing states of affairs, or different processes. O'Donnell and Schmitter remind us 
that democratisation and liberalisation are not synonymous, as the latter can exist 
without the former. 240 Political liberalisation is "an expansion of public space through 
the recognition and protection of civil and political liberties". 241 Democratisation can 
be defined as being a process by which a state becomes a democracy. Brynen (et 
al) defines political democratisation as: "an expansion of political participation in such 
a way as to provide citizens with a degree of real and meaningful collective control 
over public policy". 242 The aim here is to find out how the theories perceive the 
democratisation process: what are the requirements for democratisation and once 
begun how is it maintained? Who are the main actors or elements to be studied, and 
how? 
The latter part of the chapter will examine the attention given to the rule of law within 
the existing literature on democratisation. The rule of law, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, is seen here as an integral part of modern political democracy - 
albeit also possibly existing independently. Thus the aim here is to study the 
literature in order to find out how the approaches to study democratisation perceive 
the role of the rule of law in democratisation? Does the literature on democratisation 
acknowledge the necessity of the rule of law? Is the rule of law seen as a condition 
for democratisation, or vice versa? 
240 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authontanan Rule: Tentative Conc', sýýýý>> C, 
Uncertain Democracies (1986), pp. 9-10. 
Brynen et al (1995), p. 3. See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), p. 7. 
242 Brynen et al (1995), p. 3. 
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3.1. STUDYING DEMOCRATISATION 
3.1.1. Modernisation Theory 
The core of modernisation theory, originating from the works of Seymour Martin 
Lipset243, is an assumption of a correlation between the degree of democratisation 
and socio-economic development. Lipset argues that more prosperous nations are 
more likely to maintain democracy. 244 Modernisation (e. g. industrialisation and 
urbanisation) is believed to improve human well-being both in material and 
intellectual terms. With prosperity education will be available for a greater number of 
people, increasing literacy rates and thus personal insights into political issues. 245 
The modernisation school examines relationships between different variables 
employing quantitative methods, in order to find universal (unilinear) correlations. 246 
Since the early days, the ideas of Lipset have been adopted for the purposes of 
hundreds of studies. 247 Hadenius considers modernisation theory to be the greatest 
one "in terms of adherents and research pursued". 248 Lipset's studies were followed 
by many, such as Daniel Lerner, Philip Outright, James Coleman and Bruce Russet, 
all of whom examined the impact of various socio-economic factors on 
democratisation (or political development). Nearly all the studies employing 
quantitative methods for examining the impact of socio-economic development on 
democratisation have found a positive correlation between socio-economic 
development and democracy. 249 
243 Potter (1997), p. 11. Lipset conducted a comparative studies on western industrialised countries 
and countries in Latin America. Based on the findings, he classified three different types of countries: 
democracies, unstable dictatorships and stable dictatorships. 
244 Lipset, 1980, p. 469. Lipset himself considers both Max Weber and Schumpeter as the biggest 
sources of inspiration regarding the definition of democracy. Lipset, Political Man, The Social Bases of 
Politics(1960), p. 27. 
Hadenius (1995), pp. 77-79. 
las Potter (1997), p. 12. 
247 Modernisation theory was inspired by the optimism felt in the West due to the impressive 
democratic developments in the 1950s-1960s. See Potter (1997). 
248 Hadenius (1995), p. 77. 
249 Hadenius (1995), pp. 78-79; Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy 
Reconsidered(1992), p. 96. 
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However, modernisation theory has since the 1960s lost its predominant position 
within the democratisation literature. The theory has been criticised due to several 
methodological and conceptual weaknesses, both in Lipset's studies and in the 
studies that followed. 250 The case of the Arab Middle East works as a telling example 
of the insufficiency of modernisation theory in explaining democratisation. There 
have been no notable differences in economic development in the Arab countries in 
comparison with other "non-originating" countries, yet results in political development 
have not been alike. Parts of the Arab world are even more economically developed 
than the rest of the developing world. 251 
Rather interestingly the increased prosperity in the Arab Middle East has not brought 
with it great political developments. On the contrary, there are a few `peculiarities' in 
the region. The rate of basic education in some Arab countries is lower than in Asia 
and in Latin America. There are less Internet users in some of the Arab states than 
on an average `developing' country. In relation to per capita income, following the 
modernisation paradigm, the number of literates should be higher in the Arab world, 
and the Internet access available to a larger number of people. The reason for the 
low literacy rates is more political than economic. Adult literacy campaigns have not 
been common in the Arab states, as they are considered to be politically sensitive 
matters by the executive. It is feared that increased literacy rates might lead to 
radicalisation of the impoverished classes. 252 Also the modest number of Internet 
users is rather a sign of authoritarianism (lack of individual freedoms) than a factor 
explaining the existence of authoritarian regime. This reminds us of the significance 
of the concept of political culture; or simply of insufficiency of pure material factors 
determining political development. First and foremost, the modernisation argument of 
the causal relationship between the degree of wealth and education can not truly be 
supported. Perhaps the appropriate question to ask is not whether the societies are 
wealthy enough but who is the wealth used and by whom? It must be also noted that 
250 Diamond (1992), pp. 94-95. Among the weaknesses are the static analysis of data, assumptions 
on linearity and limited use of the methods available at the time (e. g. multivariant analysis). Lipset's 
decision to divide the sample into two parts (European and Latin American non-democracies), which 
were treated according to different criteria, resulted in an anomaly. 
251 Sadiki, Towards Arab liberal governance: from the democracy of bread to the democracy of the 
vote 1997), p. 133; Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics(1997), p. 329. 
757 Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East(1996), p. 120. 
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Upset's argument was born after studying the `originating' countries. Perhaps the 
order or the course of democratisation, or both, are different this time around. 
Modernisation theory since loosing its attractiveness has been challenged by two 
more recent theories. Both structural theory and the transition theory are born out of 
scholarly dissatisfaction with the core arguments of the modernisation approach and 
the methods used. They will be presented next. 
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3.1.2. Structural Theory 
Structural theory, also known as historical sociology, is not concerned primarily with 
the degree of socio-economic development, but rather with changing power 
structures. Studies of democratisation should, it is argued, concentrate on different 
aspects of power (class power, state power and transnational power), as "democracy 
is above all matter of power". 253 According to structuralists, certain power structures 
are more significant than others for democratisation. Over time economic, social and 
political structures keep changing gradually, altering the circumstances offering 
either constraints or opportunities for political development and democratisation. 254 In 
contrast to modernisation theory, structural theory acknowledges the role of external 
factors in national political development. The findings of Rueschemeyer (et al) show 
that all of the three "clusters" of power are significant in democratic development, 
although they admit that it is too early to define the degree of external influence. 255 
Barrington Moore256 defines the "development of democracy" as "a long and certainly 
incomplete struggle" to replace arbitrary rulers and rules through widening 
participation in rule-making gaining an opportunity to participate in rule-making. 257 
The class-based struggle triggered by economic inequality would lead to increased 
participation and eventually to improved social and economic equality. 
258 No one 
single "highway" to democracy has been found and modernisation does not seem to 
always automatically lead to democracy. 259 Furthermore, the starting point does not 
determine the course of the process, but some starting points are more favourable to 
democracy than others. 260 Historical circumstances of each country, it is argued, are 
253 Rueschemeyer et al (1992), p. 4. 
254 Potter (1997), pp. 18-20. 
255 Rueschemeyer et al (1992), p. 159. 
256 Barrington Moore Junior's work laid the foundation for the structural theory. He examined 
transformations from agrarian societies into industrialised ones, aiming to explain why only some 
became democracies. While Moore has examined democracies of the first wave, Rueschemeyer (et 
al) used more recent case studies to modify the foundation of the theory. 
Moore, Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World(1966), pp. 
413- 
414. 
257 Moore (1966), p. 414. 
258 Moore (1966), p. 414. 
259 Moore (1966), p. 159; Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, (1999), pp. 168-169. 
260 Moore (1966), p. 415. 
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important, but there are also worldwide conditions (economic and technological 
development) to be taken into account. 261 
The starting point of structuralist studies is an assumption that a positive correlation 
between economic development and democracy is a fact everyone should 
acknowledge. The best way to search for the explanation is the use of comparative 
historical studies. It gives "insight into sequences and their relations to surrounding 
structural conditions". 262 Furthermore, comparative studies, Rueschemeyer (et al) 
argue, go beyond historical particularism. 263 Structuralism-inspired studies are not 
easy to find among the contemporary literature on democratisation due to the 
dominance of the transition approach. As Grugel points out, structuralism has 
become "unfashionable". 264 Historical sociology generally speaking with its roots in 
Marxism has become unattractive since the 1970s. Scholarly criticism is primarily 
directed towards the ontological and epistemological foundation of the theory. Some 
argue that the theory is based on a too simplistic world view, while others perceive it 
as entirely inappropriate. Furthermore, its emphasis on long-term structural changes 
has been contradicted by unexpected events in eastern and central Europe in the 
late 1980s. 265 
While the structuralist theory has more to offer than modernisation theory, adapting it 
here would be slightly problematic, not least to due the different definitions of 
democracy adapted. While the benefits of "formal democracy" are acknowledged, 
structuralists see "social and economic equality" as the ultimate goal of 
democratisation. 266 Furthermore, the comparative historical approach is not the most 
practical when this study focuses only a single country. Yet there is no denying the 
significance of the history of the country for its political development or the relevance 
of external factors. Once again it is stressed that it seems logical not to expect 
democratisation in the "non-originating" countries to occur in an identical order and 
261 Moore (1966), p. 427. 
262 Rueschemeyer et al (1992), p. 4. 
263 Rueschemeyer et al (1992), p. 4. 
264 Grugel (2002), p. 55. 
265 Grugel (2002), p. 55. 
266 Huber (et al) (1999), pp. 168-169. 
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manner with the "originating" countries. Finally, the argument of central role of the 
class struggle does not necessarily explain political changes in all countries. 
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3.1.3. Transition Theory 
Transition theory was born as a critique to Lipset's "functional concerns". 267 The 
fundamental idea of the transition theory is to see democratisation as a process 
proceeding through stages. The first stage leads to the establishment of democratic 
institutions and the second stage enables institutions to survive and endure, 
connecting the new institutions to other spheres of social life. These two stages - 
transition and consolidation - are analytically differentiated, although they might 
overlap or coincide. 268 
O'Donnell and Schmitter who were among the first to examine transition processes 
define `transition' as "the interval between one political regime and another". 269 
Democratic transition is a process that starts with the breakdown of the existing 
regime, "dissolution of an authoritarian regime , 270, and ends with establishment of 
democratic government, or at least some essential parts of democratic regime. 271 
The first studies focused on the role of domestic factors in the breakdown. The role 
of external influence is not denied, but transition studies, like the one by O'Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986), have shown that most democratic transitions have been set off 
by domestic factors. 272 
267 Potter (1997), pp. 13-14. Rustow criticised Lipset of presupposing that correlation and causation 
are same things. The 'founding father' of the theory, Dankwart Rustow claims that the focus of 
research should be shifted from "functional inquiry" (how to maintain democracy) to the "genetics" of 
democracy. The question how democracy comes into being is a more relevant one particularly when 
focusing on "developing regions". Rustow, Transitions to Democracy(1970), pp. 340-342. 
268 Encarnacion, Beyond Transitions. The Politics of Democratic Consolidation(1999), p. 485. 
269 O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), p. 6. 
270 O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), p. 6. 
271 O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), p. 6; Rustow (1970), p. 355. Here the difference between political 
liberalisation and democratisation is seen clearly. Democratisation refers to a fundamental change in 
a political system (a change of regime), whereas political liberalisation occurs within the existing 
regime. Liberalisation does not necessarily lead to democratic transition (change of regime). It might 
bring extension of political rights, like freedom of association, freedom of speech, but the power would 
still be in the hands of the same non-democratic leading coalition. Mainwaring, Transitions to 
Democracy and Democratic Consolidation, Theoretical and Comparative Issues(1992), pp. 298-299. 
Rustow (1970), p. 352; O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986). According to Linz and Stepan, transitions 
have begun with uprising of civil society, collapse of non-democratic regime, armed revolution or non- 
hierarchically led military coup. A push towards democracy might also come from outside the borders, 
as a form of foreign intervention (war or occupation). However, studies by Linz and Stepan showed 
that nearly all transitions began with serious divisions within the regime. Linz and Stepan, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
Europe(1996a), pp. 71-72. Shain and Linz (1995), p. 7; Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on 
Democratic Transitions(1990), p. 32. O'Donnell et al (1986); Fishman, Rethinking State and Regime: 
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The strategic problem of transition is to get to democracy 
without being either killed by those who have arms or 
starved by those who control productive resources. 273 
Unlike the two previous theories, transition theory focuses on actors. Democratic 
transition is seen as a product of negotiations. 274 As Schmitter puts it, "democracy 
still has to be chosen, implemented, and perpetuated by "agents",,. 275 Transition 
theory stresses that democratisation does not necessarily require 'democrats' but is 
rather born out a compromise of various competing interests. During the second 
phase, however, all actors regardless of their original commitment to democratic 
principles learn to accept the existence of the democratic institutions. 276 It is also 
argued that actors who are contributing positively in democratisation are not 
necessarily the same actors through all the phases. The task of political leaders 
during the final phase is to make other politicians and citizens to respect and believe 
in democratic procedures. 277 
While there is consensus on the definition of transition (a change of regime), defining 
consolidation has proved more challenging. A pioneering definition was offered by 
Przeworski, who sees a democracy as being consolidated when it is "the only game 
in the town". 278 There are no main political groups who wish to act outside the 
democratic system, even if they had lost the competition. Instead, they will try again 
by playing by the rules. 279 Playing by the rules, however, does not eliminate the 
uncertainty in the political system. Although a majority of the actors plays according 
to the rules, no one can predict the outcome of democratic processes with absolute 
certainty. 280 As Przeworski puts it, democracy is "a system of ruled open-endedness, 
Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy(1990), p. 426; O'Donnell (et al) concluded their 4-volume 
research stating the priority of domestic factors in transition. 
273 Przeworski (1991), p. 51. 
274 Przeworski (1991), p. 80. 
275 Schmitter, Interest Systems and the Consolidation of Democracies(1992a), p. 159. 
276 Rustow (1970), p. 358. 
277 Rustow (1970), p. 346. 
278 Przeworski (1991), p. 26. Przeworski's definition is widely used by other transition scholars. See 
Linz and Stepan (1996a), p. 5; Diamond (1999), p. 69; Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: 
Processes and Prospects in a Changing World(1998), p. 39. 
279 Przeworski (1991), p. 26. 
280 Przeworski (1991), pp. 10-11. 
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or organized uncertainty"281. The biggest challenge of examining 'consolidation' is 
measuring it: when is a political system consolidated? There are minimalist and 
maximal definitions of consolidation; more recently also intermediate ones. While 
minimal definition focuses primarily, or exclusively, on institutions, the broader 
understandings include also attitudes and behaviour of the central actors. According 
to Linz and Stepan, who have been named as the founders of "consolidology"282, 
consolidation can be assessed in three dimensions. 283 The beliefs and attitudes of 
political leaders as well as the existence of rules and institutions enforcing 
democratic rules are central to this assessment. 284 
Since the 1970s, when Rustow published his work, transition theory has become the 
dominant theory of democratisation. The 1990s can be rightly named the era of 
transitology, as the third wave of democratisation not only inspired the transition 
studies but also offered a great deal of cases to be studied. 285 Potter stresses that 
Rustow laid the foundation, but other scholars elaborated the ideas into the transition 
approach. 286 There is, nevertheless, no coherent or elaborated body of literature, 
rather a massive body of literature on transition theme. 287 
281 Przeworski (1991), p. 13. 
282 Schmitter and Karl, The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to 
the East Should they Attempt to Go? (1994), p. 173. Bunce, Should Transitologists be 
Grounded? 1995), pp. 111-127. Schmitter and Santioso (1997). 
2113 Schmitter, Clarifying Consolidation(1997), p. 173; Diamond (1996b), p. 33; Merkel, Theorien der 
Transformation: Die Demokratische Konsolidierung postautoritärer Gesellschaft(1996), p. 38. 
Schmitter and Karl (1994), p. 173. 
285 Transitology is term adopted in the 1990s both by Economics and Social Science. While social 
science understands the transition as process towards democracy, economics see it as movement 
towards market economy. Boenker et al (1995). See also Schmitter and Karl, (1994); Bunce (1995). 
las Potter (1997), p. 15. 
287 Pridham and Vanhanen, Democratization in Eastern Europe. Domestic and International 
Perspectives (1994), p. 3; Hadenius (1995). There are three extensive research projects that can be 
seen as the foundation of transition literature. A project by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan examined the 
reasons behind the collapse of democratic regimes in periods of democratic crisis, the 1960s and 
1970s (The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 1978). The increase in the number of democratic 
countries inspired two projects: Scott Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Samuel Valenzuela's Issues in 
Democratic Consolidation(1986) and O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule(1986). The framework of these three studies has influenced the research agenda 
of later research to a great deal. Munck (1994), p. 356. See Linz and Stepan (1996a), p. 16; Berms 
Collier, Paths Toward Democracy(1999), p. 5; Fishman (1990), p. 423. Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule results from 'the Transition' project begun in 1979 at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The project 
aimed to examine the transitions occurred and occurring in Latin America and Southern Europe. See 
the Foreword by Abraham Lowenthal in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 
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The theory has been criticised for its overly optimistic view of democratisation. While 
the other two theories consider democratisation only as an exception globally 
speaking, transition school perceives democratisation as almost something 
inevitable. 288 The optimism is to a degree due to the timing of the theory. In spite of 
acknowledging the protracted nature of democratisation, the transition studies have 
concentrated only on short-term changes, ones located immediately prior to or 
immediately after the regime change. 289 However, this surely is not a co-incidence 
bearing in mind the emergence and the expansion of the theory alongside the third 
wave of democratisation. The optimistic tone could also be partly explained by the 
narrower definition of democracy. Unlike structuralism, the transition literature is 
based on a procedural definition of democracy. The theory has also been criticised 
for the lack of empirical evidence on which it is based. The major work has been 
done in Southern Europe and Latin America, which has led some to question the 
universal applicability of the findings. 290 Furthermore, transition theory-inspired 
studies focused on the central domestic actors and gave little or no attention to 
culture, development, history or international politics, argues Jean Grugel. 291 
In sum, there is no clear agreement on the various aspects to examine, or the 
definitions or methods to be used, or even the results to be achieved. This is partly 
explained by the large number of studies, and perhaps owing to the rather tolerant 
core arguments. The common denominator is the perception of gradual change 
through two stages. Pridham and Vanhanen summarise the contribution of the 
"theoretical school" within the transition literature as being less impressive than that 
of the "empirical school". The "theoretical school" has neglected the significance of 
international factors for regime change. The focus on the elites has perhaps been the 
most criticised. Some view that the concept of civil society should be included and 
the Eastern European experience has shown the central role of the masses. Finally, 
the historical background of transitions has not gained as much attention as it should 
have. 292 
288 Grugel (2002), p. 57. 
289 Grugel (2002), p. 59. 
290 Grugel (2002), p. 62. 
291 Grugel (2002), p. 61. 
292 Pridham and Vanhanen (1994), pp. 3-4. 
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Before the question of the usefulness of these three approaches to this dissertation 
is discussed the attention these approaches have given to the role of rule of law is to 
be examined. 
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3.2. THE RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRATISATION 
As within the democracy discourse, research on the rule of law has been neglected 
within the literature on democratisation. Mainstream theories of democratisation in 
their classical form do not pay much, or any, attention to the role of the legal system, 
or the concept of the rule of law. 293 Their primary concerns have been economic 
factors (Lipsetian modernisation theory), aspects of power (structuralists) and 
processes of negotiation and pact making (transition theory), as discussed earlier. 294 
There is, however, a small body of research, inspired by the classical approaches to 
the study of democratisation which has included the rule of law. This group of 
scholars has been growing over the last few years. 295 It is argued here that this 
group of scholars should be far bigger, because currently a majority of the classical- 
inspired research is based on the procedural view of democracy. Thus, following the 
previously presented assumption of the rule of law as a significant (but not sufficient) 
part of modern political democracy, the rule of law should be included in studies 
examining democratisation. 
The aim here is to identify what is known about linkages between the rule of law and 
democratisation. Unlike with other democracy literature, there is not much to be 
reviewed or many theories to asses. There is a severe lack of empirical evidence to 
support any theories or claims presented. As O'Donnell remarks, regarding the role 
of the rule of law, at the present it is only justified to present hypotheses. 
296 
Identifying a linkage between democratisation and the rule of law is challenging, as 
Grugel points out, due to the absence of an agreement on requirements to 
democraticise. 297 As long as is no consensus on requirements for democratisation, 
293 O'Donnell (2000a), p. 42; Rose et al (1998), p. 33. 
294 Grugel (2002), pp. 48-49 and pp. 52-53 and pp. 56-59; Potter (1997), p. 11. 
295 Maravall and Przeworski (2003). The book edited by Maravall and Przeworski is mainly 
focused on 
the debate on the compatibility between the rule of law and democracy. Linz and 
Stepan stress, for 
example, that there are three pre-requisites for consolidation: a state, elections and rulers who govern 
according to the rules. These three elements need to be assessed at 
five different interacting arenas 
of a consolidated democracy. The interacting arenas are civil society, political society, 
the rule of law, 
bureaucracy and economic society. Linz and Stepan, Toward Consolidated 
Democracies(1996b), pp. 
12-15. 
296 O'Donnell (2000b), p. 50. 
297 Grugel (2002), p. 68. 
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or pre-requirements, within the existing democratisation literature, it will be 
challenging to stress the significance of the rule of law. 
Some scholars think that democracy will strengthen the rule of law, others see that it 
is the development of the rule of law that will lead to democratisation. O'Donnell 
argues that it is the "incompleteness of a state", particularly its legal incompleteness, 
that causes the problems for democratisation. In Latin America, democratisation 
seemed to worsen the failures of the state. 298 Other political scientists stress that 
functional state apparatuses do not automatically lead to democratisation, but they 
will make it easier to tackle already enormous social and political challenges. 299Hills, 
on the other hand, assumes that it is democracy that will strengthen the rule of law, 
even if not fully guaranteeing its existence. 300 There is also a group of writers who 
see the role of the rule of law as being significant in a certain phase of 
democratisation, namely the consolidation of democracy. These writers stress the 
importance of the independent judiciary to the success of consolidation efforts. 301 
The question of the rule of law is of particular importance in the case of the new 
democracies and democratising countries. It is important for this study and the entire 
body of literature to find out whether contemporary democratisation processes are 
fundamentally different from the processes that led to the establishment of 
democratic regimes in the "originating" countries. It is worth noting that the 
"originating" countries the inclusion of civil rights occurred well before the inclusion of 
political rights. However, the construction of a citizen as a legal agency took place 
before the constructing of democratic systems, as a part of state-making processes. 
O'Donnell points out that in the case of the "non-originating" countries both the legal 
and political systems are imported. The state building and democratisation are taking 
place more or less simultaneously, making implementation of the rule of law even 
more challenging. This makes, O'Donnell argues, the democratisation process 
298 O'Donnell (1998), p. 11. 
299 Carothers (1998), p. 98; Larkins (1996), p. 604; Gruger (2002), p. 83. 
300 Hills, The Rule of Law and Democracy in Hong Kong - Comparative Analysis of British Liberalism 
and Chinese Socialism(1994), p. 1/18. 
301 Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation(1996a), p. 239; Shain and Linz (1995), p. 10; 
Przeworski (1991); Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and 
Conceptual Analysis(1996), p. 607. 
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fundamentally different in these countries. The rule of law is thus seen as a part of a 
modern state and a part of modern democracy. Furthermore, the "non-originating" 
countries are facing other fundamental problems that need to be solved as well (such 
as poverty, demographic explosion). 302 
This study is aiming to contribute to the current literature on the requirements to 
democratisation through examining the relationship between the rule of law and 
democratisation, providing that the political changes in Jordan since 1989 can be 
identified as democratisation. If democratisation is truly taking place in Jordan, it will 
be relevant for this purpose to identify the role of the rule of law in the 
democratisation process. Has the rule of law been embedded prior to the start of the 
democratisation process or has the rule of law been embedded during the process? 
This study does not only contribute to the literature by providing more evidence on 
the role of the rule of law in the democratisation process, but it also aims to 
contribute to the debate on the possible different nature of contemporary 
democratisation processes compared to the ones occurred in the "originating" 
countries. 
302 O'Donnell (2000a), pp. 40-43; Rose et al (1998), p. 33. 
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Summary 
This chapter aimed to introduce approaches to the study of democratisation. Drafting 
a general picture of the contemporary literature on democratisation was done in 
order to explain the challenges of examining democratisation. Not only was one of 
the goals to familiarise the reader with the commonly used terms, but also to define 
the main achievements and weaknesses of the main approaches. 
Regardless of the massive interest in democratisation and the ever increasing 
number of studies, there are still many unanswered questions. There is no 
consensus on the pre/requisites of democratisation, or on the dynamics of 
democratisation process/es. Also the question of the universal validity of the existing 
empirical data is at the centre of the debate. The existing literature has not yet 
answered satisfactorily whether democratisation will be a fundamentally different 
process in the contemporary world in comparison to democratisation processes that 
led to the emergence the first modern democracies. Despite the lack of consensus 
on many aspects of democratisation, it is widely agreed that democratisation is not a 
linear process initiated by a single group of factors. Rather, democratisation is 
perceived as a complex and lengthy process. 
What then have the three approaches presented in this chapter to offer for this 
dissertation? A bulk of unanswered questions? To start with it has to be 
acknowledged that some approaches are making a bigger contribution than others. 
Not surprisingly modernisation theory, already abandoned by many, is not offering 
much, and in the context of the Arab Middle East even less. The other two 
approaches have succeeded in drawing a less simplistic, nonlinear picture of 
democratisation. Furthermore, they have widened the methodological choices from 
the unjustified reliance on quantitative methods only. Structuralist theory is the only 
one to draw the attention to the role of external factors as a theory. While structural 
theory has stressed the role of external factors as one of the three main factors, it 
has to be acknowledged that later contributions have also recognised the existence 
of the external influence. This is an interesting point in relation to the `third wave' of 
democratisation, a large number of countries democratising simultaneously. 
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However, the comparativist approach does not serve the purposes of this study, as 
only one state will be examined here. Once more is known about the Jordanian 
situation, and any of the states in the Arab Middle East, comparative studies could 
be a logical next step. More importantly, the core argument of structuralist theory 
differs from the core assumption of this study. It is not assumed here that only a 
class struggle would start democratisation. Perhaps this has occurred in the past, but 
certainly will not explain all beginnings to democratise. Furthermore, the structuralist 
view of democratisation is based on a substantive view of democracy than that which 
has adopted here. As stated earlier, in the context of a "non-originating" country it is 
believed here that `maximum' definition is not realistic as a starting point. In addition, 
social equality is still a goal unachieved by many established democracies. 
Great contributions of the transition theory are the emphasis given to the gradual 
nature of democratisation and the role of actors. Establishing institutions of political 
participation (e. g. elections, multi-party system) does not mean that an authoritarian 
state becomes immediately and automatically a democracy. It does not mean either 
that all the actors involved are necessarily democrats. Thus the theory acknowledges 
the complexity of the democratisation process. Nevertheless also transition literature 
has failed to find satisfactory answers to the core questions of the democratisation 
discourse. Owing to the massive size of transition literature to pinpoint the most 
common weaknesses is a time-consuming task and does not serve the purposes the 
study. The aim here was not to assess the quality of the entire transition literature, 
but to identify any elements that could be useful for the purposes of this study 
through evaluating the core arguments of the theory. Based on the brief summary 
presented above it is possible to raise some general concerns. 
The main weakness of the theory, however, is the ambiguity of the core terms. The 
term consolidation is criticised being a challenging term to use as an analytical tool. 
How democratic does a state need to be before it can be considered as an 
established (consolidated) one? Is it beliefs, behaviour or central institutions that are 
at the core of consolidation? Acknowledging the challenges facing the students 
studying consolidation is perceived sufficient here, as the term transition is more 
central for the purposes of this study. Jordan needs to be identified as transitional 
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before consolidation becomes a relevant term. The theory has defined the start of 
the transition ("the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime"303) and the end 
(an authoritarian regime replaced by a democratic one). The transition process itself 
is left for lesser attention. Why does it start and what makes the process to reach the 
`right' destination? Transition theory stresses that transition can slow down, be 
stalled, change direction or stop altogether. Based on the uncertainty of the outcome 
it is argued here that it is not justified to label anything as 'democratic transition'. 
There are no guarantees that the dissolution of the existing regime will actually lead 
to an establishment of a democratic regime, although the optimistic label might 
suggest so. It is argued here that only in cases where the democratic outcome is 
known it is justified to label the process as `democratic transition'. 
If it is argued that the methods and arguments of modernisation theory, the core 
assumptions of structural theory and definitional weaknesses of transition theory are 
not taking us any closer in finding answers, how then should democratisation be 
examined? Following the basic assumptions of this study, the rule of law should not 
be ignored when studying democratisation. The rule of law (as a term) has been 
neglected by the contemporary classics among the democratisation literature, 
particularly by modernisation theory and structuralism. Only a minority of scholars 
acknowledge the centrality of the rule of law to democracy, and thus also to 
democratisation. This study aims to draw attention to this weakness by examining 
the political changes taking places in Jordan through assessing the rule of law in the 
country. 
The attention of this study cannot be exclusively on the rule of law, as it is also 
claimed that a state does not have to be a democracy to have an embedded rule of 
law. In order for the citizens to participate in the law-making a significant degree of 
transfer of power from the non-democratic political elite has to take place. Not only 
has the small political elite to share the legislating with the citizens, but they must 
also be subordinate to law like any other citizens. In the context of democratisation, 
"dissolution" of the existing regime, as suggested by the transition school, is 
considered here as a preliminary sign of fundamental change taking place within the 
303 O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), p. 6. 
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political system. A state to be qualified as democratising has to show serious signs of 
transferred power: the political elite that has had the monopoly of legislating and the 
luxury of being above the law has to give up these privileges. Currently not enough is 
known about the role of the rule of law in democratisation in order to make any 
assumptions of the order of the development. There are, however, two possibilities 
with regard to the rule of law. The rule of law can exist prior to democratisation or to 
be seriously embedded during the democratisation process. In the latter case signs 
of transfer of political power is not in itself sufficient enough, there must also be 
convincing attempts to improve the rule of law situation. If in the case of Jordan, 
there are evidence of both (the rule of law and transfer of power), the political 
changes can be justly identified as democratisation. Yet if there is only evidence of 
transfer of power, political changes cannot be perceived as democratisation, as the 
new democratic practices are not protected from arbitrary behaviour of the political 
elite. In the case that there is evidence of embedded rule of law but no transfer of 
power, it is argued that a pre-condition for democratisation exists. 
So far the attention within this study has been devoted to the developments within 
the democracy and democratisation discourses. Therefore it is time to move the 
focus closer to the object of this study. The next chapter will offer a summary of the 
theoretical arguments that are the basis of this study. The aim of the fourth chapter is 
to introduce the elements to be examined this study and how they are going be 
approached. The fifth chapter will introduce the object of this study: the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan. This done to familiarise the reader with the context of the study 
and to present the reader with the unique factors related to the political life in Jordan. 
The current political elite in Jordan will be introduced in order to be able later in the 
study to judge whether any transfer of power is taking place within the current 
regime. Are the political changes signs of the dissolution of the current political elite? 
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4. EXAMINING THE RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRATISATION IN THE 
HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN 
4.1. The Research Challenges 
The aim of this study is to examine whether the political changes that have taken 
place in Jordan since 1989 can be correctly understood as indicating a process of 
democratisation. Studying (alleged) democratisation, it must be acknowledged, is not 
the most straightforward task, not least due to the challenges raised by the terms 
used. In spite of the vast body of literature on democratisation the role of the rule of 
law remains an uncovered element of democratisation. There is not much empirical 
evidence on the relationship between the rule of law and democratisation. In the 
"originating countries" the rule of law as an element of political practice has existed 
longer than political democracy. Some scholars argue, nevertheless, that in the 
contemporary world the order of the development is reverse. Therefore, it will be of 
interest here to examine, whether the rule of law (the judiciary in particular) has 
contributed to democratisation, or vice versa. To make it more challenging the object 
of this study - the Hashemite kingdom - is a "non-originating" country from a region 
where lack of democratisation is more the norm than the exception. 
Defining how to assess the rule of law in Jordan proved to be one of the most 
challenging tasks of this study. This was not least to do with the failure of the existing 
literature to produce satisfactory measures for the rule of law. Carothers argues that 
the current growing interest in the rule of law, particularly on the donors' side rests on 
"disturbingly thin base of knowledge at every level - with respect to the core rationale 
of the work, the question where the essence of the rule of law actually resides in 
different societies, how change in the rule of law occurs, and what the real effects 
are of changes that are produced". 304 It is acknowledged here that finding all- 
encompassing measures for the rule of law is a massive project, something that is 
beyond this study. In addition, there are not excessive amounts of literature either on 
the rule of law in Jordan or on any other legal matters in Jordan either. There are 
304 Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law: the Problem of Knowledge(2003), p. 13. 
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studies of some of the elements of the rule of law, but no real comprehensive efforts. 
Thus, there are no previous studies to use as a starting point or whose (measuring) 
approaches may be developed further. The lack of basic research on the rule of law 
in Jordan, however, is in itself an invitation and an encouragement. 
One option to examine the rule of law is to import measures developed elsewhere 
into the Jordanian context. There are no comprehensive sets of measures for the 
rule of law, but performance of a legal system has been routinely measured in many 
countries. It has to be noted that most of the performance measures have been 
designed to be applied in more established legal systems. Thus, they are not 
necessary always very useful for studying less established systems and should be 
used with a certain amount of caution. Those measures do not necessarily take into 
account the special problems in a developing context, such as corruption, traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms and rights-consciousness. They can also be too 
expensive and time-consuming. Moreover, some of the data required is not 
necessarily even collected in some countries. 305 Furthermore, partly due to the 
above mentioned limitations, the aim of this study is not to assess the effectiveness 
of the entire legal system in Jordan. The objective here is to make one of the first 
attempts to assess whether the rule of law exists in Jordan. Measuring the 
effectiveness of the Jordanian legal system is a challenge due both to the sensitive 
nature of the exercise and to the serious lack of reliable data. 
Bearing in mind all the limitations, it was decided to tackle the research question by 
examining constitutionality, the independence of the judiciary and political 
participation. These three elements are central to modern political democracy. The 
first two are fundamental to the rule of law, while the third one is an element often 
focused primarily or exclusively when studying political democracy. Adapting an 
juristic understanding of the rule of law means that instead of the substance of laws 
the attention here will be on the constitutionality of the Jordanian political system. It is 
relevant to examine whether the `rules of game' are respected, whether the laws are 
passed and implemented as described in the constitution. The judicial independence 
can be part of constitutionality, but as such is also a cornerstone of the rule of law. It 
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must be stressed that when examining only the rule of law, analysing the third 
element is not a necessity. However, when examining democratisation analysing the 
elements of the rule of law is not optional. 
305 See Messner; http: //wwwl . worldbank. org/publicsector/legal/performancebrief. 
htm 
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4.2. Constitutionality 
The constitution of the Hashemite kingdom is the first element to be studied. 
Constitution here is understood as "systems of laws, customs and conventions, 
which define the composition and powers of organs of the state, and regulate the 
relations of the various state organs to one another and to private citizens". 306 The 
Jordanian constitution as a text will be examined in two respects: as a charter for 
government and a potential vehicle of constitutionalism. The constitution does not 
automatically function as the great passage - expressing Constitutionalism, or as the 
grand symbol of democratic governance, but as a blueprint on how to organise the 
state actors. 307 This is not to say that the Jordanian constitution is automatically 
considered unconstitutional or undemocratic, but rather that it is not necessarily 
either. The starting point for the analysis is that the constitution is primarily a charter 
for government, but can also be a guarantee of political freedoms. 
Firstly, the constitution, whether a vehicle of constitutionalism or not, has a significant 
function in defining the basic rules to be followed, the state actors and the powers 
granted for them. Institutional powers do not only differ from post to post, and 
sometimes from situation to situation, but different powers are provided to the central 
participants in different systems. It will be of interest here to examine whether signs 
of "Arab Constitutionalism", as suggested by Nathan Brown, can be observed in the 
Jordanian case. Is the constitution used to guarantee the autonomy of the state 
structures and to define the relationships among the rulers? Does the executive use 
any elements, such as the legal system, to strengthen its own position? The second 
reason to study the Jordanian constitution is to find out whether as a text it provides 
the required elements for the rule of law and for modern political democracy. It is 
relevant for this study to examine if the constitution in force includes elements of 
306 Hood and Philips and Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law (2001), p. 5. 
307 'Constitutionalism' is a term normally used to refer to a Western ideology aiming at constraining the 
state powers (via constitutions). It has been acknowledged since that constitutions are not necessarily 
either the vehicles of political progress or breakthroughs in great liberalisation struggles. 
Furthermore, 
constitutions do not necessarily guarantee any degree of democracy. 
See Brown (2002). Brown 
distinguishes between 'liberal constitutions' and 'constitutions', to stress that not all constitutions are 
necessarily 'liberal' documents. 
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modern democratic systems. Furthermore, as the object of the study is a country in 
the Arab Middle East, is Islam given a special role or status in the constitution? It will 
be relevant to identify whether so-called islamisation of the constitution has occurred 
in Jordan, like in Egypt and Iran. If islamisation has occurred, it will be important to 
find out the motive behind it. Has Islam used as a tool to manipulate the citizens or is 
there another reason for the possible islamisation? 
In addition to analysing the text of the constitution, the aim here is also to assess the 
implementation of the constitutional framework: the constitutionality in Jordan. Have 
the central actors respected the constitutional constraints? Are weaknesses in the 
constitutional framework, if there are any, due to the design or the implementation? 
The question of the implementation of the constitutional framework will be analysed 
in the context of the other two elements: the judiciary and political participation. 
Defining the constitutional framework is naturally done by examining the Jordanian 
constitution, or more precisely the constitutions. Here with `the constitution' it is 
referred to the current constitution in a form it exists today (with the amendments) 
while `the 1952 constitution' is used when referring to the non-amended constitution, 
the original text of the constitution as it was in 1952. Special attention will be given to 
the amendments made since the early 1950s. Have the amendments significantly 
changed the constitutional framework? Who is behind the amendments and what 
might their motives have been? 
In both cases English versions of the constitutions will be used. Quite unexpectedly 
one of the most difficult challenges when collecting data for the purposes of this 
study was to get hold of a copy of the original constitution. The Law Faculty of the 
University of Jordan, the only law faculty in the country, did not have a copy of the 
non-amended one. When a `1952 non-amended' copy was specially requested, 
(after several days of waiting) an amended copy of the constitution was received. 
Also the collections at the university library (University of Jordan) did not include the 
original 1952 constitution, nor did the library at the Parliament. The original copy was 
finally found at the collections of the British Library, when back in England after the 
field research. Yet it must be stressed that it is not argued here that the above 
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mentioned institutions do not have copies of the original constitution in Arabic, as 
such was not searched for. It is acknowledged here the primary aim should be 
examining documents in their original language. However, in this case Prof. 
Hammouri kindly checked the usage of the legal terms in the English version of the 
1952 constitution. 
Regarding the constitution, Professor Muhammad Hammouri has proved to be the 
most valuable source of legal expertise. He is a rare legal scholar in the Jordanian 
context, as he is not only practicing law but also actively researching Jordanian 
contemporary public law. Therefore, this study relies heavily on materials produced 
by Hammouri, particularly on his article on the temporary laws. 
The National Archives at Kew have been consulted for the purposes of this study. 
Yet it has to be stressed that many British Foreign Office documents useful for the 
purposes of this study were not yet available. The file F0437 is confidential print and 
remains closed until 2007, F0816/176 until 2012 and the file DEFE11/173 is retained 
by the department under section 3.4. However, in spite of these closed files the 
documents that were accessible are used here whenever appropriate. 
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4.3. The Judicial Independence 
The judiciary, the second element to be studied, is the foundation of the rule of law. 
"Judges are both part of the apparatus of the state and part of the mechanism that 
holds the state actors accountable. This requires them simultaneously to uphold the 
public order and to correct the actions of public authorities". 308 In order to be able to 
fulfil its responsibilities the judiciary should enjoy a sufficient degree of independence 
from the other state actors. 
It would be ideal to examine the functioning of all state institutions - elected and non- 
elected - when analysing the rule of law. This study focuses on the judiciary, the 
backbone of the legal system, as the resources available are limited. It would not be 
justified, or very useful, to concentrate solely on the other parts of the state 
apparatus when no basic study has been done on the judiciary. Once the basic 
research is done, then the natural next step would be to expand the focus to other 
elements of a state apparatus: the police force, the armed forces, the bureaucracy. 
This would be a massive task, too massive for this study, particularly considering the 
limitations placed by shortage of basic research and limited data. 
The Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary of the United Nations 
General Assembly (1985)309 will be used here to assess the independence of the 
judiciary. The inspiration to use the UN Basic Principles comes from Sherif and 
Brown, who used the principles when conducting a comparative study on the 
independence in the Arab countries. 310 Not only does Jordan belong to the UN 
family, but also the UN Basic Principles have been accepted and adopted by the 
Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession, as part 
of the Beirut Declaration of 1999. 
308 Sherif and Brown, Judicial Independence in the Arab World( 2002), p. 1. 
309 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 
htt : //www. unhchr. ch/html/menu3/b/h com 50. htm 310 Sherif and Brown (2002). 
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The Basic Principles, twenty in total number, are divided into six categories: (1) 
independence of the judiciary, (2) freedom of expression and association, (3) 
qualifications, selection and training, (non-discrimination) (4) conditions of service 
and tenure, (5) professional secrecy and immunity and (6) discipline, suspension and 
removal. It is worth noting that some of these elements are easier to assess than 
others in the case of Jordan, mainly due to the availability of data. It also worth 
acknowledging, as Sherif and Brown point out, that the second set of principles is 
less straightforward. In some legal systems political activism of judges is restricted, 
since the neutrality of judges is considered as one of the main requirements of a 
modern legal system. 31 1 However, the aim here is to cover all six categories, yet 
acknowledging that some can be covered in more detail than others. 
Considering the limitations set by the resources available and the subject to be 
studied, the emphasis is on the first set of principles, as it is considered here as the 
most essential one. According to this set, independence must be guaranteed in the 
constitution and respected by the state agencies. There cannot be extrajudicial 
bodies; judges should be the only actors authorised to practice legal authority. This 
means also that judicial procedures cannot be subjected to revision and appropriate 
resources must be provided for the judiciary. On the other hand judges themselves 
must guarantee that the cases are dealt within a legal and fair manner. 
312 
It must be stressed that, as useful as the UN principles are in suggesting the 
elements to study, there is no minimum degree of independence defined. The Basic 
Principles do not include any indication of when the judiciary is independent enough, 
nor is there any hierarchy among the principles. As the judicial independence 
is a 
vast matter to tackle, the elements studied here are divided into `structural' and 
'decisional' independence. With the structural independence is meant material, 
physical working conditions and with decisional to procedural (and psychological) 
conditions constraining judicial decision-making. This distinction, like any, 
is slightly 
artificial. Sometimes it can be debatable whether something is more structural 
than 
decisional (or vice versa), like the matters of recruiting and promoting judges. 
311 Sherif and Brown (2002), p. 3. 
312 Basic Principles (1985). 
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Assessing the judiciary is one of the most challenging tasks of the study, as the 
means to do it are scarce. Naturally the first task is to analyse the Jordanian 
constitution (and other relevant legislation) in order to define the rights and 
responsibilities of the judiciary as well as define the structure of the legal system. To 
assess whether the existing legal system supports the independence of judiciary is 
then a different matter. As shown earlier, very little is written on the Jordanian legal 
system, even less on the judiciary in Jordan. The scholarly legal discourse on the 
legal developments in the country rests on the shoulders of one or two Jordanians. In 
addition to Professor Hammouri mentioned above, another legal scholar is worth 
mentioning here. HE Farouq Kilani, former Chief Justice, is among the few legal 
scholars producing legal studies in and on Jordan. 
A very obvious problem is the lack of data produced by Jordanian governmental 
agencies. The reasons for this are either the real lack of data or simply the 
unwillingness of the agencies to co-operate. Thus alternative sources of data 
collecting data were needed. There were two approaches to choose from: either to 
interview the providers of the services or the consumers. Interviewing the users of 
the judicial services proved a too massive task, as the resources (time and money) 
were rather limited. Also the timing of the field research (spring 2003, the ongoing 
invasion to Iraq) might complicate conducting large or medium-scale survey work by 
a European student. More importantly, interviewing citizens would provide views on 
the functioning of the legal system, not on the independence of the judiciary, which is 
the main object of this study. It is also worth noting that the consumers of the legal 
systems are biased by their own interests. It cannot thus be argued that they would 
have a universal perception of the legal systems. Therefore, the only workable 
solution was to collect the data needed through interviewing legal experts and 
practitioners. 
The understanding of the rule of law here, as stated earlier, places no requirements 
for the quality of the laws. It is argued here that the substance of the laws is an 
internal matter, something that the citizens of the state in question are responsible 
for, naturally within the restrictions made by international agreements joined and 
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ratified. Thus, the aim here is not to place Jordanian laws per se under scrutiny. The 
contents of law are, however, important if they contradict the constitution or each 
other significantly. Also the substance of the laws will be taken into consideration if 
brought up by a legal expert. The legal texts used here are either official or unofficial 
translations from Arabic to English. It is acknowledged here that some of the 
meanings may alter in the translated versions of the laws. 
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4.4. Political Participation 
The third element to be examined, political participation, is the one conventionally 
associated when studying democratisation. It is stressed here that while the attention 
cannot be solely on political participation when studying democratisation, it cannot be 
ignored either. The political changes taking place since the late 1980s to equal 
democratisation requires embedded rule of law and transfer of power. Dissolution of 
the non-democratic regime is considered here, as suggested by transition theory, as 
a sign of significant systemic change within the regime. In order for the citizens to 
gain the opportunity for collective decision-making, the role of the political elite has to 
be changed. The old non-democratic elite has to give up its privileges; to share its 
political power with the rest of the citizenry. The new elected political elite is chosen 
according to pre-known procedures and every citizen has an equal right to influence 
the selection of the political elite and to be selected. 
Political elite has clearly received more attention than the other two elements 
together and thus there is more data available. The attention here will be placed on 
the three elements at the core of the Schumpeterian-Dahlian definition of modern 
political democracy: free and fair elections (incl. universal suffrage), freedoms of 
political association and expression. Here political participation is analysed through 
parliamentary elections since 1989, political associations and press freedoms. This is 
done in order to find out whether the Jordanian citizenry is provided with a genuine 
opportunity to participate in law-making (e. g. electing legislators and to be elected) 
and whether the freedoms of association (political and other) and expression are 
guaranteed for the citizenry. The time period to be analysed is the period from 1989 
to 2003, starting with the parliamentary elections in 1989 and ending with the most 
recent parliamentary elections in June 2003. 
The starting point for analysing these three activities is the legislation covering 
political participation: the legislation in force and the amendments made since 
1989. 
Does the existing legislation support political participation? Do the laws related to 
political participation respect the constitutionality in Jordan? 
Has the legislation 
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changed significantly since 1989? If it has, does it currently provide the citizenry with 
a better environment for political participation? The legislation studied here includes 
the current constitution, laws on elections (1986,1989 and 1993) and political parties 
(1992) and the media freedoms (2001). The official English versions of the laws were 
used here, with the exception of the Press and Publications Law (2001). The official 
translations are all available on the website of the Jordanian government. The 
version of the Press and Publications law used here is an unofficial version 
translated by Sae'da Kilani. 
In addition to analysing the legislation, the reality of political participation is examined 
as well. How are the rights of the citizenry in relation to political participation 
secured? Have there been any significant changes since the late 1980s? This is 
done by interviewing commentators, Jordanians involved in domestic politics or civil 
society activities either through political parties or professional and civil society 
associations. Professional syndicates have had a significant role in the Jordanian 
society, particularly when political parties were illegal until 1992. Therefore, including 
the biggest professional syndicates was seen as being central to the effort to draft a 
realistic picture of political activism in Jordan. The aim is to examine the election 
turn-outs, the attractiveness of political parties and other associations. Are the rights 
guaranteed in the legislation part of political reality? Have there been any significant 
changes in the political reality for the Jordanians since the late 1980s? Have there 
been any differences in the three parliamentary elections organised since 1989? 
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4.5. Data Used 
The politically sensitive nature of the topic studied and the scarcity of reliable data on 
the legalo-political developments in Jordan has placed a few limitations on the 
methods for the purposes of this study. Thus it was decided that collecting qualitative 
data was the most appropriate method available. Interviewing Jordanian experts and 
key actors was the only way to find out detailed information on the implementation of 
the constitutional framework in Jordan, topic currently little examined. Interviews are 
also a good way to find "attitudinal information on a large scale". 313 
The "interview guide approach" was used as the model for the interviews. 314 A series 
of open ended questions was made to the interviewees. The core of the questions, 
and the wording of the questions, remained the same, yet the order of questions was 
not necessarily unchanged. Depending on the answers given by the interviewees, 
the order of the questions was not perceived to be significant, as long as all the core 
questions were answered. The different groups of interviewees were, however, given 
a slightly different set of questions. For example, the legal experts were all asked 
about the significance of a constitutional court, whereas this was not considered a 
question to be asked from the other groups. If respondents from the other groups 
brought up the questions of the necessity of the rule of law, they were allowed to 
express their views. The main strength of the unstructured interview was to find out 
how key actors and internal observers understand the situation in relation to the rule 
of law and what do the interviewees consider as central or important to the topic. 315 If 
the interviewee in question wanted to discuss the other elements studied here in 
more detail, s/he was allowed to do so. This was done not only to gain the trust of 
the person, but also as a way to gain information not anticipated prior the interview. 
Another advantage of using unstructured, open-ended interviews was to be able to 
make further questions about issues that were not known for the interviewer prior to 
the interview. 
313 www. trentfocus. org. uk/Resources/using%2interviews. pdf 
314 Rossman and Rallis, Learning in the Field. An Introduction to Qualitative Research(1998), p. 124. 
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There were four groups of interviewees recruited: legal professionals, 
representatives from the executive, politicians and civil society activists and 
`commentators' (researchers and analysts). The sampling method used here to 
recruit the interviewees was a mixture of two methods: a list of experts and the so- 
called snowballing method. A preliminary list of interviewees was drafted prior to the 
field research. Participants were chosen from names referred to in the literature 
reviewed, such as Leila Sharaf, the first female minister in Jordan. Not only the 
names mentioned in the texts, but the aim was also to interview contributors of 
documents such as the Jordan First initiative. General secretaries of the most central 
political parties and the biggest professional associations were included in the list 
due to their current positions. In addition, all interviewees were asked to recommend 
people who they thought were central to the debate. Once the recommendations 
made by the interviewees started to include no unknown respondents (experts 
already interviewed), it was considered as an indication of meeting the most central 
figures. 
It would not be possible not to interview the two legal experts mentioned earlier, 
Hammouri and Kilani. In addition to their extensive legal experience, both are still 
actively researching the legal system in the country. Other legal experts interviewed 
were practicing legal professionals, some with very extensive professional careers, 
some even held ministerial posts. Also the aim was to recruit legal professionals who 
participated in the Jordan First initiative's working group on the constitutional court. 
One of the legal practitioners interviewed, Dr. Anis Qassim, has even been involved 
in drafting the Palestine National Charter. One clarification has to be made at this 
point. Although the interviewed legal experts are without a doubt the best legal 
experts in Jordan, none of them is currently working as a judge. Unfortunately no 
judge in office was available for an interview. Thus the interviewed legal experts can 
provide first hand' answers from the perspective of an acting judge only from the 
period when they were still working. Yet quite a few of the interviewed legal experts 
still work as attorneys and have contact with the courts on a regular basis, thus being 
able to provide views from a different point too. 
315 Rossman and Rallis (1998), p. 124-126. 
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Recruiting interviewees from the executive proved to be the biggest challenge of the 
field research. Unfortunately no one from the Ministry of Justice or from the Ministry 
of Interior agreed to participate, despite numerous requests by the researcher herself 
and members of support staff at the Center for Strategic Studies, University of 
Jordan. However, former governmental officials such as former ministers and 
ambassadors, were recruited. The Research Department at the Ministry of 
Development and Planning offered help with matters indirectly related to the rule of 
law. 
The group of politicians consisted former and present Members of Parliament as well 
as members of the opposition. The aim was to recruit politicians from various political 
parties and politicians who have involved in the domestic politics long enough to 
cover the period in question (1989-2003) and also preferably prior to 1989. There are 
a few parliamentarians like Toujan Faisal, the first ever female parliamentarian in 
Jordan and Leith Shubeilat who simply could not be excluded from the list of 
interviewees due to their very visible role in the domestic politics in Jordan. As there 
are a large number of civil society organisations in Jordan, it has to be acknowledged 
that only a small fraction of the societies could be interviewed. Interviewing all civil 
society organisations was not even seen as necessary. The civil society activists 
were selected to represent the Jordanian civil society working on issues directly 
related to the rule of law: human rights and women's rights groups. To examine 
whether foreign civil society organisations were treated equally with the Jordanians, 
it was decided to recruit representatives from a number of international development 
organisations. 
The role of the commentators was two-fold: to share their perceptions on the rule of 
law in Jordan and to provide recommendations for recruiting interviewees. 
Commentators, like Mustafa Hamarneh (the Center for Strategic Studies, University 
of Jordan) and Hani Hourani (Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center), had also a central 
role in the snowballing exercise. As directors of well-known research institutions their 
help to recruit interviewees proved very useful, particularly to access the Jordanian 
parliament. 
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All interviewees were told in advance that the interviews are used for the purposes of 
this study only. Everyone agreed to be interviewed was explained that as their 
comments might be used as direct quotes their identities can be protected. The 
majority of the interviewees did, nevertheless, not feel that it was necessary. 316 
Furthermore, all people who were contacted, except the ministries and acting judges 
mentioned earlier, agreed to participate, even sometimes in very short notice. No 
recording was done as a measure to gain trust due to the sensitive nature of the 
topics discussed. The only exception was the interview of HE Farouq Kilani, as the 
interview was conducted in Arabic, assisted by an interpreter Dr. Axel Wabenhorst. 
HE Kilani gave a verbal consent for the recording prior to the interview and permitted 
using him as a reference. During the other interviews notes were taken and the notes 
were transcripted immediately after the interviews. 
It is acknowledged here that there are no perfect methods. Qualitative interviews like 
any other scientific methods have their flaws. First of all, the personality of the 
interviewer plays a significant role in the interview situation. 317 Therefore, the aim of 
the interviewer was to approach the issue as tactfully as possibly and to guarantee 
the confidentiality of the interview. The time of the interviews was particularly 
challenging, as the US invasion on Iraq had just began. Thus it was anticipated that 
during the course of the interview the interviewees might want to touch the issue of 
the legitimacy of the war on Iraq, even if not necessarily directly related to the 
interview topic. To avoid possibly confrontation, a special attention was placed on the 
wording of the questions. It was decided not to mention the word `democracy' unless 
the interview introduced the term during the conversation. This was also done to find 
out whether the interviewees would consider Jordan democracy or not. 
As most of the interviews were conducted in English, it is acknowledged here that 
the choice of interviewing language might have limited the recruitment of the 
respondents. However, it was also perceived that the nature of interviews 
(expert 
interviews)318 would allow the use of English, as most of the experts interviewed are 
316 Rossman and Rallis (1998), p. 49. 
317 Rossman and Rallis (1998), p. 125. 
318 Rossman and Rallis (1998), p. 134. 
99 
well-educated and several of the interviewees have studied or worked outside the 
Arab world. All interviewees were offered an interpreter. Only two interviews were 
conducted in Arabic: interviews of Farouq Kilani and Dr. Ahmad Shunnaq, the 
Secretary General of National Constitutional Party. The former interview was 
recorded and later translated by Dr. Axel Wabenhorst and the latter was translated 
by Alma Khasawneh. 
Another limitation is the possible "social desirability bias", respondents presenting 
themselves or the organisations that they are representing in the best light 
possible. 319 Bearing in mind that the interviewees might not provide entirely honest 
answers, triangulation 320, collecting data from diverse sources, was done prior to and 
after the interviews. The background of the interviewees was examined prior to the 
interview, most extensively in the rare cases where the interviewee was less known. 
In addition, at the beginning of the interview the interviewees were asked briefly to 
summarise their professional backgrounds. If an interviewee made `factual 
statements', s/he was asked to provide evidence supporting the arguments. The core 
arguments presented by interviewees were checked through examining other 
sources: newspapers, statistics (whenever available), other studies, other interviews. 
Some of the interviewees had made their opinions publicly known through the local 
and international media, thus in those cases finding newspaper articles or other 
published material to back up the arguments. 
All interviewees were allowed to make comments on the other elements studied if 
they made the initiative, even though they necessarily would not have direct 
information of the other `spheres', like politicians on the independence of the judiciary 
and legal professionals on the integrity of parliamentarians. These views and 
comments were treated as such, secondary comments, unless more evidence was 
presented. Sometimes these comments, however, provided impetus for further 
questions when interviewing people who might know more about the issues 
mentioned by non-experts. Naturally the source of the original comment was not 
319 Silverman, Interpreting qualitative data: methods for analysing talk, text and interaction(2001), p. 4. 
320 Marshall and Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research(1995), p. 
144. 
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disclosed. Most often, such arguments were made in passive voice: "Sometimes it is 
argued that... ". 
In addition to the primary data collected there are also some survey data available, 
produced by the Center of Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, and statistical data 
collated by the Jordanian government and the al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center. 
The Center of Strategic Studies, University of Jordan conducts annual surveys on 
the attitudes of the Jordanians on political life in the country and the al-Urdun al- 
Jadid Research Center has produced statistical data on parliamentary elections in 
Jordan. 
Analysing these elements is done in order to see if any real transfer of power has 
occurred in Jordan since the 1989 elections. If transfer of power has occurred, has it 
occurred to the extent that it is justified to see the political changes since 1989 as 
democratisation? 
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5. THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN 
Introduction 
The year 1989 was a remarkable one in Jordanian history, as the first parliamentary 
elections were held since 1967.321 Political changes did not stop with the elections. 
Further national elections have been held in 1993,1997 and 2003. A committee was 
appointed in 1991 to draft a new national agenda: the National Charter. Political 
parties were legalised in 1992 and a year later the second martial law period formally 
ended. The press were granted more freedoms. New Political Parties Law and 
Elections laws were passed. 
These changes were not unnoticed; indeed a fair deal of scholarly attention was paid 
to the changes. This literature on the political changes will be reviewed in this 
chapter. The aim of the review is to summarise how scholars have perceived these 
changes (their nature and significance), as well as how the conclusions were 
reached. The core of this debate is whether the changes that began with the 
parliamentary elections of 1989 constitute political liberalisation or democratisation, 
or something else. 
Before this can be done the object of the study, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is 
introduced. The objective of the summary is to introduce the main challenges the 
rulers of the kingdom have been facing since its creation and to establish the nature 
of the political system prior to the political changes that began in 1989. A concise 
summary of the main factors influencing the domestic political setting is provided. 
This is done to familiarise the reader with those political factors that are unique to 
Jordan, factors that must be taken into account when ruling the country and factors 
321 Cooper and Tilly, The Road to Democracy in Jordan. 1952-1993(1994), pp. 8-9; Brynen (1998), p. 
71; Rath, The Process of Democratization in Jordan(1994), p. 535. Parliamentary elections before 
1967 were firmly controlled and between the years 1967 and 1989 none were held. The lower house 
was dissolved in 1974, leaving the king and the senate to administer and legislate. In 1978, a National 
Consultative Council (NCC) was established. The 60 members of the council were appointed by the 
king. Their task was to discuss important matters but not to legislate. 
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that must be taken into account when studying the country. It is worth noting that no 
detailed historical narrative will be provided, as it is believed to be out of the scope of 
this study. 
An essential part of the political setting is the key actors, the political elite in this 
case. Alongside with the major political challenges, the Jordanian political elite will be 
introduced in this chapter. As defined in the first part of the dissertation, it is believed 
here that democratisation requires a significant transfer of power. The transfer of 
power will be examined in the next chapters through study of three elements: the 
constitution, the judiciary and the political participation. In order to assess whether 
any changes have been taken place within the political elite it is necessary to know 
the composition of the elite prior to and after the late 1980s. However, the objective 
here is not to provide the reader with a precise list of names and titles, but to present 
the general agencies of elite recruitment, and the rights and responsibilities of elite 
members. 
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5.1. Creating Modern Jordan: Challenges for the New Kingdom 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is "among the most artificial states in the modern 
Middle East"322, a region where artificiality seems to be a common denominator 
among most of the states. Even by Middle Eastern standards the Jordanian state is 
of recent origin323. The British made Abdullah bin Al-Hussein from Hijaz of Saudi 
Arabia the local ruler of the East Bank, the first (and only) Emir of Transjordan in 
1921. The colonial state was created "to accommodate the interests of a foreign 
power and an itinerant warrior in search of a throne". 324 The Emirate of Transjordan, 
later the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, had not only new and artificial borders 
drawn by the European colonial powers and a new capital, but also had no "quasi- 
national tradition , 325. The state was constructed, as Yorke and others point out, in a 
territory that has never been a separate political entity, nor was the territory an 
ancestral land of the ruling monarchs. 326 The common elements of national identity - 
a shared ideology, history and social culture - were all missing from the young 
Transjordanian state, a former Syrian region under Ottoman rule. 327 
Thus the construction of the national identity and legitimising the `artificial' ruling 
family were the main objectives of the initial state-building in Transjordan, as well as 
objectives adapted by later Hashemite kings. 328 Neither of the goals was easy to 
achieve but the geopolitical location, an artificial nation-state in the "heartland" of the 
322 Ryan, Jordan in Transition(2001), 5. See also Roberts, Prospects for Democracy in Jordan(1991), 
p_ 120; Krämer, The Integration of the Integrists: a comparative study of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia 
ff01), p. 218. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965 )(1972). 
Roberts (1991), p. 120. 
324 Aruri (1972), p. 3. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan acquired independence in 1946, but the 
foundations for the state had been laid two decades earlier. After the First World War (and the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire), the British governed Transjordan under a League Nations mandate. 
The British government officially recognised the colonial state in 1923, an event considered as a 
declaration of independence by Emir Abdullah, and ever since celebrated as the official Day of 
Independence. 
325 Roberts (1991), p. 123. 
326 Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel(1988), p. 7; Massad, 
Colonial Effects. The Making of National Identity in Jordan(2001), p. 11; Ryan (2001), p. 4. Abdullah 
bin al-Hussein from Hijaz arrived in Jordan with the intention of fighting the French army in order to 
restore his brother Faisal's rule in Syria. 
327 Sayigh, Jordan in the 1980s: legitimacy, entity and identitv(1991), p. 167. 
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Arab world, certainly did not make it any easier. 329 In total two `projects' of coercion 
and co-option have been required since the birth of the state: to make residents from 
the both sides of the River Jordan to accept the Hashemite rule. Creating a brand 
new national identity is never uncomplicated, but it gets even tougher when a set of 
new `domestic' actors is unwillingly annexed to the young state. While Abdullah I 
aimed at consolidate his position among the East Bankers, King Hussein aimed to 
"Jordanize" the Palestinians. 330 The degree of success of these projects is 
debatable. According to some, despite the constructed nature of the state, 
Jordanians' feeling of national identity is relatively well-rooted. Others argue that the 
goal has still not been reached fully, since the division between the Palestinian 
population and East Bankers still exists along with tribal loyalties. 331 Yet it is 
commonly agreed that the Hashemite rulers have succeeded in creating a common 
national identity shared by the East Bankers. 
The lack of a shared national identity, and the political developments home and 
abroad have not been the only constraints the Jordanian rulers have had to cope 
with. There are very limited natural resources in Jordan, and there is a chronic 
shortage of water. The state relies heavily on imported food, raw materials and 
energy. Despite the significance of the agricultural sector for the national economy 
Jordan is not self-sufficient in food production. 332 In order to survive revenues were 
sought elsewhere. Jordan has been dependent on external funding "from the very 
beginning": Emir Abdullah received monthly allowance from the British. 333 During the 
early years, until 1939 one third of the annual revenues were received from British, 
later the USA replaced the Britain as the main source of foreign aid. 334 
Jordan is a classic semi-rentier state, as mentioned in the first chapter. The rents 
consist of expatriate earnings, foreign financial assistance and small-scale oil 
328 East Bank (then a "subvision of villayet Syria") had been sending their representatives to the 
regional councils during the Ottoman rule. Abu Jaber, The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan: A Study in Political Development(1969), p. 220. 
329 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, Jordan a Hashemite Legacy(2001), p. 1. 
330 Massad (2001), p. 12; Baaklini et al, Legislative Politics in the Arab World(1999), p. 140. 
331 Krämer (2001), p. 219. 
332 Rath (1994), p. 536. 
333 Brynen (1998), p. 78. 
334 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 23; Brynen (1998), p. 78. 
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production. 335 The dependence on external rents is remarkable, but the central 
government is not the direct recipient of the rents, unlike in rentier states (such as 
the Gulf oil-producers). Jordan also battles with chronic trade and budget deficits. 
The country's "indigenous economic productive forces" are ineffective in comparison 
with the financial needs of the country. 336 The decrease in oil prices since the 1980s 
has had a detrimental effect on the Jordanian economy. Another blow was caused 
by the Kuwaiti crisis which forced nearly 300,000 Jordanian expatriate workers to 
return to Jordan. 337 As the rents decreased, the government sought funding through 
borrowing. The government as the main provider of social services and benefits is 
also the biggest employer in the country. The lack of natural resources has increased 
the dependency of Jordanians on government employment. 338 Moreover, owing to its 
location next to Israel/Palestine and to a large number of residents with 
"questionable loyalty"339, Jordan's foreign and domestic policies are heavily 
influenced by the political developments in the region. 34° These vulnerabilities, 
political and economic, have made Jordanian governments very conscious of the 
importance of external relations. As a result, Jordan is characterised as a state that 
is "traditionally pro-Western and Gulf-subsidised". ' 
In spite of all the challenges the Hashemite family has succeeded in establishing and 
maintaining a dynasty for a remarkable period. Even more surprising is the fact that 
they have done so when many Arab monarchies have not survived in the course of 
history. Thus the secrets of the Hashemite survival will be examined next. The aim is 
to identify the key strategies and agencies of the Hashemite rule, as well as to 
introduce the composition of the current political elite in the country. 
335 Brynen (1998), p. 72. 
336 Brand (1992), p. 168, Schlumberger (2002a), p. 226. 
337 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 77. 
338 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace 
Process(1999), p. 25. 
339 Brand, Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions: The Bases of Jordan's 1990-1991 Gulf 
Crisis Policy(1991), p. 3. 
Owen, Government and Economy in Jordan: Progress, Problems and Prospects(1983), p. 87. 
341 Brand (1991), p. 2. 
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5.2. The Political Elite in Jordan 
5.2.1. The Secrets of Success 
A great deal of hard work and balancing skills have been required since Abdullah's 
arrival in his new country, which was at the time a "strictly hierarchical tribal society" 
342 with no centralised power base and "the entire population organized along tribal 
lines"343. The task ahead was by no means a modest one and was not expected to 
be completed overnight. The very first challenge was to survive in an environment 
where nomadic tribal groups opposed any attempts to establish a centralised 
authority and the nationalists opposed the foreign presence in the area. 44 It was not 
until the 1970s when the scepticism of the longevity of the Hashemite rule began to 
disperse. During the two previous decades in particular there were serious doubts 
about the future of the kingdom, especially among British and American 
observers. 345 Two main vehicles, the army and the royal court, and a strategy of 
balancing between competing external and internal interest groups have been 
required to consolidate the Hashemite dynasty. 346 
The Hashemite monarchs have faced one challenge after another, particularly during 
the early years of the reign. There have been riots and protests, radical political 
ideas imported into the country and attempts on the lives of the Hashemites, and 
their closest supporters. 347 Both the army and the tribal groups have had a significant 
role in the survival of the Hashemites, particularly since the dismissal of the British in 
the late 1950s. The way King Hussein handled the domestic political crisis in 1957 
shows how the army and the tribes were used to secure the king's power. The 1957 
342 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 22. 
343 Alon, The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process: Mandatory Transiordan, 
1921-46(2005), p. 213. 
'144 - Massad (2001), p. 11; Aruri (1972), p. 4. There were popular uprisings, as the newly established 
state agencies (particularly the police and the army) were filled with people from outside the country. 
This was done, as the original population was mainly nomadic or semi-nomadic 
345 Susser, Jordan. Case Study of a Pivotal State(2000), pp. 17-18. 
346 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. xvii. 
347 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 39. Not only did the king abandon the Baghdad Pact, but 
also decided to dismiss Glubb Pasha, the last symbol of British dominance in Jordan. Singh, 
Liberalisation or Democratisation? The Limits of Political Reform and Civil Society in Jordan(2002), p. 
70. 
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constitutional crisis was also a turning point in the history of the Hashemite rule: it 
was the point when King Hussein had to show that he is charge of the -348 
The forced resignation of al-Nablusi's socialist government in 1957 led to public 
outrage and protests in the country and to counter demonstrations by the 
Islamists. 349 It was apparent that the democratically elected government was more 
popular among Jordanians than the monarch. 350 The inexperienced king was not 
only facing political pressure home, the political atmosphere was also "volatile" and 
"turbulent" in the region. There were new and radical political ideas arriving in Jordan 
and gaining popularity particularly among the "unwilling citizens". 351 Not long after the 
announcement of the resignation of al-Nablusi an attempted coup d'etat led by Ali 
Abu Nuwar, came to light. 352 Syria was believed to be supporting Nuwar, the head of 
the army known for his sympathy for the Left. 353 Ironically King Hussein had 
appointed Nuwar to succeed Glubb Pasha as the head of the army. 354 It is important 
to note that at the time the army was not controlled by king and its loyalty to the 
monarchy was questionable. There were units loyal to the king and units loyal to the 
dismissed government, the latter receiving support from abroad. 355 To solve the 
crisis King Hussein used his personal authority and US support to secure his position 
as the de facto leader of the army. The 1957 crisis taught the king that while 
democracy might threaten his position by bringing new actors the control of the army 
was essential for his survival. 
348 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 39. 
349 Snow (1972), p. 106. 
350 VJ1015/69 British Foreign Office Records. 
351 Baaklini et al (1999), p. 140. Cooper and Tilly (1994), p. 6; Rath (1994), p. 532; Singh (2002), p. 
69; Brynen (1998), p. 74; Dieterich, The Weakness of the Ruled is the Strength of the Ruler: The Role 
of the Opposition in Contemporary Jordan(2002), p. 129. Monarchies in Iraq and Syria were replaced 
by Ba'athist regimes and Arab Socialism was also gaining increasing support in Jordan. 
352 VJ 1015/3 British Foreign Office Records, April 14`h 1957. 
353 VJ1015/29. April 14`h 1957 and VJ1015/118 British Foreign Office Records. Brand, The Effects of 
the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan(1999); Massad (2001), p. 13. Some believe 
that the coup was just a "palace coup", orchestrated by the king alone or together with his American 
and British allies, while majority of scholars perceive it as an authentic attempt to overthrow the 
Hashemites. Massad and Brand argue that there was no genuine coup d'etat planned. See Brynen 
1998), p. 75 and Rath (1994), p. 534. 
-5' Snow (1972), p. 95 and pp. 107-108; Abu-Odeh (1999), p. 80. 
355 Snow (1972), p. 95. 
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While the army were to guarantee the physical safety of the Hashemites during the 
most turbulent times, the function of the royal court (diwan), consisting of tribal 
leaders and local notables, was to safeguard the legitimacy of the monarchy once 
the situation had calmed down. It was clear to Hussein that while the army was able 
to keep him alive, it alone could not win sympathy and support of the key groups. 
The tribal leaders worked as a channel between the king and the local groupings. 
Once agreed within the confines of the palace the tribal leaders would seek support 
for the decisions from their own clans. In return they were generously compensated 
in terms of financial gains and social status by the king. 356 The use of the diwan 
since the late 1950s resembles the tactics used by the emir, with the exception of the 
absence of formal institutional framework. Actually diwan has become an essential 
element, the "new elite-based power-house of Jordanian politics", since the late 
1950s. 357 The foundation for the symbiotic relationship between the Hashemite court 
and the tribal leader was laid at the very beginning of the Hashemite rule. The emir 
had established the foundation of support base by granting certain tribes informal 
autonomy and offering them preferential treatments. 358 By the 1930s tribes had 
become dependent on financial assistance of the central state owing to the lack of 
natural resources. The tribal groups had transformed from fairly autonomous units 
into actors who were delivering goods and services received from the central 
authority. 359 
It would have not been possible to use either the army or the royal courts without 
"extensive network of senior and influential contacts in the West"360 During the 
chaotic days in 1957 the survival of the monarchy depended on the American military 
support. 361 The resource poor kingdom had to search for alternative sources of 
income to equip the army and to buy the loyalty of the local notables. The main 
discovery of the monarchs was to use the main liability, the geopolitical location 
between Israel and the Arab world, as an asset. 362 Playing their cards well the 
356 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 41. 
357 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 40. 
3-58 Alon (2005), pp. 219-220. 
359 Alon (2005), p. 215. 
360 Ryan (2001), p. 89. 
361 Susser (2000), p. 10. 
362 Susser (2000), p. 10; Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. xvi. 
109 
Hashemites have been able to gain financial and military support from the opposing 
sides. Once one source dried out another one was located. Arab states assisted 
Jordan due to its strategic position bordering Israel and the Americans due to the 
Jordan's stand against Communism during the Cold War. Most recently after signing 
the peace treaty with Israel Jordan has received financial support from diverse 
sources. 363 Owing to the strategy of balancing between the regional and international 
interests there has rarely been a domestic crisis without an external element or at 
least concerns over allies' interests. In the midst of the 1957 crisis, for instance it was 
announced that the US government would provide Jordan with financial support if the 
country were to fall a victim of foreign aggression. 364 
363 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 82. 
364 Abu-Odeh (1999), pp. 80-81. 
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5.2.2. Who is Who and How? 
There is no doubt who is currently controlling the political elite in the Hashemite 
kingdom. Jordan is a neopatrimonial society where the political elite is centred 
around the monarch. 365 Regardless of the significance of the diwan for the 
Hashemite dynasty, the king is nevertheless the key actor who calls "most of the 
shots"366 The king has vast executive and legislative powers, (detailed in the next 
chapter) which enable him to "manage exclusively"367 the inner circles. These inner 
circles of the political elite have been constructed through clientelist relationships and 
systems of patronage. 368 It is argued that it is the small size of the population that 
contributed to the king's strengthening position. King Hussein was able to meet 
himself several local notables frequently enough to maintain the feeling of loyalty. 369 
Alon argues the role and the significance of the royal court has been unique in 
Jordan, even when compared to other Middle Eastern diwans. 370 
Identifying the members of the current political elite, the so-called "King's men , 371, is 
not a straightforward task, not least due to the "stratified" nature of the elite372. It is 
not easy to gain access to the elite or to find information on the core elite. 373 
Furthermore, the composition of the political elite is not permanent. Some members 
might be on the rise, while others are working on maintaining their status, and not 
always succeeding to do so. This can be partly explained by the nature of the 
political elite itself and by the different challenges the facing the kings and the 
different strategies chosen. 374 It is apparent that there are both informal and formal 
365 Ryan, Jordan in Transition. From Hussein to Abdullah(2001), p. 88; Bank and Schlumberger, 
Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform(2004), p. 35; Susser, Jordan. Case Studv of 
a Pivotal State(2000), pp. 2-3; Abu-Odeh (1999), p. 266. 
366 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 40. 
367 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 35. 
368 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 36. 
369 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 41. 
370 Alon (2005), p. 234. 
371 Susser (2000), p. 2. 
372 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 40. 
373 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 37. 
374 It is worth noting that differences can be observed between the elites under King Hussein's reign 
and King Abdullah's. Whereas King Hussein's focus was more on security issues, Abdullah's primary 
interest has been on economic development. Abdullah's early years have not been easy, not least for 
him being the black horse in the succession speculation. Abdullah II, has faced some criticism and 
perhaps even some unfaith due to his modern approach and lack of experience. Rather ironically the 
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agencies maintaining the political elite. Some members move between the two types 
of agencies and others are part of both simultaneously. The combination of the 
informal and formal structures enables the king to dismiss members without shaking 
the foundation of the political elite. It is argued here that the existence of these 
informal structures is one of the main obstacles to embedding the rule of law, and 
thus democratisation in Jordan. Thus the political changes to be democratisation 
should be breaking down these structures in particular. 
There are a few members of the political elite whose position is more secure than 
others'. These are the members who are the closest and the most important to the 
king. The head of the General Information Department (GID), the heads of the army, 
the security forces and the police are the "backbone of the dynasty"375. Sa'd Khair, 
the current head of the GID (mukhabarat), is believed to be the closest adviser to 
King Abdullah 11.376 As shown earlier, the survival of the Hashemite rule would have 
not be possible without a tight control of the coercive resources. Traditionally the 
parliament, the senate in particular, has functioned as the vehicle of "recruitment and 
positioning". 37 Abu-Odeh, part of the political elite himself, describes how during his 
time in service "a ministerial portfolio was the preserve of community leaders, 
notables, members of prominent tribes or clans and sometimes senior officials". 378 
Also the speaker of the senate has often been a close ally of the monarch. The 
speaker has had a special role in communicating the wishes of the palace to the 
parliament. 379 King Abdullah II has introduced a new informal body of recruitment, 
the Economic Consultative Council (ECC), which is perceived by some to have 
decreased the significance of the senators within the elite. Many of these new 
members have been Abdullah's generation, western educated and economically 
focused. Some of the older members of the elite have been suspicious of the 
suitability of the new recruits, criticising them primarily for lack of experience. 380 It is 
well-loved late King Hussein was also considered too young and too modern at the beginning of his 
reign. 
375 Susser (2000), p. 2; Abu-Odeh (1999), p. 79; Ryan (2001), P. 89; Bank and Schlumberger (2004), 
37. 
376 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 37 and p. 44. 
37 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 37. 
378 Abu-Odeh (1999), p. 3. 
379 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 37. 
380 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), pp. 40-41. Interviews in Amman 2003. 
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also worth noting that not all agree on the changes within the elite. Milton-Edwards 
and Hinchcliffe argue that the diwan lost its significance while the prime minister's 
offices have got stronger. 381 
Some Jordanians are guaranteed a place in the political elite due to their position 
and others due to their last name. According to Abu Jaber, there were 36 prominent 
families who dominated the legislative council and the first parliaments in Jordan. 382 
It appears that with this regard not much has changed since the early years. The al- 
Majalli, al-Tarawneh and al-Lozi families are among the most influential families, 
argues a Jordanian commentator. 383 This is not to claim that there are no other 
families belonging to the elite, this is just to suggest a few names. 384 The names of 
these three families appear frequently on the list of senators and prime ministers, 
both past and present. In the acting, fourteenth senate, the Minister for Social 
Development is Suleiman Tarawneh, and there are senators from each of three 
families (Fayez Tarawneh, Ahmad Lozi, Abdul Salam Majalli). 385 There are also 
family ties connecting these families to the royals; King Hussein's brother 
Muhammad is married to Taghreed Majalli, daughter of the former prime minister 
Hazzaa' Majalli. 386 Furthermore, the offices of the royal court are well populated by 
the representatives of these three families. 387 
Rather interestingly in Jordan members of the royal family have never been 
appointed as ministers or members of the parliament, unlike in the Gulf states. The 
Hashemites have, however, maintained control and influence through patronage of 
societies, organisations and institutes, as well as the army. 388 Abdullah II, for 
instance, served in the military prior to acceding to the throne. Princess Basma, 
sister to late King Hussein, is the head of the Jordanian National Commission for 
381 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), pp. 40-41. 
382 Abu Jaber (1969), p. 226. 
383 Zweiri, Interview in October 2005. 
384 Another source suggests that Huda, Majalli, Badran, Hashim, Tal, and Qassim families are among 
the prominent families. See http: //reference. alIrefer. com/country-guide-study/iordan/jordan107. htm1 
385 4th House: Hazzaa' Majalli and Ahmad al-Tarawneh, 11 ` House: Ahmad al-Tarawneh, 12` House: 
al-Lozi, NCC: al-Lozi and al-Tarawneh. Khair, (1988). See also 
http: //ww. 6ordanembassyus. org/new/govlistinq. shtml#lowerhouse. 
386 http: //www. kinqhussein. qov. io/rfamily immediate. html 
387 httl): //www. kinqhussein. qov. oo/roval offices. htnil 
388 Ryan (2001), p. 88. 
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Women, the biggest women's organisation in the country. Queen Noor chairs a great 
number of "national institutions working in the areas of women's welfare, child 
development, health, humanitarian relief work, environmental and archaeological 
conservation and protection, the arts, aviation, and athletics". 389 This enables the 
royals to have a significant role in the domestic agenda setting as well as represent 
the 'Jordanian view' abroad. 
There is a group of actors of the elite of a lesser significance. Brand and 
Schlumberger argue that this group is not as dependent on the king as it is on the 
public opinion. Nevertheless, the less powerful members of the elite have their 
functions too. For example, the lower house, or some members of it, is expected to 
rubber-stamp the decisions made by the inner circles. 390 The members of the elite 
have thus been chosen according to their contribution to the aim, the survival of the 
Hashemite family. When the loyalty is compromised, the disloyal member will be 
removed, perhaps just temporarily. It is not unheard for a member once dismissed to 
be appointed again; elite circulation and reshuffling is a permanent element of `elite 
maintenance'. A disloyal member could be dismissed, but not always totally 
excluded, perhaps only moved to a post of lesser significance. The royal court is 
considered as an institution "absorbing senior politicians... whose political shelf life 
has expired", a chance to carry an impressive title but not much political authority. 391 
First and foremost the faith of the disloyal member depends on the `sins' committed. 
For instance, Zaid al-Rifa'i has been inseparable part of the core elite, first as a close 
friend to the late king and currently as the speaker of the senate. 392 He has secured 
his place despite the corruption accusations directed at him. 393 (See Chapter 6) Also, 
Ali Abu Nuwar involved in the attempted coup of 1957 was later forgiven; after 10 
years of exile he was appointed as an ambassador. 394 However, not all have been as 
lucky. It is worth noting that criticising the fundamental elements of the political elite 
389 http: //www. kinclhussein. gov-iO/queen noor. html 
390 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 47. 
391 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 41. 
392 Zaid Rifa'l is son of Samir Rifa'I, again a close friend and political adviser to King Hussein. The al 
Rifa'l family were among the very first civil servants brought to the emirate. 
393 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 39. 
34 Snow, Hussein. A Biography(1972), p. 111. 
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is a taboo; no one survives without punishment when criticised the royal family, the 
security establishment or those closest to the king. 395 
The former head of the GID, Samih Battikhi was once one of the closest men to the 
late King Hussein. It is claimed that during King Hussein's last months, Battikhi was 
running the country, even to the extent that the idea to replace Prince Hassan as the 
successor to the king is believed to have originated from Battikhi. 396 Eventually his 
power, and perhaps even his ambitions, grew too much to be tolerated. According to 
Bank and Schlumberger, King Abdullah II perceived Battikhi as a too big threat and 
decided to act. 397 However, it is also rumoured that it was primarily the newly 
appointed prime minister Ragheb who considered Battikhi as a risk to his survival. 
An observer claims Ragheb wanting the "total monopoly of the king's ear". 398 
Whatever is the reason behind Battikhi's dismissal, it is likely that the king, although 
being the major player, is not the only one concerned about the composition of the 
political elite. 
It is not easy to shake the foundations of the power base, as a removal of a single 
person would not have drastic effects on the elite as whole. The wide base of the 
elite has enabled the kings apply `divide and rule' tactics to control the numerous 
groups. 399 The conscious decision to create as broad base for power as possible has 
also been central to the Hashemite strategy. Ethnic and religious minorities (e. g. 
Christians, Circassians, Chechens) have been included in the political elite, as well 
as members of the tribal groups. The Majalli and the Tarawneh families, for example, 
are one of the most influential southern tribal families in Jordan. 400 There is, 
however, no consensus on the degree of involvement of Palestinians in the political 
elite. Abu-Odeh, Palestinian himself, argues that over the last decades the barriers 
have been rising, as a policy of "Transjordanization of the public sector" has been 
395 Mahafzah, Restricted Democracy: The Case of Jordan: 1989 - 1999(2001), p. 358. 396 G2 Bulletin, September 2003. http: //www. worldnetdailv. com/news/article. asi ? ARTICLE ID=34589 
397 Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 40. Battikhi was made to resign and later faced aa corruption 
trial and house arrest. Battikhi is believed to be behind to the dismissal of Mustafa Hamarneh as the 
director of the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. 
398 Al Ahram, November 2000. http: //weekly. ahram. org. eg/2000/508/re6. htm 
399 Ryan (2001), p. 89. 
400 Ryan (2001), p. 89, Bank and Schlumberger (2004), p. 45-47. Interview with Zwein October 2005. 
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implemented. 401 "Transjordanian elite" has, claims Abu-Odeh, for long considered 
Palestinians as a threat to the state's stability. 402 Palestinians are barred from 
certain roles, primarily from the senior posts in the army and the security forces. On 
the contrary to Abu-Odeh, some see that the number of Palestinians in ministerial 
posts has gradually been increasing. 403 The country's first (and so far only) 
Palestinian prime minister, Taher al-Masri, however, was appointed as late as in 
1991. 
In the next chapters it is examined whether any dissolution of the existing political 
elite has occurred since 1989, whether the political changes are signs of the existing 
political elite losing its special privileges. However, before moving to examine 
constitutionality, the judiciary and political participation in Jordan, it is important to 
find out how others have perceived the political changes. 
401 Abu-Odeh (1999), p. 276. 
402 Abu-Odeh (1999), p. 274. 
403 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 52. 
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5.3. Political Changes Since 1989 
Since the 1989 parliamentary elections a great deal of literature has been produced 
on the political changes taken place in Jordan. These changes have been followed 
by both Jordanian and international observers. The views presented on the nature of 
the changes are varied. Some, such as Brynen and Rath, see the changes which 
have taken place as a genuine "transition" towards democracy or 
"democratisation"404, others (Brand, Shull, Lust-Okar) as "political liberalisation"aos 
The most sceptical observers (Anderson, Greenwood, Singh) consider the changes 
a way for the monarch to consolidate his power406, terming this "managed 
liberalisation"407 or "de-liberalisation". 408 Naturally while the general interest has 
focused on the political changes themselves (their impact on political system), the 
early scholarly attention offered explanations of why the 1989 elections were held in 
the first place after a long gap. 
According to the "establishment view", as Brynen observes, the time was ready for 
democracy in Jordan: democratisation began as maturity was reached. Since its 
emergence the kingdom has valued and supported pluralism and tolerance, the 
foundation for democracy. 409 Thus there are some scholars who see democratisation 
as a longer process dating back from the early years of the independence. The first 
element of citizen involvement was created already in 1928 when Transjordan under 
the British mandate got a national conference - albeit non-accountable and non- 
representative. 410 The true foundations for representation were, however, laid later. 
In the 1950s elections were held and, although not entirely free and fair, trade union 
and political party activism was tolerated, press freedoms respected, all to a 
404 Dunne (2003); p. 17; Brynen, Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab 
World: The Case of Jordan(1992), p. 93; Rath (1994), p. 553. 
Shull, Political Liberalization in Jordan: An Analysis of the State's Relationship with the Muslim 
Brotherhood(1996), p. 527; Brand (1991), p. 11; Lust-Okar, The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: 
Myth or Reality? (2001), p. 565; Roberts (1991), p. 72; Brynen (1998), p. 71; Freij and Robinson, 
Liberalization, The Islamists, and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan as a Case Stud (1996), p. 4. 
406 Singh (2002), pp. 77-78. 
407 Brand, In the Beginning was the State: The Quest for Civil Society in Jordan(1994), p. 184; 
Anderson, The Status of "Democracy" in Jordan(1997), p. 75. 
408 Greenwood, Jordan's "New Bargain": The Political Economy of Regime Security(2003), p. 249 
409 Brynen (1998), pp. 81-82. 
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degree. 411 Nevertheless, acknowledging the existence of some structural elements 
does not explain why King Hussein decided to `liberalise'. 
Official explanations aside, there appears to be consensus on the force behind the 
political changes: the true source of initiative came from above. 412 A majority of 
analysts consider rentierism, or "budget and regime security", as the explanation for 
King Hussein's decision to announce elections to calm down the rioting masses. The 
decline in the 1980s of oil prices had a drastic impact on Jordan's economy as did 
the diminishing foreign aid. The economic reforms needed to receive IMF assistance 
were compensated for by political liberalisation, or rather `acts' of political 
liberalisation. 413 Greenwood asserts that the political developments represent a "new 
political bargain" between the monarch and the two domestic constituencies: the 
traditionalists and the local business community. Earlier, during the martial law era, 
based on the "authoritarian bargain" the king `traded' the support of these 
constituencies for his rule by offering the traditionalists "public jobs and subsidies" 
and "regulatory protection and state contracts" to the business elite. The king was 
forced to create a new bargain, when there were fewer rewards to be delivered to 
loyalists. Political opening would widen the business community's chances to 
influence on trade policies, while the traditionalists could be elected as deputies. 
Greenwood even rejects the impact of the external influence on `democratisation' in 
Jordan arguing the liberalisation to be "almost entirely a creation of the monarch". 414 
Some people close to King Hussein do not support Greenwood's view of the 
insignificance of external influence. It is argued by these Jordanian observers that 
the king wanted to become known as a great democrat beyond the domestic 
borders. 415 Hussein had noticed that Eastern European states experimenting with 
democratic practices were `rewarded' by western donors. To be able to `play along' 
with the democracy game would benefit the state economically at a time when the 
410 Rath (1994), p. 530. 
41 Rath (1994), pp. 532-534; Brand (1991), p. 13, Jayuusi, Democracy and Regime Survival in 
Jordan(1998), p. 1. 
TTT-Rath (1994), p. 543. 
413 See Brynen (1998); Brand (1994); Robinson (1998); Singh (2002). 
414 Greenwood (2003), pp. 249-251. 
415 Interviews in May-June 2003 Amman. 
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government was facing serious financial difficulties. Jordanian observers often argue 
that the king's primary motives were to improve his image abroad and to obtain 
financial gains. It is also argued that the 'side effects' of liberalisation took the king by 
surprise. The political scene proved to be more difficult to control than expected, as 
in the absence of political participation the king had become used to being the only 
true actor. 416 Ali Kassay, a Jordanian analyst, argues that while most observers have 
been offering the rentierism explanation not enough attention has been placed on 
external factors, the increased civil society activities brought about by international 
NGOs and the "global consensus on democracy". 417 
There seems to be a greater degree of consensus on the motives behind the 
changes than on the impact of these changes on the political system. There is also 
some dissonance in labelling the changes. It is also worth noting that reviewing the 
differing opinions on political changes in Jordan is not a straightforward task, not 
least owing to the time span (1989-2003), covering the reigns of two monarchs. 
Furthermore, over the 14-year period the `flow' of changes has not been even. 
Therefore, it is pretty normal for the observers to modify their views when the course 
of changes is taking a different course. 418 Not surprisingly the literature produced 
immediately after the 1989 elections is more optimistic, albeit somewhat cautious. 
Roberts claimed in 1991 that whether the changes are democratisation remains to 
be seen. Yet, he saw the elements as already being there: "the opportunity for 
institutional compromise is apparent", referring to the National Charter. 419 More 
sceptical views are of more recent origin. Ryan argues that there was true transition 
until the Israeli-Jordan peace agreement was signed in 1994.420 Greenwood argues, 
however, that the peace treaty cannot alone be used as an explanation for "shifting 
tides". According to Greenwood, these were simply signs of the limitations of the 
"liberal bargain". 421 Despite the hiccups the changes in Jordan are nevertheless 
ass Kassay, The Effects of External Forces on Jordan's Process of Democratisation(2002), p. 61. 
417 Kassay (2002), p. 61. 
418 See Brand (1991); Brand (1994); Brand (2000). 
419 Roberts (1991), p. 172. 
420 Ryan (2001), 41. 
421 Greenwood (2003), p. 249. 
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considered significant: limited but unique in the Middle East, "going further than in 
any other Arab country"422 and within a short period of time. 423 
Promises of free and fair elections424, legalisation of political parties, opening up of 
the political climate, a freer press and the lifting of martial law are the changes that 
convinced optimistic observers to classify Jordan as a democratising country. Brand 
also argues that, based on the reforms made between 1989 and 1991, Jordanians 
had learnt to believe that their political rights would be protected and that being 
politically active (within the legal boundaries) was no reason to fear a visit from the 
mukhabarat. 425 Moreover, the creation of the National Charter in 1991 is seen by 
many as a `culmination of democratisation'. The Charter is seen as a negotiated 
`pact' between the regime and opposition (opposition groups). As Brand puts it the 
National Charter is "reminiscent of democratic transitions". 426 Singh argues, however, 
that the National Charter is a "conserving, not democratising, pact"427. The Charter 
was primarily designed to justify and strengthen the Hashemite rule. It was not a 
great opportunity for all groups to negotiate the rules of the new system, but rather to 
agree on the general principles of political participation within the existing system. 428 
Unlike the situation in the 1950s, the political groups were given a chance to 
participate but only within the existing system. The National Charter was constructed 
in a less impressive, less democratic manner. The 60-member royal committee 
appointed by the king did not represent all political sections, the critics claim, but only 
the pro-regime groupings. Furthermore, the committee was chaired by a former head 
of the mukhabarat. Moreover, the legal status of the Charter, as well as its 
relationship to the constitution remains unclear. The Charter is sometimes 
characterised as supplementing the constitution, albeit in reality it has no legal status 
whatsoever. 429 
422 Ryan (2001), p. 16; Fischbach, Jordan(1999), p. 83. 
423 Brynen (1998), pp. 71-72. 
424 It must be noted here that defining the elections free and fair is not the greatest strength of the 
existing literature. There are some authors who made no points of the 'quality' of the elections, and 
many simply referred to one single study by Piro. 
425 Brand (1991), p. 22. See also Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan(1998). 
426 Ryan (2001), p. 40; Brand (1991), p. 22; Brand (1994), p. 149; Wiktorowicz (2002), p. 11. 
427 Singh (2002), p. 80. 
428 Singh (2002), p. 80. 
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In spite of acknowledging the same signs, authors do not necessarily agree on their 
significance. According to Laurie Brand, who acknowledged the above-mentioned 
positive developments, Jordan is not a democracy, nor democratising. 430 Riedel on 
the other hand sees some elements fundamental to democracy lacking but 
nonetheless defines Jordan as democratising. Having analysed the 1989 and the 
1993 elections, he considers that democratisation has begun in Jordan despite the 
"lack of political debate, their nonideological results, the unsatisfactory degree of 
representation, the low participation, and the yet persisting irrelevance of political 
parties and of parliament as such". 431 Rath stresses that democracy was not reached 
(by 1994), but rather a "democratized form of rule", the Jordanian state being in "a 
phase which can be termed transitional". 432 Thus Rath argues that Jordan is on in its 
way to becoming a democratising country; the power of the authoritarian leader is 
moving across to people who rule through democratically elected representatives. 433 
There are also differing views of the transfer of power in Jordan. Yayyusi labels 
Jordan a "guided democracy" as "government remains accountable for non 
accountable forces and centres of power". 434 Beverley Milton-Edwards argued in 
1993 that the political process in Jordan was "slow, incremental and completely 
dictated by the palace" and thus would qualify only as "facade democracy". 435 Milton- 
Edwards points out that three of the prime ministers appointed between 1989 and 
1993 were King Hussein's close friends, a clear indication of the power the king still 
had over the government. She claims that among the main motives for allowing 
political liberalisation was a desire to weaken the Islamists by offering other political 
groups the chance to get organised. 436 Anderson sees the more recent 
developments in Jordan as being due to the "managed" aspect of "managed 
liberalisation" breaking down. The political freedoms given to the opposition have 
made it difficult for the government to manage both the opposition and the course of 
429 Rath (1994), p. 549. 
430 Brand (1992), p. 85. 
431 Riedel (1994), p. 51. 
432 Rath (1994), p. 543. 
433 Rath (1994), p. 553. 
434 Yayyusi (1997), p. 8. 
`' Milton-Edwards, Jordan and Facade Democracy(1993), p. 196. 
436 Milton-Edwards (1993), pp. 196-198. 
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the developments. 437 According to Kassay, the "objective of democratisation was not 
to reform the clientelist system, but to acquire the means to preserve it". 438 
An important reason for the diversity of opinions on the Jordanian experiment is a 
confusing usage of the central terms in some studies. Liberalisation, transition and 
democratisation have occasionally been given different meanings in different texts, 
or curiously in some texts used as synonyms. Often little or no time has spent on 
defining the core concepts, thus the meaning given to the terms used is implicit. For 
instance, Nanes (2003) argues that currently there is a consensus on the nature of 
the "democratic experiment" in Jordan. It is seen primarily as a government's survival 
strategy. Nanes refers to three labels given to the situation: "negotiated transition" 
(by Springborg, 1992), "regime survival strategy" (by Brand 1994, Mufti 1999 and 
Wiktorowicz 2002) and "defensive democracy" (by Robinson, 1998). 439 However, 
while `regime survival strategy' is actually the situation all these labels seem to refer 
to, following Nanes, nonetheless conceptually these three labels refer to differing 
state of affairs. Springborg's "negotiated transition" is a modification of `democratic 
transition', while Robinson's "defensive democratisation" is bit of everything, as well 
as transition-inspired. The consensus Nanes is referring to seems to be a superficial 
one. Although the idea of `survival strategy' is part of all these views, not all the 
authors see the developments as democratisation, or democratic transition. 
Robinson and Springborg are the authors who define the developments as 
democratisation, while the others do not. 
There is another thing common to Springborg and Robinson: the influence of the 
transitology on their work. Yet, these authors appear to understand `transition' in 
slightly different ways. According to Springborg (also Baaklini et al), "negotiated 
transition" or "transition from above" is a useful approach in the Arab world. 
Transition is regime initiated and led; the (old) regime remains the dominant 
participant and often initiates political liberalisation as a strategy to stay in power. 
Gradually through three stages the state is democratising. "Negotiated transitions" 
437 Anderson (1997), p. 75. 
438 Kassay (2002), p. 54. 
439 Nanes, Fightin4 Honor Crimes in Jordan(2003), p. 116. 
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are often durable as the elite groups with most to lose are given an opportunity to 
participate in negotiating the rules for the new system-440 "Negotiated transition" 
starts with the survival strategy, progresses to "national dialogue" and eventually 
leads to the final stage when the parliament reaches its full authority. Robinson 
defines "defensive democratization" as a "state strategy to maintain the dominant 
political order in the face of severe fiscal crisis". Robinson points out that "defensive 
democratisation" occurs "without altering the core structures". This term, Robinson 
argues, is a "nuance to understanding of democratic transitions", in a context of a 
rentier state. 441 The outcome of the defensive democratisation is freer press, open 
political activism and the diminished role of the secret police, while many problems 
still remain. According to Robinson, progress in the future ("deepening the 
democratic transition") is not likely, as an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict might 
terminate the transition. 442 The fundamental problem of Robinson's analysis is the 
labelling: Robinson treats transition as synonymous with democratisation and 
liberalisation. 
The majority of the scholars have focused on parliamentary elections, civil society 
and the press freedoms. Some authors have examined the political changes in 
relation to power relations among the ruling elite/s. Very little has been written on the 
working conditions of the legislative, with the exception of Baaklini (et al). 
Importantly, Baaklini (et al) stress the role of the legislative for the process of 
democratic transition in the Arab world. The authors argue that while the Jordanian 
parliament has become a more important actor, the facilities available to it are 
generally poor. There is a lack of competent staff and technical facilities, and the 
committee work is undeveloped. Also the 5-month term for the parliamentary session 
is too short and the lower house is not entitled to draft laws. Baaklini (et al) 
acknowledge that the king is still the central actor. Yet, they conclude that Jordan 
has reached the second of three stages of transition towards democracy. 443 
440 Springborg (1995); Baaklini et al, 1999,29. 
441 Robinson (1998), p. 389. 
442 Robinson (1998), p. 407. 
443 Baaklini et al (1999). There is a technical weakness in Baaklini's study, as no references are 
indicated in the work. 
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The rule of law (or the judiciary) in Jordan in relation to political developments is 
neglected by scholars, almost ignored. There are a few articles, or rather an article 
combining three writings, produced by Jordanian legal practitioners. 444 Yet this article 
deals with the rule of law without covering any other aspects of modern political 
democracy. Furthermore, none of the previously discussed scholars working on the 
political changes since the 1989 elections has focused on the rule of law in Jordan. 
444 See Wazani (2000); Halasa, The Defendant's Rights in the Criminal Process and Trials(2000). 
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Summary 
Jordan is a modern state in the true meaning of the word; the independence was 
gained in the aftermath of the Second World War. The first decades were spent 
building the new state with the assistance from the British. This state-building has 
been a particularly ambitious project, including consolidating a ruling family 
originating outside the country. The history of the Hashemite Kingdom has by no 
means lacked political challenges. Further challenges were faced owing to the 
scarcity of natural resources and geographical location bordering Israel/Palestine. 
One of the major dilemmas in Jordan has been the ethnic divide between the 
Transjordanians and Palestinians. 
The Hashemites have succeeded in securing their rule through a "supracommunal, 
supratribal, supraregional and suprasectarian , 445 approach, using coercion and co- 
optation while tightly controlling the security establishment and buying the loyalty of 
local notables. This would have not been possible in a resource-poor country without 
help from the foreign allies. While it has been central for the survival of the 
Hashemite dynasty to balance between competing interests, it has been equally 
important to keep finding new sources of assistance in the changing international 
political setting. 
While the king is without a doubt the most powerful actor in the kingdom, yet the 
survival of the Hashemite is dependent on the support of the army and the royal 
court. For supporting the Hashemites, the members of the political elite are rewarded 
in terms of financial gains and social status, also the matters significant to the 
members are under a special patronage of the monarch. The core of the political 
elite (the inner circles) is without a doubt the most persistent element. In spite of the 
characteristic elasticity of the composition of the Hashemite elite, certain members of 
the elite appear to be almost irreplaceable. Although King Abdullah II has introduced 
a new agency of recruitment, the Economic Consultative Council, it seems that the 
number of recruits is not excessive, rather the opposite. Abdullah II has inherited 
125 
some of Hussein's men, like Zaed 'Samir's son', Rifa'i. This is partly owing to the 
practicalities of managing the members and to the significance of support of the core 
members. It is essential for the king not to shake the power base before his has 
consolidated his position. Yet there is no denying that Abdhullah's new recruits 
stress his priorities. The constant elite reshuffling is more like the regular members 
playing musical chairs when the monarch is in charge of the music. Abdullah has just 
chosen a different tone and brought along a few new players. The reshuffling is done 
to ensure that the power of an individual member does not grow too strong and 
perhaps also fool the public. It appears that violations of the laws of the country are 
more likely to be tolerated than the violations of the laws of the elite. There is one 
rule above all: the survival of the Hashemite family. 
Democratisation to start in Jordan, it is argued here, requires the current political elite 
to share their political power with the rest of Jordanians and to give up their special 
privilege being above the law. Therefore, the latter part of this dissertation will be 
examining whether the current political elite is showing any signs of "dissolution"; 
whether the political changes started in 1989 can be considered as "dissolution". 
This study is not the first attempt to identify the nature of political changes in Jordan. 
It was important to examine how others have perceived these political changes for 
the sake of the main argument of this study. It is argued that democracy cannot exist 
without the rule of law; thus it cannot be ignored when studying (alleged) 
democratisation. The main goal here was to find out whether different perceptions of 
the nature of the political changes in Jordan were due a limited scope of analysis 
(excluding the rule of law). 
The majority of scholars have analysed the same `signs' of political change, yet have 
reached differing conclusions. Some see them as political liberalisation or even 
democratisation, others only as a regime's survival strategy or de-libaralisation. The 
current popularity of the transition school has not left this body of literature 
untouched. At least the term `transition' is very widely used. There are, however, 
some general observations shared by a majority of involved scholars. It is widely 
445 Abu-Odeh (1999), p. 279 
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agreed that economic factors had a role in initiating the changes and the series of 
changes has been regime-led. 
The majority of the literature has focused on the conventional elements: elections, 
the economic factors and the role of the monarch at the expense of the legislative, 
political parties or the citizens. It is argued here that expanding the scope of the 
analysis would provide a more detailed (clearer) picture of the political changes. If 
the core of the debate is to define whether the changes are democratisation, then 
ignoring central elements of modern political democracy is not justified. Therefore, 
the goal of this study is to widen the scope of analysis from political participation to 
elements discussed in the previous chapters: the constitution and the judiciary. It is 
stressed that political participation will not be ignored here, but neither will it deserve 
exclusive attention. 
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6. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN JORDAN 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to define the constitutional framework in Jordan: the state 
actors and their powers. This is done in order to be able to identify whether 
constitutionality, or even Constitutionalism, has been part of the political reality in 
Jordan prior to and since 1989. It is important to make a distinction between the 
design and its implementation. For the purposes of this study not only was it 
important to define the constitutional framework, but also to examine whether the 
design has been implemented as intended by its creators. 
In 1952 Jordanian nationalists succeeded in their long-lasting battle: a new 
constitution guaranteeing a representative government was promulgated. The 1952 
constitution defined the new system of government as a parliamentary monarchy . 
446 
This constitution was the second one in the Jordanian history, promulgated 5 years 
after gaining independence. Thus it is not far-fetched to claim, following Nathan 
Brown's argument, that the Jordanian constitution was to be a symbol of newly- 
gained sovereignty, like introducing a national anthem or flag. `" This is logical 
particularly considering that the colonial power had protected its interests by a 
conscious decision not to create a constitution during the early years of the mandate 
period. Furthermore, the first ever constitution was imposed by the British to protect 
their interests, not to promote political development. 448 
446 Jordanian legislation in the pre-independence period was based on the Ottoman laws, as the 
British mandate powers left the legal system intact. An-Na'im, Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of(2002), 
p.. 
71119. 
See also Abu Jaber (1969). 
Brown (2002), p. 31. Nathan Brown argues, after examining the constitutional texts and the 
contexts they were born, that there are three functions for Arab constitutions: to act as the expression 
of the sovereignty of (newly) independent state, to manifest the governing ideology or just simply to 
organise the state powers. 
44' Brown (2002), pp. 46-47. The British opposed the idea of a representative government, as it could 
potentially cause a threat to their colonial interests in the country. The 
British saw at later stage a 
constitution necessary in order to place more control on the Emir, particularly on 
his financial actions. 
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However, the primary aim of the nationalists was to constrain the power of the 
domestic ruling elite, not to celebrate the sovereignty. It seems unjustified to perceive 
the 1952 constitution primarily or solely as a manifestation of national sovereignty. In 
spite of the formal independence gained in 1942, the British still dominated the 
political setting until the late 1950s. Furthermore, the 1952 constitution is argued to 
be based on the Iraqi constitution the British imposed a few years earlier. 449 Bearing 
in mind the object of the nationalists it appears more realistic to perceive the 1952 
constitution as a tool to organise the power relations among the key actors. The 
Jordanian constitution is thus seen here as a text indicating composition and powers 
granted to each of the Jordanian state powers and the relationship between them, as 
well as between the state powers and the subjects of the state authority. The 
emphasis is on analysing the relations between the actors defined in the constitution 
(state powers and citizens). It is central to define how the powers of the executive 
are limited, if at all. 
According to Brynen, the Jordanian constitution, in practice, has been "much more 
than a meaningless piece of paper'. 45o The constitution has, claims Brynen, been a 
significant element defining "politics and political liberalisation" in Jordan. Brynen 
argues that "Jordan's kings451 have generally endeavoured to maintain the 
appearance (and often more than the appearance) of constitutionalism". 452 The aim 
is also to analyse whether Brynen's view is valid and whether there has been any 
signs of constitutionalism in Jordan. In addition, it is important to identify whether the 
role of the constitution has been central to the political developments in the country. 
Or are there only signs of Arab constitutionalism? 
When examining the Jordanian constitution, there is a significant aspect that cannot 
be ignored. Since the promulgation of the constitution there have been two kings, 
protests against the rulers and their allies, attempts of coup d'etat and a civil war in 
aas Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 37. 
450 Brynen (1998), p. 76. 
451 Based on the time frame referred by Brynen it is assumed here that with the kings 
Brynen is 
referring to Kings Abdullah I and Hussein bin Talal. Thus 
it is argued here that it would be more 
justified to talk about the king, as the 'constitutional' period of Abdullah's reign was rather short: 
1947- 
1951. Furthermore, in the very beginning it is argued that there was a gap between the constitution 
and the practice. See Abu Jaber (1969). 
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Jordan. The kingdom has been involved in regional conflicts directly and indirectly. 
The 1952 constitution has existed through turbulent and traumatic times and 
changing political circumstances to date. A number of amendments have been made 
since 1952. The focus here is on the two 'systems': the one defined by the non- 
amended constitution (1952) and the other by the current amended one (the 1952 
one vs. the current one). 
The constitution is a text created in a certain political context by certain actors with a 
certain goal they believed the constitution would help to achieve. It is relevant for this 
study to examine the amendments in order to see whether they have made any 
significant changes in the constitutional framework. It is assumed here that the 
constitution declares the higher aim of the political entity (core of the constitution) 
and means to this end. Has the impact of the amendments been more favourable to 
the spirit of the constitution, or has the spirit (core) been changed? How do the two 
`systems' differ from each other? Do the systems both provide the elements needed 
for rule of law and/or a democratic governing system? If not, what are the main 
elements missing? What was the context where amendments were made? It is 
assumed here that analysing the amendments made in relation to the context in 
which they were made reveals motives behind the amendments. Furthermore, 
amendments are outcomes of different creative processes such that the constitution 
itself and thus the motives behind it are themselves very interesting. It is also not that 
uncommon that there is a different set of actors creating the original constitution than 
the actors amending it. 
In addition to the amendments this chapter also examines a further element 
particular for the Jordanian constitution: the temporary laws. It is not uncommon for a 
constitution to include stipulations for exceptional circumstances (mainly 
emergencies). It is acknowledged than in certain situations the normal rules can 
prove inappropriate and another set of rules are thus required. It is relevant here to 
find out if these unexceptional situations are acknowledged in the Jordanian 
constitution. If they are, then when does a situation qualify as an emergency and 
what do the `emergency' rules include? 
452 Brynen (1998), p. 77. Bold added 
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6.1. THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT: THE FRAMEWORK DEFINED 
The Jordanian constitution begins with defining the system of government in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as "parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy". 453 The 
parliamentary system is based on the separation of powers - the rights and 
responsibilities of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary are clearly defined in 
the constitution, each in a chapter of their own. 454 
The monarch is a central figure both in the executive and legislative politics, or rather 
he is the central figure. The king does not only share the executive power with his 
ministers, he appoints the members of the Senate (ministers) for the four-year 
term. 455 These powers alone are enough to keep the monarch at the centre of the 
political elite. Not only does the king form the executive with "his Ministers"456, but he 
also possesses the legislative power with the National Assembly consisting of the 
Senate (Majlis al-A'yan) and the Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwwab). 457 The 
monarch can dissolve the parliament or discharge individual representatives. The 
monarch can also declare martial law. 458 Any draft law has to be ratified by the king 
after having been accepted by the parliament. 459 As Gregory Mahler has put it; "The 
King exercises all of the powers that the Queen of England has in theory but that the 
prime minister of England exercises in practice". 460 
It is apparent that the separation of powers in the Jordanian constitution is not 
453 Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 1. 
http: //www. mordanem bassus. or /new/aboutiordan/l 952constitution. shtml#1 
454 Constitution, Chapter 4 (executive powers), Chapter 5 (legislative powers) and Chapter 6 (the 
judiciary). Here when referring to the current constitution no year of promulgation is indicated to 
distinguish between the constitution in its non amended form and the amended current constitution. 
The non-amended constitution is referred as the 1952 Constitution. 
455 Constitution (1952), Chapter 3, Articles 25-26. 
456 Constitution, Article 26. 
457 Constitution, Chapter 3, Articles 25,26 and 27. The Senate is also called House of Notables in 
some contexts, and the lower house the House of Deputies. 
458 Constitution (1952). King Hussein has declared a martial law in 1957 and then again after the 1967 
war. The martial law declared in 1967 was 
in force over thirty years. See Wazani, The Role of the 
Judiciary in the Protection of Human Rights(2000), p. 84. 
459 Constitution, Article 93, (iii)- (iv). 
460 Mahler, Constitutionalism and Palestinian Constitutional Development(1996), p. 69. 
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defined in the strictest sense; each of the three state powers having clear-cut 
authorities, as well as resources to monitor and constrain the other powers. The 
Jordanian constitution defines the roles and relationships of the state powers 
(acknowledging their existence and defining the relationship to each other). It is clear 
that the model for the separation of powers has been the conventional 'executive- 
legislative-judiciary' with each of the state powers able to constrain or balance each 
other. The executive drafts and proposes laws, and is responsible for the legislative. 
The elected legislative makes decisions to reject or to pass the laws proposed, and 
has the authority to change the ministers when dissatisfied with their work. The 
judiciary is authorised to monitor the implementation of the legislation, and conduct 
of the other state powers. The role of the Hashemite monarch, provided with both 
legislative and executive powers, is clearly a disruptive factor to the counter- 
balancing design. The king as the head of the state is granted immunity, but at the 
same time he as the head of the executive is heavily involved in the legislative and 
executive matters. He also appoints the senate. 
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The Jordanian constitution lays out a fairly standard framework for the parliamentary 
system, like many other constitutions. This is not surprising, as the Egyptian 
constitution (1923) was the model for the constitution. The Egyptian constitution in its 
turn was based on the 1831 Belgian counterpart, which was influenced by the 
English one. 462 Al-Jazy also argues that also the impact of the United Nation's 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) can be seen in the Jordanian 
constitution, as the Constitution includes many of the rights of the Declaration. 463 
The legislative makes the laws, the executive deals with the administrative matters 
and the judiciary is responsible to monitor the legality, while the head of the state is 
involved in the first two processes. According to the constitution, legislation is the 
duty and the right of the National Assembly. The lower house can reject, accept or 
amend draft laws presented by the Prime Minister. To be passed a law has to be 
accepted by both houses: the senate and the lower house. In case of a draft law 
rejected twice or of disagreement between the houses, the Speaker of the House will 
call a joint meeting where the draft will be discussed once more. To be passed in this 
meeting, a law requires a majority (two-thirds) of the number of Senators and 
deputies to vote in favour. If it happens that the draft is rejected in this meeting, it 
shall not be presented to this house during the same session. 464 In order to come 
into force a law once passed has to be ratified by the king and published in the 
Official Gazette. If the king for some reason does not want to ratify a law, he has to 
return it to the house within six months, stating the reasons for its refusal. If the 
house still decides to pass the law, it can do this with two-thirds of votes. In this case 
royal ratification is not needed for the law to come into force. 
465 The only exception 
from the general principles upon which most parliamentary systems are based is the 
exceptional powers vested in the monarch. 
The very first article of the constitution, non-amended since 1952, states that 
the 
462 Hammouri, Tem ora Laws. Between Constitutional Provisions and Political 
Sins(2003), p. 3; Abu 
Jaber (1969). 
463 Al-Jazy, Interview in Amman 2003. 
464 Constitution, Articles 91-92. 
465 Constitution, Article 93. 
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Hashemite Kingdom is a parliamentary system. This wording was one of the greatest 
achievements of the nationalists demanding an accountable government in early 
1950s. The 1947 constitution defined Jordan as a "hereditary monarchy". 466 The 
wording was changed in 1952 to introduce the word `parliamentary'. 467 This change 
(or reform), legal critics claim, was made to stress the superiority of parliament over 
the monarchy: to emphasise that the parliament should be the primary power in the 
system, not the monarch. 468 The constitution (1952) provides the king with extensive 
powers, larger than those of the legislative. The monarch is given not only immunity 
as the head of the state but powers far greater than any other state actors'. So great 
are his powers that in some parts the separation of powers gets somewhat blurred. 
Is the Jordanian constitution a contradictory piece of work: promising something yet 
providing tools for something else? Is a parliamentary system a vague promise 
forgotten, or neglected, by the creators of the text, or the implementers, the actors 
defined by the very text? 
Analysing the constitution as a text that has been evolving over the decades 
provides more answers. It is worth noting that there have been many amendments 
made since 1952. Soon after the promulgation of the constitution the first 
amendments were made. In matter of fact the majority of the amendments were 
made within a decade. In comparison, out of the total 31 amendments, only two 
amendments were made in the 1960s, six in the 1970s and one in the 1980s. 
469 It is 
of interest here whether the constitution in its current form contradicts the very core 
of the original constitution. The interest here is in the impact of the new elements on 
the unchanged core of the constitutional text. The reasons for the contradictions in 
the constitution, argue the critics, are caused by the amendments made, or some of 
them to be more precise. Consequently this is a matter that requires further attention. 
It must be noted that the focus here will be only on the amendments concerned with 
the relationship between the legislative and the executive. The amendments on the 
judiciary will be analysed later. 
466 Constitution (1947), Article 2. In Miller Davis (1953), p. 235. 
467 Constitution, Article 1. 
468 Hammouri, Faisal and Shubeilat, Interviews in Amman April-June 2003. 
469 Constitution, Articles 33,45,54,59,73,74,78,84,94,95,102 and 123. 
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6.2. BENDING OR BREAKING 
Constitutions are documents that are written under 
some historical conditions to regulate actions of 
government under future conditions. When these 
future conditions depart far from anticipations, 
constitutions either bend or break. 470 
6.2.1. Amendments 
Bending - it is assumed here - can either occur through ignoring some elements of 
the constitution or amending the original text to suit the changed conditions, or 
changed aims, while still keeping the core untouched. The noble aim of amending a 
constitution is to improve it, to adjust the constitution to better suit changed realities. 
It worth noting, however, that the people who created the original text are usually not 
the ones amending it. Thus the people behind the amendments may have different 
goals in mind. In 1952 the newly elected Jordanian representatives from the both 
banks of the River Jordan pressured King Talal to issue a new constitution. The new 
constitution made the government accountable for the first time in Jordanian history, 
the goal the nationalists had been aiming at since the early 1920s. It is another 
matter, however, whether King Talal's objective was to make a historical step 
towards representative government or, in the rather unstable political climate, to 
stabilise the political setting. 47 It is also worth noting that King Abdullah had 
promised a new constitution and an accountable government not long before he was 
assassinated. 472 Thus considering the political circumstances it looks likely that King 
Talal at the start of his reign, would not want further worries. A more important 
question than the true nature of Talal's intentions is the impact amendments had on 
the constitution. Regardless of the motive of the monarch in producing the text, it will 
live on, guiding the actions of the state actors, at least in theory. 
A majority of the Jordanians - politicians, legal scholars and practitioners 
470 Przeworski, Constitutions, Democracy and the Rule of Law (2003), p. 
htt du/constitutions 
471 Abu Jaber (1969), p. 231. 
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interviewed for the purposes of this research stressed the progressive nature of the 
Jordanian constitution. Almost all of them, however, stressed that the constitution 
they talked about is the 1952 constitution, not the current one. -`73 Professor 
Mohammad Hammouri, a leading Jordanian legal scholar, argues that in its 'original' 
form the Jordanian constitution (1952) was a "piece of art", balancing the three state 
powers in a democratic manner: each had a clear role and means of controlling the 
powers of the other two. 474 Hammouri considers the 1952 constitution as one of the 
most mature constitutions in the Arab world. 475 This balance, however, began to be 
disrupted soon after the creation of the constitution. The first amendments were 
already made in 1954, only a few years after the promulgation of the constitution. 476 
From the 131 articles of the constitution 19 articles have been amended, some more 
than once. In total there have been 31 amendments, the most recent ones in the 
1980s. 477 It has to be acknowledged that some amendments have in some parts 
been improvements, and that not all the amendments are in contradiction with the 
spirit of constitution (parliamentary monarchy). These amendments, however, are 
few in number compared to the negative amendments. 
The positive amendments, it has to be stressed, were the first amendments made. 
According to the article 53 of the current constitution, the senate can be given a vote 
of non-confidence with the absolute majority of votes from the lower house. Until 
1954, this was possible only when two-thirds of votes were gained. 478 Once the 
article 54 was amended in 1954, the lower house could not be dissolved anymore, if 
the vote of confidence was postponed (from a maximum of 10 days). 479 After 
amending the article 65 in 1955, the term of office for senators was shortened from 
eight to four years. 480 
472 Abu Jaber (1969), p. 230-231. 
473 Hammouri; Hikmat, Wazani, Shbeilat, Faisal, Qaddomi. Interviews in Amman April-June 2003. The 
government representatives tend to be the only ones praising the current, amended constitution. See 
Jordan Times 12-14/03/04. The current prime minister Faisal El Fayez describes the Jordanian 
constitution as "good and one of the best in the world. " 
474 Hammouri, Interviews in June 2003 Amman. 
47 '5 Hammouri (2003), p. 3 and Interview in June 2003, Amman. 
476 Constitution, Articles 53,74,78 and 84. 
47 Constitution. http: //www. iordanembassyus. org/new/aboutiordan/1952constitution. shtni 
478 Constitution (1952), Article 53 and Constitution, Article 53. 
479 Constitution, Article 54 and Constitution 1952, Article 54. 
480 Constitution, Article 65 and Constitution 1952, Article 65. 
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No political decision is born in a vacuum, neither is a decision to amend the 
constitution. Analysing amendments in relation to the political context where they 
have arisen helps to find the motives behind the amendments. Rath argues that due 
to the liberal policy adopted by young King Hussein the early years of his reign were 
a time of liberal experiments. She claims that a liberal attitude was seen in the 1954 
and 1955 amendments that strengthened the role of the parliament. 481 The very 
same lower house that succeeded in creating the current constitution was the first 
house to amend the constitution, two years after the promulgation. 482 In fact it was 
not only the first to amend the constitution, but it is the only house to manage to 
improve the constitution. 
These are by no means insignificant amendments. In relation to the other (negative) 
amendments their positive progressive value diminishes. Thus the focus here is on 
the `less-progressive' amendments, which means all the amendments made since 
1955. In all fairness there are chapters with no amendments made at all. The 
chapters that have not been amended deal with "rights and duties of Jordanians", 
"powers: general divisions" and "enforcement and repeal of laws". Most importantly 
the very first chapter "the state and system of government" is intact. 483 The chapters 
that have been amended deal with rights and responsibilities of the king, the senate, 
the lower house and the judiciary. Thus the basic frame defined in the constitution 
"parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy" as the system of the government has 
been the unchanged since 1952. What have been changing, or rather (intentionally) 
changed, are the elements within that frame. The motive for amending the 
constitution can be identified when connecting the amendments to the political 
context in which they were made. Thus the emphasis here is not only on the 
changes in the text of the constitution (contents), but also on the time of the 
amendment. 
481 Rath (1994), p. 532. 
482 Hourani and Yassin, Who's Who in the Jordanian 
Parliament 1997-2001(1998), p. 37. 
483 Constitution and Constitution (1952). 
138 
The King 
A great deal of the amendments seems be aiming at one particular goal: to 
strengthen the king by broadening his powers either directly or indirectly limiting the 
powers of the other state actors. First, there are the amendments blurring the 
`original' allocation of rights and responsibilities among the executive. The 
responsibility of the ministers is to administer "all affairs of the state", unless "any 
other person or body" is authorised to share some of the administrative 
responsibilities. 484 According to the original article 45, authority can be assigned to 
someone in "laws and regulations", whereas according to the amended article (1958) 
authorisation can be made in "any other legislation", including basically any 
legislative act. 485 This expands the authority considerably, as laws are issued by the 
legislative, regulations by the government and instructions by an individual minister. 
Another aspect to be considered is the publicity of the decisions. It is a constitutional 
requirement for laws are to be published in the Official Gazette. Publishing 
regulations in the Official Gazette has become a common practice, yet administrative 
rulings are rarely published. 486 This amendment makes it easier for the king to get 
involved (or interfere) in the work of the government. While laws are passed through 
known and public procedures, the less significant legislative acts can be done by 
non-elected actors through procedures less public and including fewer actors. One 
could even argue that the re-distribution of responsibilities could be done in a less 
open and public way, at least if so wanted. It is worth noting that while the ministers 
are accountable for the elected lower house, administrative bodies are not. 
Therefore, at least in theory this stipulation could be used as way of compromising 
transparency and accountability. 
The amendments on the articles dealing with the powers of the king are rather subtle 
yet simply suited to their purpose. Amending the article 33 gave the king the right not 
++ 487 
only sign treaties but "treaties and agreements . As treaties are pacts 
between 
484 Constitution, Article 45. 
485 Constitution, Article 45 and Constitution (1952), Article 45. 
486 WTO: The Legal Regime in Jordan, pp. 2-3. 
487 Constitution, Article 33. 
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nations, the original article defined the king as the leader of foreign policy. The 
amendments of the article 33 (May 1958 and September 1958) increased the powers 
of the king in domestic politics. One of the main reasons leading to the political crisis 
of 1957 was the differences between the elected house and the king. 488 As 
mentioned earlier (see chapter 5) the Jordanian foreign policy was one of the main 
issues causing disparity between the al-Nablusi cabinet and King Hussein. AI- 
Nablusi wanted to establish an Arab Union with Iraq, while the king preferred the 
Eisenhower plan, and the Baghdad Pact before that. The relationship between King 
Hussein and Al-Nablusi began dramatically detoriate when al-Nablusi took steps to 
establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 489 The final straw for King 
Hussein was when foreign minister Rimawi argued that in Jordan the monarch would 
not be the chief policy maker anymore, but the parliament. 490 At that stage the king 
felt that the future of the Hashemite rule was at stake; initiated by the government 
appointed by the monarch himself and supported by the democratically elected 
deputies. The political reality and his aspirations made King Hussein feel that the 
threat was more imminent from within, or that the foreign actors might be able to 
influence through certain Jordanians. The amended article stresses the role of the 
king as an authorised actor both in domestic and foreign policy. 
According to the article 34 in its current form, the king can dissolve either the entire 
senate or individual senators. Earlier, until 1974, it was possible to dissolve the 
senate only as a whole. 491 Thus the amendment makes it easier for the monarch to 
control potential dissidents. Naturally it is easier and more economical for the king to 
remove dissident senators than the entire senate. However, the timing of this 
amendment indicates that the amendment might be also related to the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank. 
488 After the 1956 elections, the freest elections in Jordan so far, the king appointed Sulaiman al- 
Nablusi, the leader of the National Socialist Party, as prime minister. It was soon evident that the 
policies of king and of his prime minister were far too different to coexist. 
The king was known, and 
regularly criticised, for his pro-Western sympathies. Hussein was aiming to shift 
his (financial) reliance 
from the British to the Americans, after being forced to abandon the Baghdad Pact. According to the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, Jordan was to receive financial aid from the US in return for the fight against 
Communism. Cooper and Tilly (1994), p. 8. 
489 Snow (1972), p. 105. 
490 Singh (2002), p. 73. 
491 Constitution (1952), Article 34. 
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Amending article 68 in 1960 enabled the king to prolong the term of the chamber for 
a period ranging from 12 to 24 months. According to the original constitution, the 
term was fixed to four years. 492 Therefore, in theory the king can now, when satisfied 
with the existing chamber, prevent the citizenry to change the chamber, or rather to 
postpone the citizenry electing a new chamber. This can be an attractive option 
when the monarch suspects that the voters might elect a less sympathetic or co- 
operative chamber, or a chamber full of deputies with radical ideas. The 1960 
amendment could be easily seen as an attempt to avoid holding parliamentary 
elections. At the time of the amendment parliamentary life was frozen. After 
dissolving the al-Nablusi cabinet, the radical deputies had been replaced by pro- 
Hashemite ones. However, it has to be remembered that during the last days of the 
al-Nablusi government the senate had gained an almost unanimous vote of 
confidence, and overwhelming support, from the lower house. This support for the 
senate was difficult for the king to undermine or ignore, even when the parliament 
had long since dismissed. 493 After turbulent years the king simply might have wanted 
to prevent radicalisation of the parliament. Allowing fair elections with uncertain 
outcomes was a greater risk than Hussein was willing to take. At this point it is worth 
noting that the parliaments elected since the 1957 crisis (6th - 9th) were conservative, 
and also not the outcomes of free elections. 494 
The other one of the 1960s amendments dealt with the king's succession. The king's 
succession was changed in 1965. If he so wished, the king could select one of his 
brothers as heir apparent, instead of his eldest son. 495 The attempts on the king's life 
made the monarch worried about his safety and also that of his successors. The 
assassination of the prime minister Hazzaa' Majalli, also a close friend of Hussein, in 
1960 was one more incident to convince King Hussein of the probability of him being 
murdered. 496As the king's eldest son was very young at that time, this amendment 
was made to prevent Abdullah II succeeding while still a child himself and ensuring 
492 Constitution, Article 68 (i) and Constitution (1952), Article 68 (i). 
ass Rath (1994), p. 533. 
494 Abu Jaber (1969), pp. 240-242. 
ass Constitution, Article 28(a) and Constitution (1952), Article 28(a). 
496 Snow (1972), p. 104 and p. 135. 
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that there would be strong enough ruler for the Hashemite kingdom. 497 
497 Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001), p. 118. 
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The Senate 
The amendments that have more clearly disrupted the original balance of powers, 
the democratic foundation of the constitution, were made on the articles dealing with 
the other state powers: ministers (the senate) and the lower house. It must be 
remembered that the king is a part of the senate, in fact the most powerful element of 
the senate. The king appoints the senate and can dismiss senators or the entire 
senate. 498 Expanding the powers of the senate can be seen as another channel for 
the monarch to get involved in legislating, as well as controlling the deputies. 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that even the original 1952 constitution 
provides the king with authority unlike the other actors, a position very difficult to 
weaken. 
The accountability of the senators - who are appointed by the king to start with - is 
seriously challenged by some of the amendments. The senate, according to the 
constitution, after its formation has to present a "statement of its policy" to the lower 
house, which then votes on confidence. The original constitution defined clear time- 
limits for doing this: one month if the lower house is in session, two if it is not. After 
amending the article (in 1958), it only includes the 1-month limit, but no time limit is 
defined in case the lower house is not in session. Further, if the chamber is not in 
session, or is dissolved, "the Speech from the Throne" will equal as the statement. 499 
Earlier such an option was not available. The amendment enabled the king to 
continue ruling his country although the when the government of al-Nablusi was 
dissolved and many oppositions politicians in exile. 
Furthermore, the articles that deal with the High Tribunal, a body where senators 
would be prosecuted, have been amended. According to the original article 57, the 
High Tribunal should be chaired by the president of the highest civil court. After 
amending the article 57 (1958) the speaker of the senate will be acting as the 
president of the High Tribunal. 
500 These amendments have been changing the 
498 Constitution, Articles 34-35. 
499 Constitution, Article 54, Paragraphs (1-iii), Constitution (1952), Article 54 Paragraphs (i-iii). 
500 Constitution (1952), Article 57. 
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delicate balance between the state powers in two ways. The High Tribunal is the 
body that has the authority to interpret the constitution, when either the cabinet or the 
chamber so requests (with "absolute majority"). 501 Thus giving the speaker of the 
senate (belonging to the executive) the role of the chairman of the tribunal is 
interfering in the powers of the judiciary. It is worth at this point the possible position 
the speaker of the senate has within the political elite. This amendment put one of 
the "king's men" in charge of the tribunal. Monitoring of the executive is partly in the 
hands of the executive itself, partly in hands of the legislative. The High Tribunal is 
not only chaired by the speaker of the senate, but three of its eight members are 
senators. Yet it is more difficult for the elected deputies to monitor and discipline, as 
to displace senators or the entire senate a vote of confidence is easier to gain. 
Ironically the High Tribunal was one of the main improvements of the constitution 
1952, the main elements guaranteeing the responsibility of the government to the 
elected representatives. 502 Following Nathan Brown's study on Arab constitutions, 
this is a common feature in Arab monarchies: to include the principle of ministerial 
responsibility to the elected bodies, yet making it a difficult principle to exercise. 503 
According to Mahafzah, a Jordanian political historian, the absence of the formal 
monitoring arrangements is one the main reasons for the lack of political 
development in the country. There are simply no means to monitor the political elite 
nor the administrative bodies in Jordan. 504 
501 Constitution, Article 122. 
502 See Abu Jaber (1969), pp. 231-232. 
503 Brown (2002), pp. 63-64. 
504 Mahafzah (2001), p. 358. 
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The Legislative 
There are clearly two sets of amendments: ones related to the domestic politics of 
the 1956 elections and others dealing with the occupation of the West Bank. If the 
1950s was the decade of amendments, 1958 is the year of the amendments. 
Nineteen of the thirty-one amendments ever made were undertaken in 1958. 
Moreover, 1958 was the only year when the constitution has been amended more 
than twice: on May 4th and September 1 st. 505 One reason explaining how it was 
possible to have amendments distorting the liberal constitution made, is the political 
setting in 1958. The majority of the constitutional amendments, two-thirds, were 
made during the first martial law period. The martial law was declared on April 25th 
1957 and it ended in November 1958.506 Thus it was easier (for the king) to amend 
the constitution, as radical deputies were replaced by moderate ones, not to mention 
that after April 1957 many of the opposition figures were arrested or in exile. Also the 
press was tightly controlled. 507 The political setting of 1958 does not only explain how 
the amendments were made but also why. It is apparent that the main aim of the 
amendments was to constrain the parliament and to stop the al-Nablusi incident ever 
repeating itself. 
The legislative process seems at first to be intact. 508 The amendments have not 
changed the core of the legislative procedures, yet some details have been altered. 
Earlier it was enough for a single deputy or senator to make a proposal, but once 
amended in 1958 the article 95 requires at least ten senators or deputies to do it. 509 
This is a remarkable amendment, yet more drastic in the relation to the size of the 
parliament of the time. At that time there were fewer members in the parliament than 
there are today: forty deputies and no more than twenty senators, while since 1989 
the number of deputies has increased to 80 and in 2003 to 110.510 Thus the 
requirement of ten deputies or senators was rather strict when it was made, stricter 
than today. In order to propose a law in the pre-1989 era a deputy had to be 
505 Constitution, Articles 33,45,54,102 and 103. 
506 Cooper and Tilly (1994), p. 8; Rath (1994), p. 534. 
507 Baaklini et al (1999), p. 142; Rath (1994), p. 534. See Abu Jaber (1969). 
508 Constitution, Article 91. 
509 Constitution, Article 95 (i) and Constitution (1952), Article 95 (i). 
145 
supported by a quarter of the lower house, and a senator by half of the senate. 
Another amendment related to the right of deputies to propose laws was made on 
article 95. The committee, to which the proposal is sent to be investigated, is 
currently within the house, whereas previously the committee was an ad hoc one 
located in either in the House or in the senate. 511 
One of the most significant amendments is made in 1958 to article 74 which deals 
with the core principle of the separation of powers. In democracy it is essential that 
both the legislative and the executive can balance each other, to "kill" each other, as 
Professor Hammouri puts it. 512 The legislative can give the executive a vote of non- 
confidence, whereas the executive can dissolve the legislative. Yet there are some 
rules to this. The original article 74 included only the sentence: "If the Chamber of 
Deputies is dissolved for any reason, the new Chamber shall not be dissolved for the 
same reason". 513 The amendment made was to add a sentence: "A Minister who 
intends to nominate himself for election shall resign fifteen days at least before the 
beginning of nomination". 514 This article indirectly reveals a fundamental change. 
According to the original version, under normal circumstances there would be no 
senators left to consider whether or not to stand in the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections. According to the 1952 constitution, the government should resign within a 
week of the dissolution of the lower house. A new government would be appointed 
only to administer the period leading to the election of the new deputies, and would 
thus be dissolved once a new lower house had been formed. Extending that period 
would be justified only if a case of emergency would occur. 
Many of the 1958 amendments deal with exceptional situations, exceptions to the 
ordinary parliamentary practice. Under normal circumstances the senate should 
present a statement of its policy to the lower house within a month after its 
establishment. Once the 1958 amendments were made, there were no time-limits for 
the senate to present its policy if the chamber were absent. The king's speech could 
510 http: //www. jordanembassyus. org/new/aboutiordan/dp2. shtml 
511 Constitution, Article 95; Constitution (1952), Article 95. 
512 Hammouri, Interviews in Amman in May-June 2003. 
513 Constitution (1952), Article 74. 
514 Constitution, Article 74 and the Constitution (1952), Article 74. 
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substitute the statement of the policy (article 54). The executive was given a wider 
mandate to legislate; in the absence of the parliament it could pass temporary laws 
(article 94). Prior to 1858 the power of the executive to legislate alone was restricted 
to three clearly defined emergency situations. These amendments describe what 
happens when the normal parliamentary bodies are absent or dissolved. Perhaps it 
was not anticipated six years earlier that there would be a need to make rules for 
exceptional situations. The aim of the nationalists was to create a constitutional 
framework with a parliament and an accountable government. The objective was to 
limit the powers of the executive, not to find situations when passing powers `back' to 
the executive. If the 1952 constitution were seen as a first attempt to create a 
functional parliamentary system, then it would be understandable that after a few 
years of `test-driving' some readjustments might be required. In the case of test- 
driving, however, it is important to identify whose comfort should the constitution 
guarantee. These amendments have only weakened the other state actors in favour 
of the king. Therefore they seem to be made with different goals in mind. The goals 
differ, as the people who succeeded to create the 1952 constitution were not the 
ones (or the one) amending it. When the `creators' of the constitution were amending 
the constitution (1954-1955) the amendments were of a progressive nature. 
Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967 shortly after the parliamentary elections. 515 
Elections were suspended in the 1970s, as half of the Jordanian voters (West 
Bankers) were not able to participate in the political life. Regardless of the absence 
of parliament, or because of it, the constitution was amended in 1973,1974 and 
1976. The constitution was amended to adjust to the changed political reality. 
However, it is argued here that the occupation gave the king a reason to make some 
of the constitutional constraints less constraining. According to the 1973 amendment, 
if during an emergency (force majeure) a seat in the chamber becomes vacant ("for 
any reason") and elections cannot be held, the chamber is authorised to elect a new 
member from the constituency in question. 516 This is not the most dramatic of the 
changes made (in relation to the rule of law or parliamentary system), rather a 
necessity stemming from the regional political developments, since due to Israeli 
515 Massad (2001), p. 97. 
516 Constitution, Article 88. 
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occupation no elections would be possible in the West Bank. Interestingly this 
amendment was made four years after the 1967 war. Thus the amendment might 
indicate that in 1967 the occupation was not anticipated to last as long as it has. 
The current constitution differs fundamentally from the original constitution also when 
it comes to the defining the extraordinary circumstances. In 1974 the paragraph 4 
was added to the Article 73: if force majeure circumstances occur and the senate 
considers holding parliamentary elections impossible, they can be postponed. 517 
Another added paragraph states (73/5) that in such a case the king has also the 
powers to reinstate and convene the dissolved senate until it is considered safe to 
hold elections to elect the next parliament. While the lower house is absent the 
executive is authorised to take care of legislative responsibilities by issuing 
temporary laws. 518 The right of the king to authorise the executive to take care of 
legislative matters in the absence of the legislative was absent in the 1952 
constitution. 
Amending article 94 has made it easier for the executive to issue temporary laws. 
Currently the circumstances where it is possible to issue laws in the absence of the 
chamber is described in a far less detailed manner than the original Article 94. In its 
present form the article states that the senate has a right to issue temporary laws 
"covering matters which require necessary measures which admit no delay or which 
necessitate expenditures incapable of postponement"519. According to the non- 
amended article (1952 constitution), the conditions are defined as follows: "[a] A 
general calamity, [b] A State of war or an emergency, [c] Urgent expenditure which 
cannot be delayed ,. 520 The current article 94 does not even include the word 
`emergency', only a situation where postponing decisions is not possible. There are 
two ways of understanding this amendment. A strict reading of the article would 
suggest that the amendment is corrupting the principle of parliamentary system, as 
the executive is given wider freedoms to hijack the responsibilities of the legislative. 
There are some legal experts, however, who argue that even the current wording of 
517 Constitution, Article 73, Paragraph 4. 
518 Constitution, Article 73, Paragraph 5. 
519 Constitution, Article 94. 
520 Constitution (1952), Article 94, Paragraph 1. 
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the article does not authorise the executive to freely issue temporary laws whenever 
it feels like it. Article 94 still deals with exceptional situations. 521 The matter of 
temporary laws is so significant for this discussion that it will be given a closer look in 
order to see which one of the understandings has been closer to the implementation 
of the article. 
A series of amendments made to article 73 between 1974 and 1986 is rather 
interesting. Not only were new paragraphs added but at the same time also existing 
paragraphs were amended. A significant element in this chain of amendments is the 
involvement of the legislative, which was only to convene to rubber-stamp the 
amendments. Another important element is the function of the constitution in Jordan; 
when the constitution began to be too constraining, it was amended. According to the 
original article, under normal circumstances parliamentary elections must be held 
within four months after dissolving the lower house, otherwise the lower house can 
consider dissolution annulled. 522 
The first amendment was made on November 10th 1974 when the fourth paragraph 
was added. 523 The paragraph stated that in a force majeure situation the king can 
postpone elections for a year without reinstating the lower house. 524 A month earlier 
the Rabat Declaration was issued, defining the PLO as the sole representative of the 
Palestinians. 525 Hussein is said to have opposed the Rabat Declaration, as Jordan 
could not consider the West Bank as part of the country anymore. 526 This exceptional 
situation, loosing a part of the country, can be seen as a justified reason for 
postponing the elections. The role of the parliament was rather exceptional in the 
amendment. The ninth house had already served a full constitutional term and a 24- 
month extension. 527 Still no elections were held and no lower house formed. The 
ninth house was called by a royal decree for an extraordinary session in November 
to discuss the constitutional amendments, and was dissolved immediately after the 
521 Hammouri, Interviews in Amman May 2003. 
522 An exception to this was a case where the house is convened in extraordinary sessions. 
523 Constitution, Article 73. 
524 Constitution, Article 73, (iv). 
525 Abu-Odeh (1999). 
526 
527 Khair, Brief Survey of Parliamentary Life in Jordan. 1920 -1987(1988), p. 56. 
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session. 528 Four months later a `need' for the fourth paragraph appeared: the king 
announced the postponement of parliamentary elections for a year (March 17th 1975 
- March 17th 1976). 
529 
It is worth noting that no elections were nevertheless organised after the 12 months; 
instead the constitution was amended again in March 1976. The time-limit for the 
postponement of elections was omitted. Also a new paragraph was added: under 
force majeure circumstances, when elections are postponed, the king can reinstate a 
dissolved house if the constitution requires amending. 530 This amendment thus 
enabled the king to postpone the elections for an indefinite period. 531 In 1976 the 
house was convened for an extraordinary session by a royal decree. The 
amendments were made within 24 hours and the parliament was dissolved again 
afterwards (while the senate was not dissolved). 532 
In 1984 the article 73 was amended again, this time to authorise the king simply to 
reinstate a dissolved house with no specific reason. 533 The last amendment of this 
series made in 1984 authorises the king to hold elections under force majeure in 
constituencies where holding elections are considered possible. 54 A royal decree 
was issued to reinstate the dissolved house to discuss constitutional amendments. 
Once the reinstated house had made the amendment it was dissolved. 535 The 1984 
amendment was done just before the 1984 by-elections. There were popular 
demands for holding elections. Some observers say that the by-elections were a trial 
election for the king to see who would win after the long absence of elections. 
536 
There were only seven deputies to be elected in the by-elections, thus in the worst 
case the `favourable balance' in the house could be maintained. The decision to hold 
elections would also have helped to create and/or maintain liberal image of the king. 
528 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 41. See also Baaklini et al (1999), pp. 146-147; Khair (1988), p. 59. 
529 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 41. 
530 Khair (1988), p. 52. 
531 Khair (1988), p. 60. 
532 Baaklini et al (1999), p. 143. 
533 Khair (1988), p. 71. 
534 Constitution, Article 73 (vi). 
535 Khair (1988), p. 61. 
536 Shubeilat, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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To conclude, not only were most (if not all) of the negative amendment made at the 
most turbulent times, but also when the lower house was absent or convened to an 
extraordinary session. Thus these amendments were initiated by the executive and 
other actors were given hardly any chance to oppose the plans. Although it is safe to 
say that the people appointed into the parliament in the aftermath of the 1957 crisis 
were unlikely to oppose any plans of the king. Despite the regional political events 
the amendments can also be seen to have worked in the favour of the executive. 
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6.2.2. Temporary Laws: Emergencies 
Drafting constitutions - making rules for future conditions that at the time of 
constitution drafting can only be anticipated - is a tremendous challenge. Although 
the constitution defines the rules for normal circumstances ('business as usual'), it is 
acknowledged that there are times when the normal procedures might prove difficult, 
if not impossible, to follow for the interests of the state (even for the survival of the 
state). Consequently there are different, alternative sets of rules to be followed in the 
case of an emergency. In a parliamentary system, the ordinary legislative process 
can prove too time-consuming when drastic and/or speedy measures are needed. 
The rights and responsibilities of state powers are re-defined, usually in favour of the 
executive. Hence there are also clear restrictions when these measures can and will 
be used in order to eliminate possibilities to the executive (or any other actor) to 
hijack the legislative powers. 
The Hashemite Kingdom is not an exception. The executive has two ways to use 
legislative power: regulations and temporary laws. The executive can issue 
regulations in matters dealing with administering state affairs, public funds or 
government's deposits. The right to pass regulations is strictly limited to these 
matters only and the parliament has no authority to deal with these matters. 537 Article 
94 of the constitution gives the senate the power to issue temporary laws (with the 
king's approval) providing that "the National Assembly is not sitting or is 
dissolved". 538 Thus the senate can use legislative powers only when there is no 
legislative body to pass laws. Furthermore, there is a distinction between laws and 
temporary laws. Once the next national assembly is in session temporary laws 
issued will be presented to it in the beginning of its first session. The deputies can 
either reject or accept the law (or make amendments). If the national assembly 
decides not to pass the temporary laws the executive powers have to cancel them. 
539 
Temporary laws have been issued in Jordan since the 1950s, but never before has a 
537 Constitution, Articles 45,114 and 120. See also Hammouri (2003), p. 4. 
538 Constitution, Article 94. 
539 Constitution, Article 94. 
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government issued so many temporary laws as Ali Abul Ragheb's second 
government between June 2001 and April 2003. Since the dissolution of the lower 
house in June 2001 until the parliamentary elections on June 18th 2003 the Ragheb 
government issued nearly 200540 temporary laws. According to Hammouri's 
calculations, on average eight laws were issued each month. 54 ' The Ragheb 
government had sessions twice a week, thus one new temporary law was discussed 
in each of the sessions. When compared to the rate previous parliaments have 
issued (ordinary) laws one can easily see the difference. The three previous 
legislative bodies produced 146-190 laws each in a 4-year term, which would make 3 
laws a month. 542 This is a rather modest estimate, as this calculation was based on 
160 temporary laws, instead of the 200 laws. 
The matter is controversial due to the number of temporary laws issued as well as 
the circumstances of that period. Based on the amount of temporary laws issued by 
the government in those 21 months one could easily conclude that either Jordan 
seriously lacked laws or the force majeure situation was extremely severe. First, as 
Professor Hammouri points out, Jordan "was not a barren desert with no legislation 
to organize life in it". 543 Also the political situation hardly qualified as an emergency. 
Hammouri stresses that although the current constitution does not define the 
emergency situation in detail (unlike the 1952 constitution) not every exceptional 
situation can be considered as an emergency. Article 13, Hammouri points out, 
describes reasons for a possible emergency: war, public, danger, fire, flood, famine, 
earthquake, serious epidemic. In June 2001 when King Abdullah II postponed 
elections no emergency endangering the safety of the population had occurred in 
Jordan. 544 
Yet the degree and the amount of the temporary laws issued suggest something 
else. The first temporary law was issued on July 19th, the parliament having been 
540 Hammouri (2003), p. 11. 
541 It is important to note that Prof. Hammouri made these calculations based on the assumption that 
there were 160 temporary laws, but the amount of temporary laws was increased to closer to 200 by 
the end of the period of emergency law. 
542 Hammouri (2003), pp. 12-13. 
543 Hammouri (2003), p. 11. 
544 Hammouri (2003), p. 11. See also Constitution, Article 13 (i). 
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dissolved just a few weeks earlier. Why then to dissolve the parliament if new laws 
were needed urgently? It is not realistic to assume that between June 16th (the house 
dissolved) and July 19th (1St law passed) there would be enough time to start drafting 
the law from scratch, particularly when the king announced postponing the elections 
on July 24th after passing the first temporary law. Based on this, the contents of the 
first temporary law are rather surprising (in the context of the `2001 emergency'): "the 
Law of General Election to the House of Deputies" (July 19th) 545 Even analysing the 
titles of the temporary laws makes it no easier to find justification for them. The 
temporary laws passed between 2001 and 2003 deal with a wide range of issues, 
but no only matters of urgency or emergency in a conventional sense of the word: 
from veterinary syndicate to orphans fund and insurance execution. Yet hastiness in 
issuing the laws seems rather apparent. For instance, the temporary law on public 
universities in Jordan (no. 42) was issued in 2001 and amended twice the following 
year, while the companies law (no. 4) issued in 2002 was amended twice the same 
year and once the following year. These are just examples of many similar cases of 
temporary laws passed and amended within the period of 2001-2003. Thus the 
velocity of issuing laws implies that the government in question, Hammouri argues, 
has broken the principle of "mature formulation" of laws. 546 
Not only is the speed of issuance of temporary laws of a concern, but the 
government's actions have other consequences too. A7 These temporary laws have 
placed an enormous burden on other actors. According to Hammouri, if the next 
parliament tried to discuss all the temporary laws issued thoroughly (spending as 
much time as the parliaments before it), it would not have enough time to do so. 
Thus the next parliament would not have time to discuss any laws of its own, and it 
would have to leave some of the temporary laws for the parliament after it. 548 Thus 
the second Ragheb government, in the absence of the elected house, has been busy 
keeping the next two chambers busy. The situation is equally challenging for legal 
scholars and practitioners, as they are facing the tremendous task of keeping 
545 Hammouri (2003), p. 12. 
546 Hammouri (2003), p. 16. 
54' Hammouri (2003). Interview with al-Oran in Amman 2003. 
548 Hammouri (2003), p. 13. 
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themselves informed of the changes in the legislation. 549 Legal practitioners feel that 
it is an enormous burden to keep up with the fast changing legislation. It requires 
money and time on their part. 550 Hammouri is not the only Jordanian legal 
practitioner who sees the situation reaching the limits of unconstitutionality. Asma 
Khader, appointed as the Minister of State and the government's spokesperson after 
the 2003 elections, describes the last three decades as "three decades of 
emergency laws" where "the constitution and laws have been frozen". 551 
Hammouri also considers the clarity of these temporary laws as questionable. It is 
"hard not to regard these laws but as a black mark". 552 According to Hammouri, 
among these laws there are several including the following stipulation (as "unified 
text"): "no provision of any other legislation may be applied should its application 
incur a contradiction with term of this law". 553 This stipulation, argues Hammouri 
further, is unique in any existing legal system. Many Jordanian laws issued before 
the (Ragheb) temporary laws, or parts of them, have been cancelled. Yet it is not 
clarified which of already existing laws have affected and which not. Hammouri 
stresses, that this stipulation (and its impacts) is such a significant matter that it 
requires urgently massive amounts of comparative legal research. This will probably, 
claims Hammouri, produce at least partly controversial results. 554 To make an 
already complicated situation even more complicated there is another stipulation that 
requires attention in this context. The Jordanian constitution, as shown before, 
authorises the next legislative to discuss any temporary laws, yet with the condition 
that nullification "shall not affect any contracts or acquired rights". 555 Hammouri 
suggests that in theory it would be possible to issue temporary laws in order to make 
financial agreements and arrangements that would stay "valid and financially 
binding" although the temporary laws enabling them would be rejected. This has, to 
say the least, a rather unbalancing impact on the whole governmental system not 
549 Hammouri (2003), pp. 14-15. Interviews with Hammouri and al-Oran in June 2003 Amman. 
550 Al-Oran interview in Amman May 2003, Hammoun interviews in April-June 2003. 
551 Interview with Khader in June 2003 in Amman. 
552 Hammouri (2003), p. 14. 
553 Hammouri (2003), p. 14. 
554 Hammouri (2003), p. 14. 
555 Constitution, Article 94. 
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least to the principle of the rule of law. 
556 
The temporary laws issued by the Ragheb government do not qualify as temporary 
laws (as defined in the constitution) on the substance matter nor on the context (non- 
emergency). Yet why are the laws issued and who is to blame? In a parliamentary 
system it is a right and responsibility of the elected representatives to "improve and 
modernise" the legislation. So, why then was the chamber dissolved and elections 
postponed? In a parliamentary system it is a "constitutional sin" to make the law- 
making body absent and thus to gain the (temporary) right to pass laws, particularly 
in the absence of a genuine emergency. 557 Hammouri argues that it is not possible 
for the government "to seek protection or take cover with the King", as the monarch 
decides on the dissolution of the chamber and the postponement of elections. 
According to the constitution, Hammouri points out, the king cannot do it without the 
prime minister and the minister/s concerned signing the royal decree as we11.558 To 
summarise, Hammouri perceives the government's decision to postpone elections as 
a "flagrant legal mistake" and the nearly 200 temporary laws another "flagrant legal 
mistake". The paragraphs (iv-vi) of the article 73 were added when the West Bank 
was occupied. The occupation can be justified as an emergency. 559 
556 Hammouri (2003), p. 15. 
557 Hammouri (2003), pp. 17-18. 
558 Hammouri (2003), pp. 18-19. 
559 Hammouri (2003), p. 21. 
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Summary 
The Jordanian constitution defines the governing system of the Hashemite kingdom 
as a parliamentary monarchy. It describes a rather standard parliamentary system 
based on the principle of separation of powers. The exception to the liberal 
parliamentary system is the strong position guaranteed to the monarch. Not only is 
the king the head of the state but he is granted executive and legislative powers as 
well. The legislative powers are shared by the monarch and the parliament. The 
members of the lower house are elected, but the senate is appointed by the king, 
while the lower house has no constitutional authority to influence the composition of 
the senate. 
The aim of this chapter was to find out whether there have been any significant 
changes in the constitutional design or constitutionality in Jordan as a consequence 
of the political changes. It is justified to state that there have been no significant 
improvements in either respect. Changes have been made in the constitutional 
design, yet prior to 1989. It is also worth noting that these changes were by no 
means improvements. The constitution in force today was promulgated in 1952, yet 
the text has been altered through several amendments since. All amendments were 
made before the political opening of 1989 and there have been no plans to make any 
since 1989. The amended constitution includes the same basic elements as the 
1952 constitution, yet the powers of the king have grown bigger at the expense of the 
legislative. Hammouri describes the current situation as a table with uneven legs. 
The system of governance defined in the original constitutional text was a solid table 
standing on equally strong legs, while the current system stands on unequal legs: 
one has grown massively while others have shrunk. 56° Owing to the amendments, 
the way they were made and their impact on the constitution, it is questionable 
whether constitutionalism and constitutionality exist in Jordan, prior to or since 1989. 
The constitutional design has thus not changed since 1989, nor have there been any 
improvements with a regard to constitutionality. In accordance with Brynen's view it 
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is admitted here the Jordanian constitution has certainly been more than a 
"meaningless piece of paper'. 561 The constitution has not fully constrained the rulers, 
but nevertheless has not been ignored either. The Jordanian rulers have 
acknowledged the significance of the constitution as the superior law and the primary 
source of legality. However, the point of disagreement with Brynen is the degree to 
which the constitution actually has "defined politics and political liberalization" in the 
country. It is argued here that it is politics that has defined the contents of the 
constitution, both before and after the 1989 parliamentary elections. At times when 
obedience to the constitution seemed less attractive (or impossible), whether 
threatened by leftwing radicals or Islamists, King Hussein chose to amend the 
constitution instead of ignoring it altogether. It is stressed here that the aim of using 
the constitution was to guarantee the survival of the Hashemite rule, not to promote 
political development. Despite this Brynen argues that the "constitutionalism" in 
Jordan has been "often more than appearance". 562 
It has not been very difficult for the kings to keep up with the `constitutional 
appearance', either prior or since 1989. The space for the king to manoeuvre was 
extended significantly in the 1950s and the 1960s, particularly when considering that 
even without amendments the king was the most powerful actor. Another point to be 
made on Brynen's argument is his understanding of "Jordanian constitutionalism". As 
defined in the beginning of this chapter the term constitutionalism here refers to an 
ideology aiming at constraining the state powers. King Hussein does not appear to 
be the most constrained ruler. Whenever he needed the backing of the constitution 
(to legitimise his actions), he did not hesitate to amend the constitution, even to 
reinstate a dissolved chamber of deputies just to amend the constitution. To be fair 
all this occurred before the political opening. However, the amendments made the 
constitutional design so flexible that it might simply be the reason why no further 
amendments were made since. The only remarkable change occurred is not related 
to the political opening, but to a fundamental change in the political elite. 
560 Hammouri, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
561 Brynen (1998), p. 76. 
562 Brynen (1998), p. 77. 
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A new king has brought with him a different approach. King Abdullah has chosen an 
approach that combines something old with something new. To keep up with the 
constitutional appearance Abdullah II has chosen not to amend the constitution but 
to interpret it loosely to suit his purposes. Abdullah's decision to postpone 
parliamentary elections in 2001 and to use the emergency clause of the constitution 
without comprehending, or respecting, the meaning of the constitutional text is a 
"constitutional sin", as Hammouri argues. An emergency that requires urgent 
changes in the car insurance legislation or in the laws on private universities is a 
pretty unusual national emergency. According to King Abdullah II the decision was 
justified: "We have last year deemed appropriate to postpone parliamentary 
elections, until a modern elections law is finalized, and the necessary arrangements 
are in place to conduct elections. When this was concluded, we found that the 
difficult regional circumstances dictate that we postpone these elections, even if for a 
while, although we sincerely wished for different circumstances, that would enable us 
to conduct elections on time. But our wish for these elections to be free and fair, and 
unaffected by regional influences and circumstance, left us no choice but to 
postpone the M,,. 563 In the king's statement there is no reference either to the 
constitution or the looming national emergency. The king's primary concern appears 
to be the impact of the regional influences might have on the outcome of the 
elections, not the safety of the nation. A skeptical mind reads the king's statement as 
an attempt of electoral engineering. 
The argument about keeping appearances loses its relevance in this context. It must 
be said that true constitutionalism (constraining the ruling powers) has not existed in 
Jordan, prior to 1989 or since. Furthermore, it is argued that Brynen's understanding 
of constitutionalism resemblances of the understanding of constitutionality adapted 
here. It is, however, evident that Jordan is another case of Arab Constitutionalism. 
The constitution has perceived by the king first and foremost as a tool to augment 
political authority of the Hashemites. Whether this has weakened the judiciary and 
the legislative in practice will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
563 Address to the Nation by the HM King Abdullah II, Amman, Jordan. 
http: //www. lordanembassyus. orq/'hmka08l62002. htm Italics added. 
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To argue like Baaklini (et al) that the amendments were done to within "the rule of 
law" is not justified. Unless Baaklini's (et al) understanding of the term differs 
fundamentally from the one adapted here. Constitutionality of the amendments was 
seriously compromised by reinstating the house only to rubberstamp the 
amendments. Based on the findings of this study it does not appear that King 
Hussein was as concerned about staying within the rule of law as he was concerned 
about staying in power. It is also argued here after analysing the constitutional 
design and its implementation that the rule of law is not upheld in Jordan. Not during 
the period the study by Baaklini et al covered, and not during the reign of King 
Abdullah II so far. More importantly there is no evidence the political opening to 
have any impact on the rule of law after examining the constitution and 
constitutionality in Jordan. In addition to the possible different understanding of the 
term it has to be acknowledged that they studied the legislative, not the judiciary. 
More precise picture of constitutionality in Jordan can be given after analyzing the 
judiciary and the political rights in the next chapters. 
Reforming the constitution in force, or even going back to the original text, it is 
argued here, is not required for democratisation to commence in the Hashemite 
kingdom. The amendments of the late 1950s and the 1960s left the fundamental 
elements of the system untouched: no amendments were made on the very first 
chapters defining the aim of the constitution (parliamentary monarchy), nor on the 
chapters on the citizens' rights. The matter is primarily dependent on the 
implementation of the constitution, and thus above all on political will. The current 
constitution provides an adequate framework, yet rather elementary for a democratic 
state. It is not argued here that the constitution in force is a flawless document. 
Nevertheless it is stressed that the lack of constitutionalism in Jordan is not owing to 
the flaws in the constitution, but the flaws in using it. 
Brynen predicted in 1998 that "in the post-1989 period, both the constitution itself 
and a legacy of Jordanian constitutionalism will play a central role in defining the 
legal terrain upon which the ebb and flow of liberalization is played out". 564 This 
interesting view will be discussed further in the next chapters. Based on this chapter 
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there are no grounds to perceive the political changes as `democratisation', but it is 
too premature to make the final conclusion, as there are two more elements to study. 
The independence of the Jordanian judiciary will be analysed, followed by a chapter 
on political participation. 
"C4 Brynen (1998), p. 77. 
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7. THE JUDICIARY IN JORDAN 
Introduction 
An independent judiciary is not only crucial for an effective legal system, but also a 
cornerstone of the rule of law. Regardless of the understandings of the rule of law, 
the basic requirement for the rule of law is the existence of the judiciary able to 
provide the subjects of the law effective legal services. The Hashemite kingdom is no 
exception. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to examine whether this cornerstone 
of the rule of law exists in Jordan. To identify whether the rule of law is embedded in 
Jordan it is important to examine both the design and the implementation. The 
former is done through analysing the current constitution and other related 
legislation. Do the structures of the legal system defined in the legislation support the 
independence of the judiciary? Special attention will be given to structural elements 
that compromise the independence of the judiciary: the state security courts, tribal 
law and the question of judicial review. 
The judicial independence in Jordan is assessed with the help of the United Nations 
Basic Principles, as to make the vast and complicated matter more approachable. 
The Basic Principles suggest approaching the independence through six 
subcategories. This will make it easier to highlight the elements that might be 
compromising the independence. To give the analytical task more structure the 
elements assesses are also divided into structural and decisional independence. The 
former is used to refer the physical working conditions of the judges and the latter the 
sense of freedom to practice law without external interference experienced by the 
judges. 
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7.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE JORDANIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
The Jordanian constitution defines the structure of a rather 'standard' legal system, 
one belonging to the civil law famiIy. 565 It is a "dual system", like many legal systems 
in the Arab Middle East. It is a combination of two "conceptually different legal 
traditions": Western and Islamic. 566 The legal system is constructed according to 
Western (constitutional) models, yet also incorporates the Islamic law. This is usually 
done basing criminal and civil law on Western examples and the personal status 
code on the Shariah law. 567 The main influences on the Jordanian system have been 
the legal traditions of the foreign (occupying) powers, the Ottomans and the 
European colonial rulers. %8 The Jordanian constitution defines Islam as the religion 
of the state. 569 Yet, there are, as al-Jazy points out, no stipulations that would give 
(or not give) Shariah a special role "as `a' main source or 'the' main source of 
legislation". 570 Unlike in Saudi Arabia or Unified Yemen, Islamic law in Jordan is only 
the basis for personal status code, (e. g. matters to deal marriage, divorce and child 
custody), and there are separate courts for the Shariah law. 571 
The constitution is the highest legal authority defining the Jordanian legal system. 572 
According to the constitution, the judiciary in Jordan is built on three sets of courts: 
565 Simplified the civil law tradition is based on broad legal principles and interpretation of doctrinal 
writings, while the common law tradition is based on traditional unwritten law, based on custom and 
usage. 
566 Warrick, Law in the Service of Legitimacy: Gender and the Political System in Jordan(2002), p. 8 
and p. 20. 
567 Warrick (2002), p. 8 and p. 20. See also `Jordan - the Judiciary', 
http-Hcountrystudies. us/iordan/57. htm (US Congress Library). 
Massad (2001), pp. 23-24. Joseph Massad argues that the British influence has been greater than 
has been acknowledged, particularly by the Jordanian nationalists. 
569 Constitution, Article 2. 
570 AI-Jazy, Civil and Political Rights in the Constitutions of the Arab States: A Comparative Analysis 
with Special Reference to Egypt(2000), p. 45. Unlike in Jordan, for instance, the Egyptian constitution 
defines the Shariah as the main source of legislation. 
571 Constitution, Article 103, Paragraph (ii). In some dual systems despite personal status code being 
based on different legal tradition all civil matters are tried in the same courts. See Warrick (2002). 
572 Recently new documents has been produced, although their status, particularly in relation to the 
constitution itself, is under dispute. The National Charter was produced by "60-member royal 
commission" in the early 1990s to mark the `new beginning'. The role of the document is unclear, yet it 
clearly cannot be taking the role of the constitution. It is not a legal text and has no legal authority. It is 
more a declaration of a governmental agenda. According to a government source, however, the 
National Chart "along with the Jordanian Constitution, provides a compass the national debate on 
fundamental issues". (http: //www. kinghussein. gov. jo) There are some who keep referring to it when 
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civil, religious and special courts. Several judicial principles are acknowledged in the 
constitution: equality of the subjects of the law, publicity of legal affairs and the 
independence of the judiciary. Regardless of their type, all "courts shall be open too 
all and shall be free from any interference in their affairs". 573 Sessions of the courts 
are public, with the exception of matters that require in camera sessions due to the 
nature of the matter (public order or morals). The decisions made in camera trials 
must be made public. 574 While the constitution draws the general lines for the legal 
system, details are often left to "provisions of laws", such as regarding the "various 
courts, their categories, their divisions, their jurisdiction and their administration". 575 
Furthermore, the amount of details varies depending of the type of the court. 
Civil courts, from Magistrate Courts to the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Cassation, adjudicate civil and criminal matters that are not assigned to the other 
courts, religious or special. 576 The civil courts are structured on four levels: 
magistrates courts, courts of first instance, appeal courts and the Court of Cassation. 
While the 14 magistrate courts deal only with minor civil claims577, the first instance 
courts adjudicate all cases. The Court of Cassation also acts as the Supreme Court. 
The decisions of the Supreme Court consisting of a president and seven judges are 
final. 578 The president of the court, the seven judges, the Administrative Attorney 
General and the assistant are appointed by a royal decree upon decisions by the 
Higher Judicial Council, a 10-member administrative body consisting mainly of senior 
judges. 579 
Religious courts include the Shariah courts and "Tribunals of other Religious 
Communities", (currently the Christian churches). The Shariah courts exercise 
jurisdiction according to the Shanah law in three types of cases: personal matters 
talking about the system of governance in Jordan. See Obeidat, Democracy in Jordan and Judicial 
Control(1995) and Hikmat, Democracy and Judicial Control in Jordan(1995). 
577'Constitution, Article 101 (i). 
spa Constitution, Article 101. 
575 Constitution, Article 100. 
576 Constitution, Article 99. 
s" Minor claims are cases that are worth up to 250 Jordanian dinars or criminal cases of worth 100 
dinars or maximum one year sentence. 
578 Wazani, Interview in Amman May 2003 and Afif Amin, (Judicial Institute), Interview, in Amman 
June 2003. 
579 McDermott, (2003), p. 6 
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when all of the parties are Muslims, or the cases dealing with "blood money" (diya) if 
one of the parties is Muslim, or if all non-Muslim parties agree to the case being 
brought to a Shariah court, and in matters related to Islamic waqfs (charity). 580 
Inheritance law, both for Muslims and non-Muslims, is also based on Shariah. 581 
Standard cases are decided by five judges, more severe cases by all seven. In the 
Shariah courts there is only one judge (gadi) in each court to hear the cases and 
make decisions, while in the Christian courts there are three judges. 582 
The Supreme Court acts as the administrative judiciary. The Supreme Court as an 
administrative court was given a wider range of competencies when the law on the 
Supreme Court was amended in 1992.583 The Court deals with election appeals of 
civil society associations (professional and civil associations and the Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce) while earlier appeals could only be made on elections at 
municipal, local and administrative councils. The court's jurisdiction includes all 
appeals against final administrative decisions, even the ones that include an 
immunisation clause. Prior to 1992 the cases with immunisation clause were 
excluded from the court's the jurisdiction. 584 The Supreme Court is also a court for 
compensation and court for annulment, while it was earlier only a court for 
annulment. 585 Ahmad Obeidat, former prime minister and the chairman of the 
National Human Rights Commission, sees the 1992 law as "a really positive step 
towards completion of the judiciary authority" and "democratic development". 586 
The only special courts mentioned in the constitution are the High Tribunal and the 
Special Tribunal (Diwan Khass). The High Tribunal, as discussed before (see the 
previous chapter), is authorised to interpret the constitution and the Special Tribunal 
the constitutionality of laws. 587 While the constitution is rather vague about the civil 
and the religious courts, it leaves even more details open about the special courts. 
Out of the fourteen articles of the constitution dealing with the judiciary only one 
580 Constitution, Article 105 and 106. 
581 Jordan 2002 Report, 2003. 
582 Jordan - The Judiciary, 1. http: //countrystudies. us/Jordan/57. 
htm (US Congress Library) 
583 Obeidat (1995), p. 43. 
58' Obeidat (1995), p. 44; Hikmat (1995), p. 76. 
585 Obeidat (1995), pp. 43-44. 
586 Obeidat (1995), p. 43. 
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deals with the special courts. All the constitution says about special courts is that 
"special courts shall exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of 
the laws constituting them". 588 Thus not much is revealed in about special courts' 
jurisdiction, role or their composition. The appointment of judges for civil and 
religious courts, the constitution defines, is done by a royal decree. Yet nothing is 
said about the appointment of judges for the special courts. 589 This makes the courts 
unequal in relation to each other and the legal system in this respect is `unbalanced'. 
More importantly these stipulations are in a contradiction with the judicial 
independence guaranteed by the constitution. 
587 Constitution, Article 122. 
588 Constitution, Article 110. See Chapter Six (the Judiciary): Articles 97-110. 
589 Constitution, Article 98. 
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In the constitution there are a number of stipulations to ensure that everyone is 
subject to the law. The only exception is the king who as the head of the state is 
provided with immunity against criminal prosecution. While there are ways of state 
agencies monitoring each other, citizens can seek to restore their rights if any 
administrative decision violates their constitutional rights. According to the 
constitution, citizens have the right to "address the public authorities" in matters 
regarding public affairs affecting them or their relatives. 590 State agencies are 
subjected to civil law regulations and are treated as a single individual. People can 
demand annulment of any non-constitutional administrative procedures or 
suspension of unconstitutional temporary law or by-law. Quite surprisingly annulment 
is justified only if the procedure is based on unconstitutional law (or by-law). Yet it 
does not include the unconstitutional law itself. Also the suspension of an 
unconstitutional law is not applied to the final law itself. Thus the Supreme Court is 
not authorised to deal with the constitutionality of laws, only with procedures and by- 
laws. Taher Hikmat sees, however, the difference between annulment of procedures 
based on unconstitutional law and declaring laws unconstitutional as "merely 
theoretical". 591 
According to the constitution, ministers can be tried in the High Tribunal. Senators 
can impeach ministers when two-thirds from the lower house supports the 
impeachment. In such a case the Penal Code will be used or a special law in case 
the Penal Code is not applicable. Minister will be suspended from the office during 
the trial, and trial will continue even if the minister/s resign. 592 The constitution is 
vague regarding the terms of minister's immunity. Some see it to be applying to only 
current ministers, others to all ministers, previous and current. There have been 
(major) corruption cases in which both former and then current ministers involved 
have not been prosecuted, as there has been confusion on the legal details. It was 
argued that previous ministers should be tried in regular courts, which they later 
argued did not have the authority to deal with such matters. This interpretation 
590 Constitution, Article 17. 
591 Hikmat (1995), p. 77. 
592 Constitution, Articles 56,58 and 59. 
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considers that the constitution refers only to current ministers; in effect, Sakijha and 
Kilani point out, would provide 450 Jordanian ministers with immunity. Thus ministers 
who committed criminal offences while in office cannot be tried when they are not in 
the office anymore. 593 
The constitution guarantees a number of legal rights central to the rule of law: 
equality before law, the right to appear in front of an independent court and 
protection against illegal detainment or imprisonment. 594 There are, however, no 
references in the constitution to principles and procedures such as the presumption 
of innocence, suspension procedures, or the right of defence. This does not 
necessarily mean that these rights would be utterly excluded from the Jordanian 
legal system. In effect, some argue that the articles guaranteeing equality of all and 
non-discrimination are wider guarantees and include the missing ones. 595 
Furthermore, more rights are guaranteed in other legislation. According to the law, 
litigation procedures in Jordan are based on the principle of presumption of 
innocence, and defendants are entitled to counsel. 596 
To summarise, the legal system described in the constitution is a `standard' dual 
system. Islam, the state religion, is acknowledged as a part of the legal system, yet 
not the predominant element. The constitution recognises the principle of the 
independence of the judiciary: judges must be free from any interference and subject 
to nothing but the law. 597 It also includes the guarantee of the independence of 
courts. 598 Regardless of the acknowledgement of these principles the legal system 
contains tribunals and courts that are not fully controlled and administered by the 
judiciary. The existence of extrajudicial bodies compromises the monopoly of the 
judiciary. The special courts in particular have a controversial role. The legislation 
regarding the special courts is easier to change, as they are (almost totally) outside 
the constitutional framework. As mentioned earlier, the constitution is less detailed 
593 Kilani and Sakijha, National Integrity Systems(2001), p. 6. The corruption cases referred to: a case 
that ministers had been involved in buying gold from the Jordanian Central Bank and cases that some 
ministers had been involved in bigger construction projects. 
594 Constitution, Articles 6 (i) and 8. 
595 AI-Jazy (2000), p. 57, p. 117 and p. 121. 
596 Halasa (2000), p. 86; McDermott (2003), p. 7. 
597 Constitution, Article 97. 
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regarding the special courts, which makes the situation even less satisfactory. Not 
only are the special courts `extrajudicial' with the regard to their composition (military 
judges) and the role of the executive in monitoring special courts, but with the regard 
to their stability. The legislation covering special courts can be approached through 
`ordinary' legislation, while amending the jurisdiction of the other courts requires 
amending the constitution. 
598 Constitution, Article 101 (i). 
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7.2. EXTRA-JUDICIAL POWERS 
7.2.1. State Security Courts 
State security courts belong to the `less transparent' part of the Jordanian judiciary. 
The organisational details, as mentioned earlier, are left open in the constitution and 
are mainly defined in the provisions of laws. State security courts deal with cases of 
"sedition, armed insurrection, financial crimes, drug-trafficking, and offences against 
the royal family"599. Unlike those of other courts, the sessions of the state security 
courts are not open to the public, yet most decisions are customarily published in the 
Official Gazette. The courts' verdicts will be automatically reviewed by the Court of 
Cassation, but no appeals can be made. 600 A questionable element of the state 
security courts is the composition of the court. There are three judges: two military 
officers and one civilian. Civilian legal practitioners have criticised the military 
officers' role in the cases where civilians have been tried. It is argued that military 
officers do not possess the legal expertise, yet the government reports suggest 
otherwise. In the past there have also been allegations of the defendants being 
psychologically and physically tortured while in detention. There have also been 
reported cases of pre-trial detention where defendants have been denied the right to 
meet their legal representatives. 601 The amendments made to the state security court 
laws as a temporary law in 2001 weakened the rights of defendants. The 
amendments expanded the prime minister's powers to refer cases to state security 
courts. The maximum length for incommunicado detention was increased from two to 
seven days. The right to appeal was abolished for the minor misdemeanors (3 years 
or less). 602 
The state security courts seem to have been busy with cases which some might 
consider as being nothing but attempts to silence political opposition in Jordan. The 
two cases referred below have two things in common. The cases have been 
599 US State Report (2003), p. 9. 
600 Al Ahram (2002), p. 2. http: //weekly. ahram. orq. eq 
601 US State Report (2003), p. 5. 
602 McDermott (2003), p. 7. 
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controversial; the most vocal members of the opposition have been accused of 
expressing their critical opinions in public. The defendants in both cases were very 
popular and outspoken Jordanian opposition politicians, yet from different ends of the 
political spectrum. Leith Shubeilat is an independent Islamist, a former deputy and 
the president of the Jordanian Engineers Association (JEA) - the most powerful 
professional syndicate in Jordan. He characterises his significance himself: "We 
have no opposition in Jordan, I am the only opponent". 603 According to Shubeilat, the 
government's representatives have indirectly made threats to his and his family's 
safety. He claims that his telephone calls have been intercepted, his house placed 
under surveillance and his family received threats. 604 Shubeilat, known for his anti- 
normalisation policy towards Israel, has been tried in the state security court three 
times, and even sentenced to death once. On all occasions late King Hussein 
intervened and pardoned Shubeilat. 
The first time around Shubeilat was arrested and tried in the state security court in 
1992. He was accused, together with three other people, of belonging to a terrorist 
organisation, Al-Nafir al-Islami (Islamic Herald). All accused were given a death 
penalty. Shubeilat argues that the testimonies were false and the organisation did 
not even exist. The work of the defence team was made challenging as the 
witnesses' identities were sealed. The sentences were turned into life sentences and 
48 hours later all those convicted were pardoned by the king. 605 Rather conveniently 
Shubeilat's trial interrupted his ongoing campaign against corruption. It was publicly 
known that Shubeilat was about to indict Zayd al-Rifai, a close friend of King 
Hussein. 606 Shubeilat was rearrested in December 1995 and his second trial began 
in January 1996. This trial demonstrated yet again the lack of respect for defendant's 
rights or a regard for the process of law. Shubeilat was arrested without the 
possibility of bail and his family was not allowed to meet him. There were 
accusations of "procedural errors including illegal alteration of documents (such as 
the changing of page numbers and dates of his interrogation), questioning of Mr. 
Shubailat beyond the scope of the charges against him, denial of legal counsel prior 
603 Shubeilat, Interview in Amman in June 2003. 
604 Shubeilat, Interview in Amman in June 2003. 
605 Al Ahram, 2002. http: //weekly. ahrani. orci. eg/2002/615/rel. htm 
6°s Brand (2000), p. 110. 
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to (but not during) his trial, the court's arbitrary veto of all of the defense's questions 
to state witnesses, and the state's refusal to call upon all of the witnesses for the 
defense". 607 The evidence produced by the prosecution were speeches written by 
Shubeilat, some only drafts never publicised anywhere. 608 Shubeilat was given a 3- 
year prison sentence for slander, but later the same year released by the king. 
Ironically King Hussein - the target of Shubeilat's slander - drove to the prison 
himself to release Shubeilat and gave him a lift home. 609 
Shubeilat was arrested again in 1998 after giving a speech at a mosque in Ma'an, 
southern Jordan. Shubeilat was sentenced to three years imprisonment based on a 
"shameful act that is directed against the king". Shubeilat was later pardoned by King 
Hussein, but he refused to accept the pardon as he was expecting the sentence to 
be overturned. The appeal was rejected and Shubeilat served the full sentence. An 
alarming, new element of this trial compared to the previous two trials was a 
publication ban declared by the executive. Although in the state security courts cases 
are not public their details have customarily been reported in the media. In this case 
it was not even a possibility. A series of letters were sent to provide the press with 
`guidance'. The first letter from the Ministry of Information was sent to the press to 
ban all press coverage, "any news or commentary" . 
61 0 The contents of the letter and 
the response by legal experts was published in Jordanian newspapers. This is 
believed to have upset the executive who sent another letter. The second letter 
reminded the press of the ban and stressed that violating the ban would lead to 
criminal prosecution. Also a third letter was sent, this time from the state security 
court on the day the trial against Shubeilat began. Once again the members of the 
press were made aware of the publication ban and the consequences of 
disregarding it. 611 
607 AAAS Human Rights Action Network: http: //shr. aaas. org/aaashran/alert. php? a id=28 and Human 
Rights Watch: http: //www. hrw. orq/press98/aprl/iordan2. htm 
608 Human Rights Watch / Middle East (1997), p. 21. 
609 Human Rights Watch / Middle East (1997), p. 21. 
610 Human Rights Watch / Middle East (1998) 04/09. 
http-//hrw. orq/enqlish/docs/1998/04/09/iordanlO9l. htm 
611 Al-Ahram (2002). htte: //weeks ahram. orq. eg 
173 
The other opposition politician tried in the state security court is Toujan Faisal, the 
first Jordanian female deputy. 612 Faisal, a member of the Circassian minority, is a 
controversial politician known for her outspoken views. Faisal had made public 
accusations against the Abu Ali Ragheb's government in 2002. In an online letter 
addressed to King Abdullah, she accused the prime minister, a member of the 
political inner circle, of issuing a law for private financial gains and of the judiciary of 
being corrupted. In the same year in Baghdad, Faisal also expressed her frustration 
regarding the government's Iraqi policies. She was charged under an anti-terrorist 
act of four counts of seditious libel in 2002. Once again the reports from the trial are 
not the most encouraging in response to it being a fair trial with due process. 
Furthermore, Faisal had no choice other than to act as her own defence, as all the 
defence lawyers quit as a protest against the restrictions laid by the state security 
court. Her lawyers wanted Farouq Kilani, former Chief Justice, and Abu Ragheb 
himself to be called as witnesses, but the court refused to subpoena them. 613 Faisal 
was sentenced to an 18-month term of imprisonment for "disseminating information 
abroad and in Jordan, undermining the reputation of the state and that of its officials, 
defaming the judiciary and offending religious sentiment"614 Faisal was pardoned by 
King Abdullah II in June 2002, after a 29-day hunger strike. The special pardon was 
made by the royal decree on the basis of "humanitarian grounds". 615 
612 Faisal was charged for apostasy in 1989, even though there is no apostasy law in Jordan. The 
shari'a appeals court finally declared Faisal not guilty. The dispute was regarding Faisal's perceptions 
on interpretation of the Islamic law. See Brand (2000), p. 146. 
613 http: l/www. fidh. org/communiq/2003/1o2605a. htm. See also Amnesty International. 
614 AI-Ahram (2002), 23-29 May. 
615 Jordan Times (2002) June 27. htti): //www. oordanembassvus. orq/06272002001. htm 
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7.2.2. Tribal Law 
There is an element that cannot be left out when talking about a legal system in 
Jordan. As in many other Arab countries there is a more traditional, or `original', 
(`legal') institution that lives alongside the formal - `modern' - legal system: tribal law. 
Tribal law, common in the most Arab countries, has its origin in the pre-Islamic era or 
the early Islamic period, thus is not necessarily `Islamic' in content. 616 In cases of 
settling disputes, tribal status and loyalties are sometimes the (primary) carrying 
force, and the formal legal procedures are passed. 
To start with it has to be said that among the Jordanian legal experts interviewed for 
this study the opinions on tribal law are divided in two respects. Some dispute the 
very existence of tribal law in Jordan, arguing that it is an element belonging to the 
past. According to Taher Hikmat, former Chief Justice and former Minister, tribal law 
ceased to exist in Jordan in May 1976 when a law was issued to abolish it. Hikmat 
argues that tribal law exists only in societies where the state is not strong enough. 617 
Thus Hikmat appears to believe, while denying the existence of tribal law in Jordan, 
that there is no need for tribal law in Jordan. The Jordanian state is strong enough to 
provide alternative means for receiving justice. Among those who reckon that tribal 
law is an existing institution, there is no consensus on its significance. Regardless of 
differences in opinion all the interviewees stressed that tribal law is not codified; it is 
not included in the formal legal system. The constitution does not even mention the 
tribal law, although there was still a considered need to abolish it in the 1970s. 
Sonbol argues, however, that when the tribal law was abolished in 1976, "certain 
aspects" of tribal law, including diyya (blood money) traditions, were integrated into 
existing legislation. Sonbol even considers tribal law as "an important basis for the 
way judges rule in Jordanian courts". 618 
It is another issue as to whether the law in the mid-1970s had the impact expected. 
Leila Sharaf claims that tribal law was indirectly the reason leading to her resignation 
616 Sonbol, Women of Jordan(2003), p. 44. 
617 Hikmat, Interview in Amman 2003. Also Wazani, Interviews in May 2003 and Qaddomi June 2003. 
618 Sonbol (2003), p. 21. Sonbol has studied the Jordanian legislation on women. 
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from the post of the Minister of Information in 1983. Sharaf, one of the first women in 
the Jordanian parliament619 was in dispute with King Hussein, as she refused to 
accept the limitations on the freedoms of expression and press placed by the king. 
Hussein had sent a letter to the prime minister, disregarding Sharaf, the minister 
concerned, to inform him that there would be stricter measures to control the press. 
The reason behind the king's plan was a publicised debate in the parliament. This 
debate, explains Sharaf, was about the tribal law. Members of the national assembly 
were making inquiries as to the status of the plans to integrate tribal law into the civil 
law. The media coverage on this debate aggravated tribal groups. Sharaf explains 
that she was publicly expressing concerns about the power of tribal law present in 
Jordanian society, regardless of the formal law. She said that despite the promises 
given by King Hussein she was asked to leave this issue untouched. Sharaf believes 
that the king was pressured by tribal groups who favoured the institution as an 
inseparable part of their lives. 620 Since her resignation Leila Sharaf has been 
appointed to other ministerial posts; she is an appointed deputy in the current 
senate. 621 
Tribal law today can be seen as a method of reconciliation of disputes before they 
are dealt within the formal (legal) system, or sometimes instead of it. For instance, 
when accidents leading to serious injuries or loss of human lives occur, relying on 
tribal law (`tribal reconciliation') is not uncommon. The concept of diyya (blood 
money) is central to these procedures. According to Sonbol, after abolishing tribal 
law as an entity, "diyya traditions" were codified into the legislation. Rather 
interestingly, the current constitution defines the cases involving diyya belonging to 
the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts. 622 A list of crimes to be compensated by money 
(diyya) was included, as well as the reasonable amounts of diyya to be paid for each 
type of crime. Sonbol also claims that for the crimes not listed a practice for defining 
for the amount of diyya was established: percentage from the maximum amount of 
diyya (causing death) is calculated according to the seriousness of the crime 
6'9 Leila Sharaf was the first woman to be appointed as a 'political' minister. She is currently a Senator 
in the government. 
620 Sharaf, Interview in Amman May 2003. See also Hourani (2000), p. 45. 
621 htto: //www. iordanembassyus. org/new/govlisting. shtml#lowerhouse 
622 Constitution, Article 105, ii. 
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committed. 623 The victim's brother is taken to police custody, to be protected from 
potential vengeance. The first step is for the guilty person's father to mobilise 
dignitaries of their tribe to visit the victim's tribe. The size of the `delegations' can be 
anything from twenty to two hundred men624, depending on the importance of the 
tribes involved and the seriousness of the accident. So too does the length of the 
visit/s vary. The aim of the first visit is to pay condolences and for parties to define 
the length of a `calming down' period together. According to tribal law, the party 
which suffered the loss has a right to get even. If a life is lost, it is justified to make 
the guilty party to suffer an equal loss. During the agreed period the aggrieved party 
waives the right to revenge. After this period the delegation returns to ask 
625 forgiveness and to pay compensation as requested by the other side. 
There are legal experts who see tribal law as something positive and constructive, an 
alternative way of restoring peace at times when people are extremely emotional and 
irrational. Wazani considers tribal law only as a "way of reconciliation", not something 
solving the matter. He also stresses that it is only used in the most serious cases. 626 
According to Rehab Qaddomi, an attorney of law, the involved parties save public 
resources when aiming to solve the problem among themselves. The settled cases 
are usually given milder sentences. When there is no settlement, the penalty is 
harsher. Qaddomi also stresses that this way of settling is not compulsory, yet "high 
percentage of cases" are thus decided. 627 Sonbol argues in particular in a case of so- 
called honour crimes the existence of diyya is an encouragement, as people are 
aware of the likelihood of receiving reduced sentences. 628 Anis Qassim, another 
attorney, considers these procedures "extremely costly" and thus unnecessary. 
These formalities take a great deal of time and resources in a society where 
resources could be spent (more) wisely. Throughout the reconciliation process the 
victim's brother is held in `protective' custody; to prevent the male relatives of the 
victim to get even. The legal system is on hold waiting for the matter to be solved by 
the involved parties. The court will not proceed with the case unless the legal 
623 Sonbol (2003), p. 47. 
624 Tribal reconciliation/mediation is a 'men-only' activity. 
625 Anis Qassim, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
626 Wazani, Interview in Amman May 2003. 
627 Qaddomi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
177 
representatives can produce evidence of the waived right of retribution. Qassim also 
argues that there have been no genuine attempts to abolish tribal law practices in 
Jordan. He believes that the younger generations benefit from the system and the 
executive relies on the support of the tribal groups. Regardless of what the people 
close to the executive might say, even in the 1990s a programme on tribal law was 
shown on national TV. Qassim concludes: "If tribal law did not exist, why would there 
be a reason to broadcast such a programme? " 629 
The relevance of tribal law to the rule of law in Jordan is not straightforward, as it 
depends on the perception of the role of the tribal law in Jordan one chooses from 
the above-mentioned. The fact that tribal law is a part of a traditional system or 
society does not necessarily make it inadequate, inappropriate or unwanted. It 
seems that some observers deny the existence of tribal law due to its `primitive' 
nature. Yet it must be stressed here that within this study tribal law per se is not 
something automatically undesirable, or incompatible with the rule of law. As a 
method of rebuilding damaged relationships and dealing with stressful experiences, it 
can be a valuable method. 
There are, however, elements that should be treated with caution. Once tribal law 
interferes with the formal legal system, it becomes problematic. Once a way of 
settling disputes exists outside the formal (legal) system, it becomes a source of 
instability and unpredictability. Tribal law in Jordan, as mentioned earlier, is not in the 
code; there are no formal written rules about the tribal law practices. Thus there are 
also no way of monitoring its functioning, at least by state agents. As tribal settling is 
not compulsory, what happens in cases where only one party is willing to settle in a 
tribal way? Perhaps in some cases it might be tempting for the more powerful tribe to 
use their bargaining power. If the court is (only) expecting to receive documents of 
`waived rights of retribution', they are not necessarily interested how the `agreement' 
was reached. The equality of the citizens might be compromised, when one party 
belongs to a less important tribe. There have also reportedly been cases where the 
police have not carried out any investigations, nor pressed any charges, because the 
628 Sonbol (2003), p. 47. 
629 Qassim, Interview in Amman 2003. 
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accused belongs to a powerful tribal group. The argument of the people involved to 
be better suited to investigate the alleged violation seems to be on shaky grounds. 
Imagining a violation investigated by police, a neutral outsider, or by people 
personally related to the violation (through the violator or the victim): which actors 
would be less irrational and emotional? Therefore, tribal law as long as it is not an 
acknowledged and codified (and thus in theory monitored) element of the formal 
legal system is compromising the rule of law. 
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7.2.3. Constitutional Court 
The constitution - the highest legal authority in Jordan - has no stipulations on who is 
responsible or authorised to control constitutionality in Jordan. Monitoring 
constitutionality is a task that has not been reserved to anyone in particular nor 
denied it from someone particularly. 63o As shown before, the High Tribunal is 
authorised to interpret the constitution, but only when so requested by the Senate or 
the lower house. Thus it cannot take the initiative on interpreting constitution. The 
request by the lower house has to be supported by an absolute majority. 631 The 
responsibility of the Special Council (or Special Tribunal) is to interpret 
constitutionality of laws if requested by the prime minister, as long as no other court 
has done it. The members of the Special Council - the president of the highest civil 
court and two judges from the same court and a senior administrative official - are 
appointed by the Council of Ministers. The Minister concerned is also entitled to 
appoint one member from the ministry. 632 
The lack of precision in the Jordanian constitution has led to constitutional confusion. 
According to Abu Wendi, a legal scholar, all Jordanian courts, both ordinary and 
administrative, have reacted in a similar manner to this confusion. From 1952 until 
the late 1960s, courts including the Supreme Court of Justice, simply denied having 
any responsibility to discuss the constitutionality of laws. Thus the Jordanian 
judiciary, unlike the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt, was not actively seeking 
to get involved, but rather choosing to remain passive. 633 The decision by courts to 
deny themselves the duty `to guard' constitutionality can be interpreted as a 
precautionary measure. Courts were avoiding the responsibility of becoming involved 
in unpleasant political situations. On the other hand the decision can simply be an 
allegiance to the spirit of the law (as they understand it). Judges might have 
considered the constitution but had given the duty of guarding the constitutionality to 
some other actor. 
630 Abu Wendi, The Role of the Judiciary in the Control of the Law's Constitutionality(2000), p. 81. 
631 Constitution, Article 122. 
632 Constitution, Article 123. 
633 Abu Wendi (2000), p. 81 
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There are two developments that altered the situation (reduced the confusion); one 
concerning laws and the other parliamentary acts. In 1967 the Supreme Court 
authorised itself to interpret the constitutionality of laws (Case no. 91). The other 
event was the promulgation of Law no. 12,1992, a long expected and welcome 
addition. The law no. 12 provided the Supreme Court with the task of interpreting the 
constitutionality of laws, yet with one remarkable restriction: the duty of interpretation 
is to be applied only to temporary laws, laws issued by bodies other than the 
legislative. According to Abu Wendi, the 1992 law was a disappointment, as it is 
"distorted, leading to strange and illogical results". 634 The other shortcoming of the 
law was its vagueness. If the Supreme Court declares a law an unconstitutional law, 
it only ceases the enforcement. It does not provide any answers as to what to do with 
decisions that have been based on a temporary law that has been later decided 
unconstitutional. Neither does it cover any acts issued by parliament. 635 Law number 
12 (1992) is the same law both Hikmat and Obeidat praised in relation to the 
Supreme Court of Justice as the administrative court (See Chapter 7.1. ). 
Not surprisingly the question of who should be guarding the constitutionality is one of 
the main debates in contemporary Jordan. Only a small minority of legal practitioners 
is content with the existing situation. These individuals are mainly former ministers or 
are in some other way connected to the government. Some experts think that there 
is no need for a separate legal body, as according to the constitution every court ("of 
all degrees and kinds")636 has responsibility to interpret the constitution. 637 No court 
is allowed to make decisions that contradict the constitution. Yet the `current method' 
is restricted by a case-by-case principle. Whatever decision the court in question 
makes will be applied only to the case in question and changes no legislation as a 
whole. Thus the unconstitutional law itself will not be annulled, but will stay intact. 
Another court might consider the same law constitutional and make a differing ruling. 
Even the same court can make a differing ruling on the same law on a different 
case. 638 Hence this situation is a true challenge for the rule of law. Citizens affected 
634Abu Wendi (2000), p. 83. 
635 Abu Wendi (2000), p. 82. 
636 Abu Wendi (2000), p. 82. 
637 Kilani, Wazani, Hikmat, Interviews in Amman Jordan 2003. 
638 Abu Wendi (2000), p. 82. 
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by potentially unconstitutional laws are not treated in an equal manner. Furthermore, 
this challenges the predictability of laws. 
Taher Hikmat admits that the competence to review constitutionality is "not stabilized 
yet" into a system wide approach, yet he considers it better than establishing a 
constitutional court. 639 Hikmat prefers the `legal status quo', as a constitutional court 
would require amending the constitution, which Himat perceives as an activity that is 
always risky. 640 Rateb Wazani argues that the current `method' is better that a 
constitutional court, as instead "a small group monitoring" all judges have the same 
responsibility. Wazani, like Taher Hikmat, considers the constitutional court 
potentially vulnerable to outside pressure. 641 However, these experts seem to 
consider judges currently monitoring the constitutionality immune to such pressures. 
Taher Hikmat is also worried that there is not yet enough legal expertise in Jordan for 
the needs of a constitutional court. 642 Both Wazani and Hikmat see demands for a 
constitutional court as a political slogan ("propaganda weapon") used by "certain" 
political groups. Wazani stresses that the underlying reason for these demands is the 
lack of understanding among these politicians. They simply do not comprehend how 
the Jordanian legal system functions. Different legal systems consist of different 
elements. "There are not even any unconstitutional laws in Jordan", concludes 
Wazani. 643 
The `dissatisfied' experts can be divided into two groups. Some see the problem as 
structural, while for the others it is a matter of power relations. The former group 
thinks that in order to improve the situation there is a simple solution: to establish a 
constitutional court, like the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt. 4 Among the 
supporters of the proposed constitutional court is Farouq Kilani, former Chief Justice. 
According to Kilani, there should be just one court monitoring the constitutionality of 
639 Hikmat (2000), p. 77. 
'0 Hikmat, Interview in Amman 2003. 
641 Wazani, Interview in Amman May 2003; Hikmat, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
642 Hikmat, Interview in Amman 2003. 
643 Wazani, Interview in Amman 2003. 
644 Kilani, Interview in Amman May 2003; Shubeilat Interview in June 2003 and Faisal in Amman June 
2003. 
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all laws, not just some. 645 Hani Khasawneh supports the idea of constitutional court, 
as he thinks that the court would be needed also to interpret the vague articles of the 
constitution, not only to review the constitutionality of laws. 646 Qaddomi supports the 
idea of a constitutional court as the only reform that is needed for the Jordanian 
judiciary. Qaddomi mentions the case of the Kuwaiti election law as an example. 
Critics saw the elections law as a violation of the constitution as it did not allow 
women to vote, and took the matter to the Kuwaiti constitutional court. The court 
decided in their favour on the basis that the law contradicted the constitution. In 
Jordan the same could be done for the nationality law that does not allow women to 
pass the nationality to their children, or for any other unconstitutional Iaw. 647 Others 
think that whether or not there is a constitutional court does not make a big 
difference as long as the executive is not willing to be constrained by the constitution. 
If there are (state) actors wishing to break the constitution they will always find a way 
or another to do so. 648 There are also people who feel that the time is still not ready 
for the constitutional court. A majority of all interviewees stressed that complying with 
constitutionality depends on political will. As long as the separation of powers does 
not exist in Jordan, any structural improvements will prove meaningless. Even those 
favouring the existing system, the less critical observers, like Hikmat, emphasise the 
centrality of political will in the functioning of the state apparatus, the judiciary 
included. 
At the formal level the need for a constitutional court has both been acknowledged 
and denied. In the 1991 report to the Human Rights Committee, the government 
announced that it has decided to establish a constitutional court. The announcement 
was made "without further elaboration". 9 Later more details were revealed. The 
National Charter (1991), the document created to symbolise `the new beginning' in 
the early 1990s, considered establishing a constitutional court to be as "imperative". 
The duties of a constitutional court would be interpretation of the constitution when 
so requested by the Council of Ministers and discussing constitutionality of cases 
645 Kilani, Interview in Amman May 2003. 
646 Khasawneh, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
647 Qaddomi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
648 Qassim, Interview in Amman June 2003; Al Oran, Interview in May Amman 2003. 
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brought to its attention by courts as well as of laws and decrees. 650 More recently, 
under King Abdullah's reign, the government's attitude towards constitutional court 
has changed. The recommendations by `Jordan First' - the government led reform 
initiative651 - stated that the time is not right for a constitutional court. It decided: "to 
consider the possibility of establishing a Constitutional Court at the appropriate 
time". 652 The five-member committee on Constitutional Court, Hikmat and Wazani 
being among the members, produced the recommendation either formulating the 
recommendation in the most diplomatic manner possible (not at all) or simply 
653 suggesting that the time is not right (at present). 
An example of constitutional confusion is the case of Toujan Faisal. After being 
pardoned by King Abdullah in 2002, Faisal was even more determined to continue 
her political career. A natural step was candidacy in the 2003 parliamentary 
elections. Faisal was, however, disqualified by the Governor of Amman. The 
elections committee rejected Faisal's candidacy on the grounds of a temporary 
Elections law (no. 34 article 8). According to the Elections Law, citizens are ineligible 
for candidacy if they are convicted of a non-political crime, for longer than 12 months 
or pardoned by a special pardon. 654However, according to the constitution, convicted 
citizens are denied the right to vote, if convicted of a non-political crime and not 
pardoned by the king. 655 There is thus a small but significant difference between the 
law and the constitution: there are no requirements for the type of the pardon defined 
in the constitution. It was exactly this difference Faisal was basing her appeal on. 
Faisal argues that she is entitled to participate in elections both as a candidate and a 
voter, as she was convicted of a political crime. A further piece of evidence justifying 
her candidacy is the fact that Faisal's name appeared on voters' timetables issued by 
649 Report of the Human Right Committee, General Assembly Official Records, 46th Session, UN 
DocA/46/40, p. 141, paragraph 572. Al-Jazy, 2000,174. 
650 National Charter (1992), Chapter 2. Second Recommendation. 
651 Jordan First is a "philosophy of governance". Five committees were formed to transform the 
concept 'Jordan First' into something practical, tangible. The committees are Constitutional Court, 
Political Parties Law, Women's Parliamentary Quota, Anti-Corruption and Professional Associations 
and Civil Society. 
652Jordan First: Recommendations. http: //www. mfa. gov. jo/pages. l)hp? menu id=437 Italics added. 
653 http: //www. amanjordan. org/enqlish/daily news/wmview. php? ArtID=683 
654 Jordan Times May 20 May 20th "161 candidates registered in capital for 5th District; 2 rejected" (page 
3 
6 Constitution, Article 73 (i) e. 
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the Ministry of Interior in 2003. Thus, argues Faisal, if she can elect, she also has the 
right to be elected. Faisal says that the rejection was something she had already 
anticipated. Faisal wanted to contest the decision made by the committee, and took 
the matter to Amman's court of first instance. The aim was to attack the temporary 
law no. 34 which Saleh Al Armouti, Faisal's lawyer and (then) the President of the 
Jordanian Bar Association argues as being unconstitutional, and thus cannot be 
applied. The court ruled against Faisal's appeal, on the grounds of her conviction. 656 
Faisal, and many legal experts, were astonished to hear the court's decision. 
According to Amman's court of first instance, it does not have jurisdiction to argue 
the temporary election law to be unconstitutional. The right institution would have 
been the High Tribunal. 657 Faisal also believes that the 2003 elections should have 
been postponed while her case was still pending. Faisal argues further that none of 
the Jordanian newspapers dared to publish her comments after receiving the court's 
decision on the appeal. Faisal also sent a letter to the prime minister and the king, 
neither of whom replied. 658 
656 Faisal, Interview in Amman June 2003. Jordan Times 29`h May 2003: "Toujan Faisal blasts the 
legality of her ban". Jordan Times May 22"d (2003). "Toujan Faisal challenges elections committee". 
Ibtisam Awadat. 
657 Jordan Times May 25: "Full elections list to be released soon; 2 appeals rejected". Jordan Times 
May 20th (2003). "161 Candidates registered in capital for 5`h District; 2 rejected". 
658 Faisal, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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7.3. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 
7.3.1. Resources: Structural Independence 
In order to work independently the judiciary has to be provided with appropriate 
working conditions: reasonable compensation and facilities needed. The views of the 
independence of the Jordanian judiciary by the "informed observers, 659 are divided, 
perhaps even more than on constitutional review or tribal law. Not surprisingly the 
experts close to the government are less critical of the judiciary in general. They see 
fewer problems and very few (or no) improvements being needed. According to 
Rateb Wazani, in the late 1990s a commission was formed to investigate the 
functioning of the judiciary. The commission chaired by Ahmed Obeidat, former 
prime minister, found no real problems. 660 Unfortunately no documents on the 
outcomes of the work by the commission were available for this study. Regardless of 
different perceptions, most experts agree that there have been major changes since 
the early 1990s, the most remarkable changes in the last six to seven years. 661 Once 
again there is no consensus on the consequences of the changes or on their 
usefulness. 
No legal expert interviewed complained about the compensation judges receive. 
Generally speaking judges' salaries are "significantly higher" than most of the other 
governmental employees. 662 According to Farouq Kilani, the judges' salaries are 
better in Jordan than in the most Arab countries, including the Gulf states. 663 Judges 
also receive substantial benefits packages: subsidised housing is available and 
schooling benefits for judges' offspring are offered. Despite the lack of complaints on 
the part of the legal practitioners there have been announcements from the 
659 One clarification has to be made at this point. Although the interviewed legal experts are the 
without a doubt the best legal experts in Jordan, none of them are currently working as a judge. 
Unfortunately no current judge was available for an interview. Thus they can only provide first hand 
answers from the period when they were still working. Yet quite a few still work as attorneys, and have 
contact with the courts on regular basis. 
660 Wazani, Interview in Amman May 2003. 
661 Qaddomi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
662 McDermott (2003), p. 6. 
663 Kilani, Interview in Amman 2003. 
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government's side to increase the allowances and benefits for judges. 664 There are, 
however, claims that the 'benefits' are not distributed equally among judges. Judges 
following the executive's 'recommendations' will receive more `bonuses' than the 
others. 665 Also differing opinions were expressed regarding the working conditions at 
the courthouses. Over the last decade the number of support staff has increased and 
new computer systems have been provided. Despite the increased number there is 
still not enough support staff, but Qaddomi reckons that the government has 
acknowledged the problem. 666 Also the number of the judges has increased. 
Currently there are nearly 600 judges employed, while the situation was not that 
good some years ago. 667 Furthermore, there are plans to appoint more judges; in 
2001 the government announced a plan to spend nearly two million Jordanian dinars 
to recruit 280 judges and to computerise courtrooms. 668 According to a recent 
announcement, made on 27th June 2004, the aim is to increase the numbers of 
judges to 800.669 Also the number of female judges has increased. Ten years ago 
there were no women appointed as judges, while at the moment there are nineteen 
female judges. 670 Tagreed Hikmat, the first ever female judge in Jordan, was 
appointed in 1996.67 The result of the reforms made, as aimed, is faster processing 
time. According to Qaddomi, in the last two years the judges are producing the 
decisions faster. Earlier it took two to four years, while nowadays the maximum time 
spent on giving a judgement is a year. 672 
Not all consider the current situation to be satisfactory: either the degree of changes 
has been exaggerated or their impact has not matched the expectations. Qassim 
argues that the processing of cases has become faster only in an administrative 
sense. Generally speaking the legal process is still too time-consuming and over- 
664 Jordan Times, November 11 (2001). 
665 Khader, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
666 Qaddomi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
667 Kilani, Interview in Amman May 2003; Wazani Interviews in May 2003; Hikmat Interview in Amman 
June 2003. 
668 Jordan Times November 24 (2001). "Minister finalises plan to overhaul judiciary" by Rana 
Husseini. 
669 Jordan Times June 27ýh (2004). 
670 htti): //www. 'ordanei-nbass yus. org/02112004006. htm There are currently 1500 women registered as 
lawyers at the Jordanian Bar Association and 6000 men. 
671 http: //www. *ordanembassvus. orq/031'12003002. htm Qaddomi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
672 Qaddomi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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burdened judges have gained little from the `speeding-up' of reforms. 673 On the 
contrary, the government's determination to speed-up the legal procedures is putting 
more pressure on the judges. Due to the piling up of cases and shortage of judges, 
judges do not have enough time to discuss and research the cases. 674 It is argued 
that either the insufficient number of judges is not most acute problem, nor is the 
drastic recruitment the best approach to improve the judiciary. Some see that the 
rapid increase of the number of judges has lead to the recruitment of incompetent 
judges. 675 McDermott even argues that there are civil court judges lacking "both 
knowledge of the law and adequate legal skills", 676 It is argued that the training 
programme offered by the Judicial Institute places legal practitioners in unequal 
positions. Normally a legal practitioner has to work ten years before being eligible to 
become a judge, while clerks at the ministry of justice can be trained to be judges 
through a training programme with less actual legal work experience. 677 
The reforms were made in order to speed-up the legal proceedings, as by many the 
biggest challenge is to tackle the "snail's pace of court proceedings". 678 Providing 
(more) computer facilities, argues Kilani, improves the writing of judgements made, 
but does not ease the judges' burden, as making the judgements is the core of the 
legal process. Kilani argues that there are no computers available for the judges. 
Computer systems would enable the judges to find out information on previous cases 
and rulings. Thus the increased number of judges, and the IT systems made 
available for administrative purposes, will not (necessarily) make processing the 
cases faster. 679 Kilani criticises the state of recording the minutes of sessions and file 
keeping. Statements given by defendants/plaintiffs are passed to the clerk recording 
the session by the judge involved in the way s/he understands (or even remembers) 
the statement. Kilani argues that "recordings are often twisted", as judges do not 
report everything from the session. Recording prolongs the proceedings of the case, 
as it is time-consuming. Also the minutes are not always produced in a clear manner 
673 Qassim, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
674 Khasawneh, The Legal Profession between Yesterday and Today(2000), pp. 84-85. 
675 Kilani, Interview in Amman May 2003; Qassim, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
676 McDermott (2003), p. 6. 
677 AI-Oran, Interview in Amman May 2003. 
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679 Kilani, Interview in May 2003; Kilani (2000), p. 76. 
188 
due to handwriting being used which leads judges to spend too much time trying to 
read the recordings. Kilani also criticises the way the files are stored. He considers 
the filing practices and the storage facilities very "primitive". 680 
Furthermore, faster litigation processes do not necessarily mean that the quality of 
the decisions has got any better. There is also an obstacle to the independence of 
the judiciary from within; from judges themselves. According to Kilani, some judges 
are "resisting enlightenment efforts" and any attempts to reform the judiciary. In the 
late 1990s there was a plan to enhance the judicial independence "through bringing 
in enlightened people" (legal experts). Judges excluded from the group of 
enlightened "fought ferociously", and the plan was never implemented. 681 Kilani also 
sees the "scientific backwardness", meaning "lack of follow-up studies", as one of the 
main obstacles to the Jordanian judiciary becoming "independent and capable". 
When the judiciary lacks the interest for study and self-development, this will show in 
the decisions made. The critique directed to the education of judges is not only 
limited to the lack of studies, or unwillingness to study. Kilani argues that modern 
legal systems are built on the idea of specialisation. Kilani is referring to a 
recommendation made in 1958 in the International Conference of Judges in Rome. 
In Jordan even the highest courts have no specialised judges. Judges in the Court of 
Cassation should be experts in civil, criminal and commercial law, while judges in the 
High Court of Justice (administrative court) in administrative law. 682 
Kilani brings attention to some cases that seem to have been inaugurated with very 
little awareness of the Jordanian constitution. The Court of Cassation has given a 
ruling that confirmed "instructions" by the director of the Land and Areas Department 
to have the "power of legislation". Kilani finds this decision outrageous. Law students 
learn already during the first years in a law school that only a constitution can "define 
the forms of legislation and their binding power". "In the middle ages, personal 
opinions of directors and ministers were considered as laws", Kilani points out. 683 
The Court of Cassation has made a decision in 1985 on `Astaneh' Chambers of 
6130 Kilani (2000), p. 79. 
b81 Kilani (2000), pp. 74-75. 
682 Kilani (2000), pp. 75-76. 
683 Kilani (2000), p. 72. 
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Commerce. Curiously the Astaneh Chambers of Commerce did not exist any longer 
at the time of the ruling (or afterwards). Furthermore, the Court of Cassation based 
this decision on "the Ottoman Brokers Law". This is not possible, as all Ottoman laws 
have been "null and void" since the termination of Ottoman rule. Surprisingly, this 
decision by the Court of Cassation is considered effective even today despite the 
inaccuracy. The decision was made on an institution that has ceased to exist and 
was based on a law that did not exist any longer either. 684 
In 1998 the Court of Cassation declared a recommendation by the Chief Justice 
illegal and to be nullified. The Chief Justice had sent a letter to the Minister of Justice 
recommending a provisional retirement of some judges, indicating that the matter 
had been discussed in the meeting of the Judicial Council. A Deputy President of the 
Council, however, wrote another letter to inform the minister that such matters were 
not discussed in the meeting. Kilani, deemed the court's decision as being illegal, as 
the letter by the Chief Justice did not infringe the soundness of an administrative 
decision. The Chief Justice is entitled to make recommendations and the Minister 
concerned can either refuse or accept them. The Minister of Justice in this case did 
not claim to be forced to follow the recommendation. Therefore, the Court of 
Cassation based its decision on assumptions, as there were no accusations of the 
Chief Justice forcing the minister made. Furthermore, recommendations are part of 
the formal procedures, and thus cannot violate judges' rights. Kilani also argues that 
there was no "twisting facts", as the deputy President was present at the meeting. If 
the recommendations were not recorded in the minutes, it does not necessarily 
mean that they were not discussed at all. The Court of Cassation's decision was 
based on the "litigant and judge" principle that cannot be applied to an administrative 
judge, only to a civil or criminal judges. The "Litigant and judge" principle is 
applicable only in cases which are of personal matter, not administrative ones. 685 
684 Kilani (2000), p. 73. 
685 Kilani (2000), pp. 73-74. 
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7.3.2. Decisional Independence 
As defined in the list of the Basic Principles, judges should have the ability to make 
decisions based only on facts and the laws. There must be no interference on the 
decision-making process of an individual judge, nor any revisions on the decisions 
once they are made. 686 Some say that the judiciary in Jordan is indeed given 
freedom to work and make independent decisions. Others have commented 
conversely on the significance of outside influence on formal judicial processes. 
According to Rateb Wazani, the Jordanian judiciary has been independent for over 
40 years. 687 Nevertheless there are others accusing the executive of using its powers 
to interfere in the work of the judges. According to Farouq Kilani, former Chief 
Justice, there was significant amount of outside interference when he was working 
as a judge. 688 A study by McDermott argues that judges experience interference not 
only from the executive, but also from the security forces. 689 Nevertheless there is 
some disagreement on the degree of the success of such attempts. According to 
Rateb Wazani, despite the executive's attempts to control the judiciary during the 
martial law period (1967-1991), the judiciary has been able to protect its 
independence. When martial law is declared the government is entitled to issue 
temporary laws in matters of defence of the country. The Supreme Court can annul 
any temporary law that does have no relation to defence, and has done so in number 
of occasions. 690 Thus while Wazani does not deny the attempts of interference by the 
executive, he stresses the "incorruptible" nature of the judiciary. 
According to Asma Khader, there are some mechanisms that are legal not yet 
constitutional enabling the executive to interfere. 691 The procedures of appointing 
and promoting judges and administrative personnel for courts are not fully 
satisfactory. The constitution does not define the terms of the appointment; the terms 
are defined in the law on the Independence of the Judiciary. Only since 2001 have 
judges themselves had the responsibility to select, promote and transfer judges. 
686 UN Basic Principles, 1986. 
687 Wazani (2000), p. 84. 
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Previously the ministry alone was fully in charge of the appointing the judiciary. 
According to the Law of the Independence of the Judiciary, the Judicial Council is the 
only body that can appoint, promote and discipline civil court judges, both in the civil 
and the Shariah courts (trial courts). The Council is presided over by the president of 
the Court of Cassation. The other members are all senior judges. 692 The Higher 
Judicial Council's authority to appoint, however, is restricted to select judges from a 
list of candidates recommended by the Ministry of Justice. 693 It is also worth noting 
that the members of the council are appointed by the Minister of Justice. Prior to 
2001 the Council of Ministers had the power to decide the length of the appointment, 
as well as to make decisions regarding the retirement age. Yet currently the Minister 
of Justice can only make recommendations. 694 The support staff and the judicial 
panels, however, are still appointed by the justice minister. 695 This, argues Faruq 
Kilani, is not only unconstitutional, but also in contradiction with the principle of the 
independence of the judiciary. 696 
Regardless of the amendments this law contradicts the constitution. Although the 
constitution does not provide details on the appointment of judges, it provides the 
core principle that should be followed; a principle that should be one of guiding an 
issuing any laws on the judiciary. Regardless of how the appointment is done, it 
should never compromise the independence of the judges. Therefore, it is rather 
peculiar that passing such a law was possible. Even more surprising is the lack of 
judges (or anyone else for that matter) disputing the law. Another `legal' way to 
interfere is through the administrative monitoring of judicial decisions. The court of 
first instance in Amman and the Court of Reconciliation have been authorised to 
examine the documents and decisions from the other courts. The president of the 
court either agrees on the decisions or amends them. According to Kilani, this is a 
gross violation of the constitution. The judiciary should be independent, not 
subordinated to any form of administrative control. Monitoring of the decision can 
691 Khader, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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only be done by a higher court. Administrative control can be extended only to purely 
administrative matters outside the judicial work. 697 
According to Farouq Kilani, when he was working as a judge, ministers used their 
`legal' rights frequently, giving recommendations on matters of appointment. The 
influence has been mainly indirect; judges are made aware that the terms of their 
appointments can be re-negotiated unilaterally. There are claims of judges being 
transferred from one court to another in order to influence of the outcome of legal 
processes. 698 According to Kilani, when Riad AI-Shakaa was acting as minister of 
justice in the late 1990s the greatest violations in appointing and promoting were 
made. Kilani argues that there have been occasions where the executive has been 
involved in transferring and promoting judges and courts, yet never as much as while 
al-Shakaa was the minister. During al-Shakaa's term, it was decided by the 
recruitment panel, consisting of members of the Judicial Council, that only those 
graduates from the Institute of Justice who scored more than 60 percent in the final 
exams should be recruited. Yet, in contradiction to this decision, instead of the 16 
fulfilling the criteria all of the 36 graduates were recruited. 699 
Furthermore, the appointment of judges is normally for life, but judges are fully aware 
that there are no legal obstacles for the executive to shorten the appointment. It must 
be stressed here that the retirement age varies. In trial courts judges serve until they 
are 68, and in the higher courts until 74. Yet the Higher Judicial Council is authorised 
to terminate the term of judges after 25 years of service. 700 Judges work knowing 
that there is a (at least a theoretical) possibility to be given sudden and unexpected 
transfer to any court anywhere in Jordan, or even an early retirement. It was not 
uncommon for the Minister of Justice to contact the presidents of courts to make 
them know what is the favoured outcome of certain important cases. 701 Kilani argues 
that one reason for senior judges to interfere is tribal pressure. "The burden of Jaha", 
dignitaries contacting the person in charge (usually the judge on the case) to solve 
697 Kilani (2000), pp. 77-78. 
698 US State Department (2002), p. 9. 
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the case, is something that some judges might not be able to resist. According to 
Kilani, "The dominance of tribal traditions opens the door for violations and makes 
corruption cases exonerated". Kilani mentions an incident when a judge was 
removed from one court to another when refusing to let a defendant on bail as 
requested by his senior. 702 Senior judges have taken cases from individual judges, to 
guarantee the desired outcome or possibly to punish judges. Kilani argues that this 
has been a regular phenomenon for quite some time. It leads to further prolonged 
litigation processes, as the work done by the first judge is wasted and the new judge 
has to study the case. According to Kilani, cases have even been lost while 
extracting them from one judge to another. At times senior judges may even request 
to see pending cases. Kilani defines this as a clear violation of independence of the 
judge working on the case in question. No judge shall be "subject to no authority 
other than that of law". Monitoring at this stage is not justified nor necessary, as the 
rank of the judge is irrelevant when making judgements. 703 It must be remembered 
here that while the executive's role in the appointment of judges is not against any 
laws (but the constitution), it is not legal for the executive to dictate judges to make 
certain judgements. 
Perhaps the most striking case of the executive's influence is the early retirement of 
the Judge Farouq Kilani himself in 1998. Less than three months after he was 
appointed as the President of the Higher Council of Justice and the Court of 
Cassation (the highest legal authority in Jordan) he was forced to retire. According 
journalist Amy Henderson, Minister of Justice Riyad Shakaa refused to comment on 
the reasons behind Kilani's retirement. Yet Shakaa was the very person who 
recommended Kilani to be appointed to the post 80 weeks earlier. Shakaa insists, 
however, that the decision was reached unanimously after Kilani himself requested 
such a possibility. 704 Kilani himself refutes this categorically. He argues that the sole 
reason for his dismissal was of him criticising the government. According to Kilani, he 
had made open accusations of corruption among members of the Jordanian 
judiciary. Furthermore, Kilani finds it rather convenient that the "retirement" occurred 
702 Kilani (2000), p. 79. 
703 Kilani (2000), p. 76. 
704 Jordan Times, 4th March (1998). "Justice minister maintains silence on rationale behind judge's 
retirement. " by Amy Henderson. 
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just before he intended to implement the removal of the judges he considered 
corrupted. 705 Kilani was also at the beginning of his short term involved in overturning 
the amendment of the Press and Publication Law (1997), a temporary law heavily 
criticised as violating press freedoms (see chapter 8). This decision of 
unconstitutionality of the law by the Supreme Court is widely assumed to be the real 
reason behind the early retirement. 706 
In addition to recruiting judges and administrative staff, the ministry has also been 
involved in naming judges for particular cases. This is a violation of the "natural 
judge" principle. According to this principle, courts cannot be established, nor judges 
named, for particular crimes after the crimes have been committed. This principle 
aims at protecting the right of the litigant for a fair trial. Kilani argues, however, that 
this has not fully been followed in Jordan: "The Jordanian legal thought has not 
grasped this principle". In 1997, for instance, the minister interfered in forming a 
special panel to deal with an appeal case (no. 144/97) by recommending the judges 
for the panel. It is also claimed that the decision made was recommended by the 
minister, and afterwards the minister recommended the head of the panel to be 
promoted. The Chief Justice (Kilani himself) considered this to be a reward from a 
job well done, and refused to follow the recommendation. Two other members were 
given an opportunity to travel to the UAE "on business". 707 
The threat of losing one's job, or of a forced relocation, are not the only ways to 
convince judges to make preferred decisions. Alternatively, there is the `carrot' 
method, although not all interviewed agree on its existence. Taher Hikmat disputes 
the existence of corruption among Jordanian judges. He says that corruption was 
never a problem in Jordan when he was working, and hopes that it is still not the 
case. 708 Yet Farouq Kilani, Hikmat's predecessor as a Chief Justice, considers 
corruption and wasta (nepotism and favouritism) to be the core obstacles for the rule 
of law in Jordan. He goes even as far as naming the possible culprits. During Faisal 
705 Kilani, Interview in Amman in May 2003. 
706 Jordan Times (1998). "Former judge reiterates charges that judiciary lacks independence"; 
Interview with Yahia Shukkeir, June 2003 Amman. 
707 Kilani, (unknown year), Chapter 1, Point 1.2.2. 
708 Hikmat, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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Firawny's premiership the executive interfered in the matters of the judiciary on 
several occasions. Taher Hikmat, then acting Chief Justice, simply "complied" with 
that. According to Kilani, forty of Ahmad Firawny's relatives were appointed as 
judges when Firawny was acting Chief Justice. Even before Firawny was appointed 
as Chief Justice several officials protested against the appointment on the basis of 
him being corrupt. 709 Regardless of the opinions of the legal scholars and 
practitioners, there are other sources that consider corruption as a serious problem 
in Jordan. According to the Arab Archives Institute, corruption among the judiciary is 
one of the main reasons why Jordanians do not have faith in the legal system and 
often prefer tribal law settlement. 710 
The Inspection Department from the Ministry of Justice is in charge of monitoring the 
judges. According to Wazani, the inspectors are judges themselves. Monitoring does 
not apply to ongoing litigation processes, as it would mean interfering in the 
independence of the judiciary. Monitoring is done without any complaints placed. If 
inspectors find anything worth mentioning, the judge in question needs to answer the 
inspectors. Yet there are no penalties and no sanctions. Monitoring, stresses 
Wazani, is used for evaluation purposes only. Moreover, continues Wazani, there 
has been no need for any drastic disciplinary action. "' A royal committee was 
established in the early 1990s to monitor the judiciary. The committee appointed by 
King Abdullah was chaired by the prime minister Abu Raghed. Other members were 
then senator Ahmad Obeidat, the Head of Judiciary, deputy Prime Minister, Minister 
of Justice and Minister of State for Administrative Development. The aim of the 
commission was to review the courts, legislation and the judges, and then possibly to 
investigate the opportunities to offer judges better "allowances, salaries and 
incentives" to improve the situation in Jordan. 712 Establishing the commission was a 
mistake in Hikmat's opinion, as it violated the very principle of the independence of 
the judiciary. When a body consisting (almost) entirely of administrative actors 
monitors the work done by judges it can easily be seen as a way of controlling the 
709 Kilani, Interview in Amman May 2003. 
710 Kilani and Sakihja (2002), p. 66. 
711 Wazani, Interviews in Amman May and June 2003. 
712 Jordan Times, September 1-2 (2000). "Commission judiciary finds favour among veterans of the 
bench, officials. " by Rana Husseini. 
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judiciary. 713 Furthermore, an anonymous member of the judiciary ("veteran judge") 
argues that providing judges "psychological security" is far more important than 
financial security. The same expert also sees the monarch's decision to establish the 
commission as "a clear indication of a malfunctioning judiciary". 714 
713 Hikmat, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
74 Jordan Times, September 1-2 (2000). "Commission judiciary finds favour among veterans of the 
bench, officials" by Rana Husseini. 
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Summary 
The Jordanian constitution guarantees basic elements of the rule of law, including 
one of the most essential ones: the independence of the judiciary. The degree to 
which the principle has been implemented is another matter. In spite of 
acknowledging the principle of judicial independence, the constitution does not 
provide the judiciary with the appropriate working environment. The independence of 
the judiciary can be compromised either legitimately (within the legal system) or 
unofficially through other channels, by extrajudicial actors. The political opening of 
1989 has had, it is claimed here, no significant impact on the implementation of the 
judicial independence. 
While the constitutional design acknowledges the independence of the judiciary, the 
structure of the legal system does not support it. There are three legal institutions at 
the centre of this debate, two existing (special courts and tribal law) and one fictional 
(constitutional court), at the moment at least. It is worth noting that the existence of 
the third institution (tribal law) is a matter of dispute; whether it still exists, and if it 
does in which form. Furthermore, special courts are only one of these institutions 
included in the constitution. It is worth stressing that in spite of this `constitutional 
existence', the details of the composition of the special courts is left for the legislators 
to decide. 
The existence of special courts does not only jeopardise the independence of the 
judiciary, but also the principle of fair trial. The type of special courts considered 
problematic is the state security courts, where the jurisdiction is in the hands of non- 
civilian judges. In addition, compared with the ordinary courts, the state security 
courts are less transparent and trial procedures are often lacking stability. As the 
high profile cases of Shubeilat and Faisal have shown, the executive has effectively 
used the state security courts to silence the opposition. It is important to stress that 
the cases of Shubeilat and Faisal have all been tried in the state security courts 
since 1989: Shubeilat in 1992,1995 and 1998 and Faisal in 2001. Therefore it is 
justified to argue that the political opening has had no positive impact on the usage 
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of the state security courts, rather vice versa. It appears almost as the political 
opening has increased the regime's reliance of the state security courts. The 
temporary law of 2001 to strengthen the courts' position is another evidence of this, 
and the lack of any open discussion to alter the status of the courts. 
While in the case of state security courts the interference is from the direction of the 
executive, actors with extrajudicial powers within the framework of tribal law are not 
included in the state apparatus at all. Thus these actors are functioning outside the 
formal monitoring and disciplinary procedures. Of these three components the 
position of the tribal laws is most secured. There have been no public discussions or 
plans to tackle the tribal law since 1989. In all fairness it seems that there is less 
focus on the tribal law since the political opening. It is also fair to say that tribal law is 
still very much of a taboo. Tribal law was officially abolished in the 1970s and still 
proving to be a persistent institution. The existence of tribal law is a serious 
restriction to the judicial monopoly of the judiciary. The reliance of tribal law 
procedures compromises the equality of citizens, and their right to be equally 
protected by the existing legislation. Whereas special courts are a more structural 
matter, tribal law is a social and cultural phenomenon. The controversy related to 
tribal law is revealed in the lack of consensus among the legal experts on the 
existence and the significance of tribal law. The protected position of tribal law 
reveals if nothing else the importance of tribal groups for the Jordanian political elite, 
which has gone to great lengths to shield it. 
One of the most fundamental dilemmas regarding the entire Jordanian legal system, 
or indeed the entire system of governance, is the implementation of the constitution 
itself. The constitution includes very little on the matter of guaranteeing 
constitutionality. The absence of clear instructions for the monitoring of the 
constitutionality is one of the greatest weaknesses of the constitution. Needless to 
say the contents of the constitution have very little significance, if there are no 
independent actors authorised to monitor the implementation of the constitution. 
After several decades the monitoring of the constitutionality is still an undecided 
issue in Jordan. It is not only unwillingness of the judiciary during the early years, but 
the more recent decisions by judges (regarding the case of Toujan Faisal, for 
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instance) that indicate that a degree of confusion and/or reluctance still exists. There 
have been no improvements since the late 1980s. However, the constitutional court 
has been the most discussed element of the Jordanian legal system by far. At the 
official level the attitude towards the importance of the constitutional court has been 
changing over the last decade. The dividing line has not been the political opening of 
the 1980s, but the change of a monarch. It appears that during the first years 
immediately after 1989 the political elite was in favour of the court. Since King 
Abdullah II succeeded the official stand has changed. It has to be stressed that 
during both reigns there have been no official plans to establish the constitutional 
court, only the tone of the formal debate has changed. In case of guaranteeing 
constitutionality, it has to be said that the matter is more political than merely judicial 
in nature. The view of Anis Qassim is worth remembering here: no body in charge of 
monitoring constitutionality is meaningful as long as there is no political will to 
respect its jurisdiction. 
The actual degree of independence of the judiciary is more difficult to assess than 
the structure of the legal system. However, some comments about the general 
trends can be made. The situation regarding the working conditions and material 
resources has been improving since the late 1980s, and it is the most positive and 
encouraging element assessed here. Within this study there have not been many 
matters that were the subject of such consensual, yet positive assessments. It is 
difficult to identify whether these changes are products of conscious decisions to 
improve the judicial independence or whether the aim has been something else. The 
legal reforms implemented were of technical nature, thus they are easier to 
implement without shaking the foundations of the systemic status quo. These 
reforms are not necessarily threatening extrajudicial actors yet still stressing the 
commitment of the regime to legal improvements. It should be remembered that, 
regardless of the reforms, the outcome has not been entirely positive. Some argue 
that the quantity of judges has been improving at the expense of the quality, thus 
showing the lack of insight and/or commitment on the side of the reformers. 
The main obstacle for the independence of the judiciary in Jordan is outside 
interference. In spite of the constitutional guarantees, the rest of the legislation (in 
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some parts) compromises the principle of independence. Anyone, whether part of 
the state apparatus or private citizen, can (illegally) place pressure on judges to 
produce desired outcomes, yet the executive involved in appointing and promotion 
has more bargaining power than any other actors. The reform of 2001 to reduce the 
government's role in recruitment is definitely an improvement. It has to be stressed 
that with a regard to the judicial independence the greatest problems lie with the 
implementation not in the design. Again, no serious improvements since 1989 can be 
observed. The forced retirement of Farouq Kilani in 1998 is a convincing piece of 
evidence of the executive's continuing influence on judicial matters. The case of 
Kilani is an indication of what happens to dissident judges who do not comply with 
the unspoken rules. The greatest weakness of the legal system is the lack of clearly 
defined terms of service and promotion, or of disciplinary actions, as well as the 
existing practice to authorise non-judicial actors to participate in administrative 
matters regarding the legal system. Plans to improve the legal system and the 
judicial independence have recently been announced by the government, yet the 
outcome remains to be seen. It is worth noting that it is not the first time such 
intentions have been made public and thus the political opening of the 1989 appears 
to have no direct connection to the announcement. 
So far it has been established that very little has improved since the 1989 
parliamentary elections. There is one more element to examine: political 
participation. This element is by no means the least important; it is important to study 
to identify whether any transfer of political power has occurred as a consequence of 
the 1989 political changes. 
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8. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
The two previous chapters have been examining elements central to the rule of law. 
This chapter moves the attention to other, more researched elements of modern 
political democracy. While the two previous chapters have focused on the state 
actors, the emphasis of this chapter is on the citizens and their political rights. 
According to the constitution of Jordan, "the nation is source of all powers: the 
legislative, the executive and the judiciary". 715 The citizens of the kingdom are 
guaranteed political rights such as the freedom of expression and association, the 
rights to hold meetings, to establish societies and political parties, and to express 
their opinions. 716 
The aim of the chapter is to analyse the central Schumpeterian-Dahlian elements of 
political democracy: free and fair elections, political associations and press 
freedoms. This is done through examining the constitution and other related 
legislation. The object is to identify whether the constitutional design in Jordan in 
relation to political participation complies with the procedural principles of political 
democracy. However, it is not only the design that is of interest here, but also the 
implementation. Have the rights guaranteed in the constitution been part of the 
political reality in the country? The period examined here is one starting with the 
1989 parliamentary elections and ending with the 2003 elections. It is relevant here 
to examine whether political rights have improved since the late 1980s. 
The laws examined here are Elections Law, the Political Parties Law, and the Press 
and Publications Law. The 1986 law (with amendments) was applied in the elections 
in 1989,1993 and 1997, and the 2001 law in the most previous elections in June 
2003. The contents of the laws will be examined in relation to the outcomes of the 
last four elections. When analysing the election laws in relation to the political 
developments it is worth noting that since 1989 no election law has survived without 
715 Constitution, Article 24. 
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amendments from one election to another. "' The versions of the Elections Law 
(1986) and Political Parties Law (1992) used here are the official English 
translations. Due to the failure to obtain an official English translation of the Press 
and Publications Law Sae'da Kilani's translation is used here. It is also worth noting 
that while the other two laws are available on the website of the Jordanian 
government, none of the versions of the press laws is. "$ On the governmental 
website there is hardly any information on press rights in general. However, the 2001 
Elections Law was not available, not even on the official website. As analysing the 
text of the law is not possible, secondary sources are used instead. 
The implementation of the political rights are analysed through experts interviews. 
There are members of the lower house, former and present, interviewed here, as 
well as members of other political associations, journalists and civil society activists. 
When analysing election results it was decided to solely use the statistical data 
provided by the al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, for the sake of consistency. 
716 Constitution, Articles 15 and 16. 
717 It has to be noted here that the text of the 2001 Election Law was not available for the purposes of 
this study. An official source (the website of the Jordanian mission in Washington D. C) is still offering 
the 1986 with a notice of the amendments (without their details). Thus it was decided to use 
secondary sources and interviews to find out the fundamental changes of the amended law. 
718 See hftl): //www. jordanembassyus. org/new/aboutiordan 
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8.1. ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES 
8.1.1. Electoral Legislation 
At first glance, the rights guaranteed for the Jordanian citizens in the constitution 
appear to comply with the principles of procedural democracy. The constitution 
provides the citizens with rights to found and join political associations, express their 
opinions, as well as to elect and to be elected as a deputy. 79 According to the 
constitution, to be elected to the parliament as a deputy one has be a Jordanian 
citizen and be at least 30 years of age and 40 years to be appointed as a senator. 720 
The right to participate in the elections is not granted to those citizens holding post or 
privilege that are considered neutral, non-political: the members of the royal family, 
judges, personnel of armed forces and security forces when in service. Anyone who 
holds a public office is not eligible. Also no one is allowed to be in the both houses at 
the same time. 721 Citizens can also loose their `electoral' rights; for example when 
given 12-month (or longer) sentence for a non-political crime and have not been 
pardoned, or convicted for bankruptcy charges and not discharged. 722 
Although the senators are appointed by the king, he is restricted by the criteria 
defined in the constitution. To be appointed as a senator one has be at least 40 
years old and to "belong one of following classes": current or former ministers, 
ambassadors, speaker of the lower house, judges from the Court of Cassation and 
appeal courts, retired military officers of higher ranks or "similar personalities who 
enjoy the confidence of the people". 723 The age limit in case of senators is to 
guarantee that the candidates are genuine dignitaries, that they have already done 
remarkable services to the kingdom. 
Besides the details on the electoral qualification, the Jordanian constitution does not 
included further details about the parliamentary elections. The constitution leaves 
719 Constitution, Articles 16,17,64,70. 
720 Constitution, Articles 64 and 70. 
721 Constitution, Article 76. 
722 Constitution, Article 75. 
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many practical details to be announced in other legislation, particularly in the 
electoral law. No amendments have been made to the constitutional articles dealing 
with the rights and the liberties guaranteed for the citizens, as mentioned earlier. 
However, other electoral legislation has been changing over the decades, over the 
last decade in particular. The electoral law especially has been in `flux' over the 
years. According to Hourani and Yassin, there have been "five electoral laws and 
dozens of amendments" issued between 1923 and 1986. This is quite surprising, as 
there have been no elections between 1967 and 1986.724 Since 1947, the year of the 
formal independence, there have been five electoral laws, including the current one 
issued as a temporary law in 2001.725 The third and fourth election laws were 
amended several times. More importantly for this study, the 1986 electoral law was 
amended in 1988,1989,1993,1997 and 1998.726 The most recent electoral law was 
issued in 2001 as a temporary law. 
According to the constitution, the electoral law has to be based on "integrity of the 
election, right of the candidates to supervise the process of election and the 
punishment of any person who may adversely influence the will of voters". 727 
Because the electoral details are left to be defined in ordinary legislation, they are 
easier to amend and it is also possible for the executive alone to decide on the 
electoral details in the absence of the lower house. Whether the legislators are 
deputies or the executive the requirements for fair and transparency of elections 
stated in the paragraph or any other stipulations of the constitution cannot be 
contradicted. The emphasis here is on any stipulations that might be in contradiction 
with these requirements or generally compromise the constitutionality of political 
rights. 
723 Constitution, Article 64. 
724 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 18. 
725 Jordan Times, July 25`h (2001). 
726 Law of Election to the House of Deputies (No. 22/86). 
727 Constitution, Article 67 (i)-(iii). 
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8.1.2. Electoral Peculiarities 
The first requirement of the Schumpeter-Dahlian definition, universal suffrage, is 
fulfilled in the design. All citizens, men and women are entitled to vote in the 
elections as long as their names are listed on the Final Electoral Lists. 728 The 
suffrage has been universal since 1976. Women got the right to vote in 1974 and the 
Bedouin population in 1976. In 1955 the parliament granted women the right to vote 
provided that they had competed elementary education, but King Hussein cancelled 
the decision. The 1974 amendment was made by a royal decree. Massad argues 
that the change of legislation in 1974 initiated by King Hussein was not a 
coincidence, as it was done just before the United Nations conference on women in 
1975.729 Considering the political circumstances and the amendments of the 
constitution this was not as progressive a change as it might first appear. It could be 
argued, based on the previous chapters, that perhaps at the time of making this 
reform King Hussein was not even planning to hold elections any time soon. It was 
not until the by-elections in 1984 that women were able to practice the right, due to 
the absence of elections between 1967 and 1989. 
There are two main weaknesses in the electoral law: the nationality requirement and 
the definition of the constituencies. The election law requires the candidates to have 
been citizens at least for ten years. 730 This time limit was introduced in 1986, it being 
earlier only 5 years. Joseph Massad points out that this 10-year requirement was 
also included in the 1987 nationality law, for the first time. Nationality laws did not 
have any restrictions for naturalised Jordanians until 1987. Therefore, the previous 
nationality laws guaranteeing nationalised citizens equal rights and the election law 
restricting their electoral rights contradicted each other. 731 At this point it is worth to 
reminding us that Jordan announced its disengagement from the West Bank in 
1988.732 Thus while drafting these two laws the government might have anticipated 
728 Law of Election to the House of Deputies (No. 22/86), Article 3. 
729 Massad (2001), p. 14 and p. 55; Cooper and Tilly (1994), p. 15. The Council of Representatives 
Electoral Law (1947), Article 3: "Every male Transjordanian, not being a Bedouin... completed 
eighteenth solar year of his age". 
73 The Elections Law (1986), Article 18 A. 
731 The Elections Law (1986), Article 18 A. See also Massad (2001), p. 43. 
732 http: //www. iordanembassyus. org/new/aboutiordan/oh3. shtml 
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the increase in the number of people applying for citizenship. This amendment can 
also be seen as an attempt to obstruct the participation of the Jordanian 
Palestinians. 
The constituencies have been uneven since the early years of the representative 
parliament. The allocation of seats among the constituencies and the number of the 
constituencies have been the most amended element within the elections legislation. 
Yet the aim of the amendments has not always been to tackle the disproportionate 
representation, but rather to use it opportunistically. There are currently 110 seats in 
the Jordanian parliament elected from 45 multi-seat constituencies. The number of 
the deputies was increased in 2003 by a royal decree, to suit the requirements for 
the women's quota. Six seats were added, thus the total number of the deputies was 
raised to 110. The number of the constituencies was increased from 21 to 45 in 
2001.733 There are seats reserved for the minorities: nine seats for Christians and 
three seats for Circassians and Chechens to share. There are also nine seats 
reserved for Bedouins. 7M The number of the deputies elected from the 
constituencies varies; from one-deputy constituencies to constituencies with five 
representatives. 
The 1986 election law was issued primarily to introduce changes in the 
constituencies. The 1986 law was drafted after the (shocking) by-elections in 1984. It 
is claimed that the aim of the executive/king was to curb the opposition. Robins 
summarises the outcome as a "hotchpotch combination, 735 of small electoral districts 
and proportionally smaller multiparty constituencies. The smallest constituencies 
were labelled as "kinship seats" as they encouraged electing on the basis of personal 
loyalties instead of political convictions. 736 The 1986 law for the first time defined the 
Palestinian refuge camps on the East Bank as constituencies. Earlier only the camps 
on the West Bank were treated in such a manner. This change was the most 
criticised element of the law. Palestinians opposed the idea as it would seem to be 
733 Jordan Times July 24 (2001). 
734 Jordan Times, June 19`h (2003); "The Final Results". As the 2001 temporary law was not available 
the allocation of the seats were counted from the final election results list. 
735 Robins, Politics and the 1986 electoral law in Jordan(1991), p. 200. 
736 Robins (1991), pp. 200-201. 
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as an acknowledgement of the camps as a permanent element of the Jordanian 
state. The East Bankers, on the other hand, were worried that their position would be 
weakened. 737 According to the 1989 temporary law, there were twenty constituencies 
with two to nine deputies. 738 Compared to the size of the previous (1989) 
constituencies the current ones (2003) can also be characterised as `smaller and 
even smaller', because currently in terms of the number of seats the constituencies 
are even smaller than in the 1989 law (1-5 seats vs. 2-9 seats). 
The allocation of the seats in the parliament has been a controversial matter. 
Throughout the period of independence the allocating of seats has been designed to 
favour the pro-Hashemites at the expense of groups considered as a threat to the 
Hashemite rule. An impact of the allocation of seats has been the disproportionate 
representation of Palestinians. 739 First, the areas predominantly Palestinian, such as 
Amman, have less seats relatively in the parliament than the southern pro- 
Hashemite districts. Sawalha stresses that in Amman there is a deputy for every 
172,000 inhabitants, while in Tafileh there is a deputy for every 18,000 inhabitants. 740 
The imbalance can also be seen when considering the seats given to the refugee 
camps on the East Bank. In 1986 there were 54,307 refugees in the Baqa camp, 
while in the Talbiyyah camp only 1,508. Yet both were electing a deputy. 
Not only is the law favouring the rural areas at the expense of the cities, but also the 
minorities are over-represented at the parliament. Interestingly these minority groups 
are also the ones represented in the political elite. According to unofficial estimates, 
only three percent of the population are Christians, yet they currently have eight 
percent of the seats (1989 11.25%). According to same estimates, only 1.5 percent 
of the population are Circassian, yet they have 2.7 percent of the seats. The number 
of the seats reserved for these minorities has not changed since 1928.741 Sawalha 
argues that the implications of the minority quotas can be seen in the 1997 elections. 
Prominent female candidates Toujan Faisal and Emily Naffa would have been 
737 Robins (1991), p. 196. 
738 Law of Election to the House of Deputies (1986), Provisional Law no. 23. 
739 Robins (1991), p. 201. 
740 Sawalha, Democratisation in Jordan - The Electoral System(2001), pp. 12-13. 
741 Sawalha (2001), p. 2. 
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elected if they had been running for the Muslim seats. Naffa got over 2,000 votes 
and Faisal 4,000, while the candidates for the Muslim seats from the same district 
have been elected with 1,300 and 1,042 votes. However, in the other districts the 
ratio is the opposite: Christian candidates have got elected with fewer votes 
compared to Muslim candidates. 742 Riedel argues, however, that Faisal's success in 
the 1993 elections was possible only due to the Circassian seat. Running for a 
minority seat Faisal was competing with only two candidates. 743 
These discrepancies are acknowledged by the government. When the 13th 
parliament was elected in 1997, the newly-appointed government announced that it 
would be drafting a new elections law. A proposal was announced in 1999, however 
it was soon forgotten. Nothing was presented until 2001.744 The 2001 law was issued 
as a temporary law, as the lower house had dissolved earlier in 2001 by a royal 
decree. It was not tested in practice until June 2003, as the elections were 
postponed. The government justified the postponement with a need to spend at least 
10 months to implement the reforms brought by the new law. 745 Abdullah II stressed 
that the new law should to tackle two problems: the disproportionate constituencies 
and the allocation of the seats. 746 According to then Interior Minister Khleifat, the 
2001 law tackles this problem successfully: "redrawing of constituencies granted 
justice to all geographic areas of the Kingdom". Khleifat argues that the system 
introduced in the 2001 law is "close to the British system". 747 Not all agree with 
Khleifat. Sawalha argues that despite other improvements made the law had almost 
no impact on the disproportionate districts. The voters-seats ratio is almost the same 
as in the previous laws, in some places even worse. The most affluent areas of 
Amman are defined as constituencies on their own in the new law. Irbid, the 
stronghold of tribal groups, is given sixteen seats for 220,000 eligible voters, while in 
Amman 1St district gets three seats for 150,000 voters. The number of seats reserved 
for ethnic minorities in the new law remains the same. 748 The introduction of single- 
742 Sawalha (2001), p. 2. 
743 Riedel, The 1993 parliamentary elections in Jordan(1994), p. 60. 
744 Sawalha (2001), pp. 8-12. 
745 Jordan Times, 25`h July (2001). 
746 Sawalha (2001), p. 12. 
747 Jordan Times, July 25 (2001). "Royal Decree delays elections" 
748 Sawalha (2001), pp. 12-13. See also Greenwood (2003), p. 264. 
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person constituencies or only one constituency will be done "at a later stage, once 
political parties will be more consolidated and active in society". Yet Khleifat reminds 
us that "there is no country in the world where the number of the deputies is precisely 
proportional to the population". 749 
749 Jordan Times, July 25th (2001). 
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8.1.3. Election Outcomes 1989-2003 
Before analysing the elections results it is worth noting that finding the exact figures 
on the turnout is not a straightforward task in Jordan. The literature on the elections 
in Jordan offers differing figures for the turnout of the elections. One of the reasons 
for the differences is the electoral registration. The actual number of the votes cast is 
sometimes compared to the number of election cards collected, sometimes to the 
number of registered voters or to the number of eligible voters. The figures used here 
are the ones describing how many eligible Jordanians voted, instead of the 
percentage of all registered voters or cardholders. It is more relevant to identify how 
many citizens with the right to vote really cast their votes, instead of comparing the 
cast votes with the citizens' initial intention to vote. Also to avoid confusion, this study 
refers to a single source (al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center), with the exception of 
the 2003 elections. The changes in the turnouts from an election to another are 
considered more significant than exact figures. It has to be acknowledged that in this 
context numerical data is not necessarily exact or reliable. The al-Urdun al-Jadid 
Centre relies on information from the Ministry of Interior, the body in charge of the 
voting processes (until 2001). The official sources, however, prefer reporting the 
results as a percentage from registered voters, which makes the figures look better. 
The 1989 Elections 
In April 1989 to calm down the protestors the king promised that elections would be 
held. In July King Hussein announced parliamentary elections would take place in 
November. Thus the candidates were not given much time to prepare for the 
elections, particularly considering the prolonged absence of parliamentary elections 
and the ban on political parties. Officially no political parties took part in the elections, 
as they were still illegal. Yet candidates represented a broad spectrum of ideological 
stands. 750 Regardless of the shortness of the campaign it was considered as a lively 
one. 751 The elections are also considered to have been: "surprisingly free, open and 
750 Yayyusi (1998), p. 6; Robinson (1998), p. 392. 
751 Baaklini et al (1999), p. 144. 
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outspoken". 752 The opposition protested against the changes in the 1986 election 
law, yet decided to participate. 753 The turnout, however, was not encouraging, it 
remains only 41 percent. 754 The low turnout is explained partly by the complicated 
registration process and partly by the short period of campaigning. There are also 
differences in turnouts between various parts of Jordan. In the urban Palestinian 
population districts turnout was lower than in the southern (Transjordanian) districts. 
It was rumoured that Yasser Arafat encouraged Palestinians not to vote, as active 
participation would have made them appear to be a part of the Jordanian state. 755 
As with the turnout, there are also discrepancies when reporting the seats gained by 
different (ideological) groups in 1989. Categorising candidates is difficult, as 
candidates did not openly announce their political stands. After all political parties 
were still illegal. The Muslim Brotherhood (al-lkhwan al-Muslimeen) gained 22 seats, 
independent Islamists 10-14 seats and conservatives 30. A majority of observers 
stress the surprise victory of the Islamists; independent and the Islamic Brothers. 756 
The success of the Islamists was explained by the years of absence of political 
parties. The suddenness of the elections favoured groups that were already 
organised and active. 757 Also the multi-vote system favoured Islamists. Yet, not all 
consider the outcome of the elections to have been surprising. Singh argues that "the 
palace" anticipated the outcome. Prior to the elections two surveys were made 
indicating the increased popularity of Islamists at the expense of the leftists. Thus the 
king would not have been stunned by the election results. From the royal court's 
perspective the Islamists were a lesser evil than the leftist groups. The Islamists had 
been supporting the monarchy through the previous domestic crises. According to 
Singh, despite the number of the seats gained by the Islamists, the outcome of the 
1989 elections was still an "extremely loyalist" parliament. 758 Freij and Robinson's 
752 Riedel (1994), p. 51. 
753 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 19. 
754 Brand (2000), p. 101; Brand (1999), p. 53; Riedel (1994), p. 51; Robinson (1998), p. 392; Cooper 
and Tilly (1994), p. 14; Riedel (1994), p. 56; Robinson (1998), p. 392. According to some, the turnout 
was around 54 percent of eligible voters and others claim that is 40 percent, even as little as 34 
percent. 
55 Brand (2000), p. 102. 
756 Singh (2002), p. 78; Riedel (1994), p. 51; Greenwood (2003), p. 254. 
75' Robinson (1998), p. 392. 
758 Singh (2002), p. 78. There were two cabinet members who confirmed the government using the 
polls. 
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argue that in spite of the comments of the victory of the Islamists, they gained less 
than a third of the seats. Furthermore, King Hussein did not consider Islamist as the 
greatest threat to the Hashemites. In matter of fact Islamists and the Hashemite 
monarchy have "coexisted in mutually beneficial relationship". 759 Also the success of 
Islamists in the 1984 by-elections might have given some indication of the popularity 
of the Islamists. 76° 
In the 1989 elections female candidates were allowed to stand for the first time in the 
country's history. Yet, none out of the 12 candidates got elected. 761 
The 1993 Elections 
The 1993 elections were the first multiparty elections in Jordan since the 1960s, yet 
they are characterised by Jordanians' lack of interest in political matters. There were 
fewer candidates running and the election campaign is considered to have had little 
"political content". The issues talked about were services and "bread and butter 
issues", leaving many politically sensitive issues with little attention. 762 According to 
Riedel, Jordanians were disillusioned with the parliament. The parliament had 
managed to raise important issues and create lively debate on matters. Yet the 
deputies did not seem to have the power to influence the most important decisions 
made during the term 1989-1993. The government had the major role in making 
decisions and implementing matters regarding the IMF programmes, the National 
Charter, the relations with Israel, and finally the 1993 Elections Law. 763 The 
resources of the parliament were by no means sufficient: "no private offices, no staff, 
no funds, no organisational background S,,. 764 
The government intentionally weakened the chances of political groups in the 1993 
elections. By no means was the 1989-1993 period an easy one. In 1990 Iraq's 
759 Freij and Robinson (1996), p. 27. 
760 Freij and Robinson (1996), p. 15. 
761 Rath (1994), p. 545; Amawi, Against all odds(2001), p. 35. According to Rath, there were only 9 
female candidates. 
762 Amawi (2001), p. 38; Riedel (1994), p. 55. 
763 Riedel (1994), p. 51. See also Robinson (1998), p. 393. 
764 Riedel (1994), p. 52. 
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invasion of Kuwait created an economic crisis in Jordan. Foreign financial assistance 
was decreased, as the king had expressed his support for the Iraqi regime. There 
were also a great many Jordanians working in the Gulf who were forced to return to 
Jordan. The Madrid Peace Process which began in 1991 had a number of opponents 
in Jordan. In addition, the PLO signed a peace agreement with Israel in September 
1993, just weeks before the elections. Considering the complicated political 
environment the government's intention to eliminate any surprises and to decrease 
the possibility of a radical (anti-normalisation) majority being elected was not 
surprising. First, the government delayed announcing the election date. People were 
expecting the government to postpone the elections due to the peace negotiations. 
Only a month prior to the elections it was declared that elections would be held as 
planned. It is also argued that after the disappointing turnout of the 1989 elections 
the government was eager to encourage (conservative) voters to participate. It is 
claimed that the government hoped that postponing the elections until November 
would give Jordanians returning from Iraq enough time to register as voters. The 
300,000 expatriate workers returning from Iraq were considered as `cautious' voters 
unlikely to vote for the Islamists. If the majority of the `returnees' would vote, it would 
have the increasing impact on the turnout the government was wishing for. 765 The 
government also forbade public rallying. The decision was in fact overturned by the 
Supreme Court, but only a week before the elections. These matters both 
contributed to the fact that the political parties, this time legalised, did not have 
enough time to campaign. 
The greatest attempt to influence the election results was the introduction of the new 
election law in 1993. The only amendment in the law was the controversial 1-man-1- 
vote formula. 766 Earlier voters could vote for as many candidates as were elected 
from their district, while the 1993 amendment restricted the right to only one 
candidate regardless of the number of the deputies chosen from the particular 
district. 767 The government justified the reform as an attempt to reduce the 
765 Freij and Robinson (1996), p. 23. 
766 In 1993 when the one man one vote amendment was made, there were only 20 constituencies. 
The number was increased to 21 in 1997, as the election law was amended once again. Hourani and 
Yassin (1998), pp. 21-22. 
767 httpz//www. iordanembassyus. orq/new/aboutiordan/onemanvote. shtml 
214 
significance of tribalism. The amendment was criticised for being biased; maintaining 
voting based on tribal loyalties. A majority of the political parties expressed their 
unhappiness regarding the change. 768 This amendment has been the most 
controversial of all amendments, leading to many protests and even to the boycott of 
the 1997 elections. It is fair to say that more people criticise the amendment than 
praise it. 
According to Professor Shteiwi, the critique is not justified, as in his view the new 
formula does not support tribalist thinking. The outcome of the 1989 elections was 
not less tribalist than the outcome of elections after the 1993 amendment, yet the 
1989 elections were the last elections in which electors could cast several votes. The 
current 1-vote formula will "eventually" weaken tribal thinking. Shteiwi argues that 
when allowed to vote for as many candidates as elected from the constituency, an 
Islamist is also deciding the success of the Christian seat. 769 It is worth noting here 
that in contrast to Shteiwi's interpretation of the election results the 1989 parliament 
has been considered the most democratic one so far. The opponents of the formula 
are, however, demanding the formula to be replaced by a double-vote formula. This 
requirement is also included in the recommendations made by the Jordan First 
committee. 770 
It is claimed that the changes in the election law also contributed to the `non- 
ideological' nature of the campaigns. The 1-man-1-vote formula favoured tribal 
loyalties. Many voters registered in their hometowns instead of the place of 
residence in order to be able to vote for a relative. "' It is justified to claim that the 
law was designed to weaken the Islamists and strengthen the existing unequal 
allocation of seats in the parliament (favouring East Bankers). 772 The way the 
amendment was made is very telling. The king announced on June 10th that there 
would be no changes in the election without appropriate debates and involvement of 
the actors concerned. The National Charter was issued in 1991. The Charter was 
768 Robinson (1998), p. 398; Sawalha (2001), p. 2; Roberts (1991), p. 122. 
769 Shteiwi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
770 Shunnaq, Interview in Amman June 2003; Jordan First Recommendations, 2002. 
771 Riedel (1994), p. 54. 
772 Riedel (1994), p. 53. 
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seen as a pact between the political groups and the monarchy: political groups 
promising to support the Hashemite monarchy and the king in return provided an 
environment which encouraged democratic participation. The opposition groups were 
worried about possible amendments in the election law and announced their 
readiness to boycott the forthcoming elections should the election law be amended 
without the parliament being present. When the 12th parliament was dissolved 
August 4th, the king promised that no law would be amended. No election date was 
declared, however. Only two weeks later, however, the amended law was presented. 
The al-Majalli government presented the amendment, yet the king's involvement was 
undisputed. 773 Opposition's protests died out, however, when the king expressed his 
support for the law. Once the Islamic Action Front announced its intention to 
participate in the elections other parties joined in. The careful involvement of the 
inner circles of the political elite in introducing the law is seen also when in July the 
official news agency, Petra, published a poll stating that majority of Jordanians 
favoured the one-man-one-vote formula. 774 
The turnout of 45.7 percent was higher than in 1989.75 From 534 candidates only 
100 can be identified as political candidates, 55 of them officially running as party 
candidates . 
776 Sixty deputies from the 11th parliament wanted to renew their 
mandates, but only 26 succeeded. "' The majority of the candidates were moderate 
tribal representatives. Islamists gained fewer seats than in the previous elections, 
only 16 out of 80. Not only did the new election formula favour tribal loyalties, but 
also the voters were not impressed with the role of the Islamists in the 12th 
parliament. There were also internal problems weakening their performance. 778 
There are also claims of election fraud and vote selling. According to Robinson, 
several claims were made of the support procedures for illiterate voters being 
abused. An illiterate voter can request the chairman of the balloting board to assist 
with writing the candidate's name. The election law (1986) states that the chairman 
should read the name(s) to the voter "audible within the earshot of the board", while 
73 Yayyusi (1998), p. 7; Robinson (1998), p. 398; Brand (2001), p. 112. 
74 Cooper and Tilly (1994), p. 21. 
775 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 207. 
776 Anderson (1997), p. 60. 
777 Riedel (1994), p. 60. 
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the regulation issued in September 1986 only requires the chairman to read the 
names to the voter and make any modifications requested. 779 It is argued that these 
procedures were used as a way for the person selling her/his votes to prove that the 
vote really is given to the person who is purchasing the vote. 780 
One of the most remarkable achievements of the 1993 elections was the election of 
the first female deputy in Jordan. There were only three women running for a seat, 
whereas in the 1989 elections there were twelve. Toujan Faisal was elected for the 
Circassian seat from the Amman's Third district, an affluent area with well-educated 
and progressive inhabitants. 781 It is interesting, argues Robinson, that Faisal's 
success relied on no significant support groups, political parties or tribes. 782 
The 1997 Elections 
Compared to the two previous elections, the 1997 elections were full of controversy. 
The new election law (1993) encouraging voting based on tribal loyalties had 
aggravated the Islamists, who had won substantially fewer seats in the 1993 
elections. The Muslim Brotherhood declared an election boycott, which other 
opposition groups soon joined, including among others the Islamic Action Front (IAF) 
and the Council of Professional Associations (CPA). In addition nearly hundred 
public figures and ex-parliamentarians joined the boycott. 783 The government 
negotiated with the opposition groups trying to convince them to cancel the boycott, 
yet with no success. 784 
The turnout was lower than in the two previous elections: only 41 percent. As in the 
previous elections in the constituencies where the tribal presence is strong more 
votes were cast; the turnout being significantly higher than that nation-wide (between 
778 Baaklini et al (1999), pp. 156-157. 
79 Law of Election to the House of Deputies 1986,46 B; Regulation No. 60 for the Year 1986 
Elections Regulation, Article 8. 
780 Robinson (1998), p. 398; Naffa, Interview in Amman June 2003; Faisal, Interview in June Amman; 
Shubeilat, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
781 Riedel (1994), p. 56 and p. 60. 
782 Robinson (1998). 
783 Sawalha (2001), p. 4. 
784 Sawalha (2001), p. 4. 
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83-93 percent). 785 Baaklini (et al) argue that the boycott was not that successful, as 
there were not many fewer candidates compared to the previous elections. 786 Thus it 
is argued here that the number of candidates alone does not necessarily say 
anything about the success of the elections. It could be argued that the king surely 
was aware that the observers would focus on the numerical data. Therefore, 
encouraging people outside the boycotting groups to participate might be useful. The 
amount of the candidates also tells very little about their quality or the quality of the 
deputies chosen. The 13th parliament is characterised apolitical and tribal, even 
`incompetent' by some critics. Only four from eighty elected deputies belonged to 
political parties and some were "stealth candidates" from National Constitutional 
Party (NCP). 787 No women were elected; even Toujan Faisal did not succeed in 
renewing her mandate. 788 
A majority of observers, as well as the domestic opposition, considered the 1997 
elections not to be free, or fair. According to the elections regulation (No. 60) made in 
September 1986, the presence at the polling station is limited to the candidates, the 
members of the balloting panel and the voters (a maximum of 5 at the same time . 
789 
Thus it was possible for the supporters for the opposition candidates to be present, 
and there are many stories told about electoral flaws at the polling stations. Many 
claims of fraud were also reported in the press. The Minister of Interior admitted that 
errors had occurred in registration of voters. In some constituencies "over- 
registration", repeating names twice or more, reached 150 percent. 790 In order to 
vote the eligible citizens have to be registered in the electoral lists. All the 
(registered) voters need election identity cards to be able to vote. According to the 
1986 law, anyone can order the cards on behalf of the family members included in 
the same family book. Registering is done by inscribing a mark in the voter's family 
book. Family books include all the unmarried members of the family in question. It is 
785 Sawalha (2001), p. 6. 
786 Baaklini eta/(1999), pp. 163-164. 
787 Sawalha (2001), p. 6. 
788 Amawi, (2001). p. 47. 
789 Regulation No. 60 for the Year 1986 Elections Regulation. Issued by the Virtue of the Artide of 72 
of the Law of Election to the House of Deputies 1986, Article 5. 
790 Sawalha (2001), p. 5. 
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possible for anyone from a family to register the rest of the family members 
mentioned in the family book. 791 
Toujan Faisal reports being shown forged election cards. The cards were given to 
deceased Jordanians, members of the army and the security forces. 792 Furthermore, 
the voting cards needed for balloting, it was argued, were abused and powers of 
attorneys were forged. 793 It is argued by many that the election frauds were made 
possible by the vagueness of the new election law or the deliberate interference of 
the executive, or both. The law did not clearly indicate how the registration should be 
done. The law was not specific whether the registration should be taken at the place 
of birth, permanent or temporary residence. Furthermore, it is not indicated whether 
all unmarried family members mentioned in the family book should be present at the 
. 
794 Baaklini et al argue, nonetheless, that despite the claims of election 
rigging the government was sincerely trying to prevent any wrongdoings. 795 The 
government had appointed an "election spokesman" just a few weeks before the 
elections. Also some people were charged for election fraud, mainly for forging 
power of attorneys. 796 
The 2003 Elections 
The 13th parliament was dissolved in July 2001; just some weeks before the 
government issued the 2001 election law. Shortly afterwards the parliamentary 
elections were postponed. According to the prime minister, it would take at least 10 
months to implement the reforms brought by the new law. The following year another 
announcement was made to postpone the elections, this time owing to `regional 
turbulence', the second Palestinian intifada and the anticipated Iraqi war. It was 
believed that the true reason for the postponement of the elections was the negative 
sentiment towards the Israeli peace treaty. The executive feared that the new lower 
791 The Elections Law, 1986, Articles 6-9. This excludes the members of press and any (official) 
observers. 
792 Faisal, Interview in Amman June 2003. See also Sawalha (2001), p. 5. 
793 Al-Khoury, The 1997 Elections in Jordan(1998), p. 378. 
794 Sawalha (2001), p. 5. 
795 Baaklini et al (1999), p. 165. 
796 Al-Khoury (1998), p. 10. 
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house might pursue to annul the treaty. 797 After months of postponement, it was 
announced in February 2003 that the elections were to be held in June. It is rather 
interesting that immediately after the 1997 elections the government announced that 
it was working on a draft election law. The 1997 law, as previously shown, had led to 
protests by the opposition and to a widespread election boycott. What makes this 
announcement interesting is that the draft law was finally resented in July 2003 when 
the elected house had been dissolved, and the law was passed as a temporary law. 
The need to amend the 1993 election law was acknowledged by the king and the 
executive throughout the term of 14th parliament, with no practical steps taken. 798 
There were several novelties in the elections. Some of the new elements were 
definitely improvements, others bit more controversial. One improvement in the new 
elections law is the age limits. According to the previous law, although a citizen 
reaches the age of majority at the age of eighteen, s/he is only entitled to vote a year 
later. This was changed in the 2001 elections law. The first ever election law 
provided the right to all citizens 18 and over, and in 1960 this was raised to 21 
years. 799 It has to be noted at this point that there were `radical' political activism at 
the universities in the late 1950s. Thus the increased age limit appears to be 
obstructing the opposition forces. In the 2003 elections for the first time the voter's 
identity card was personal and could not be used by any other family member. 800 
Previously it was possible for any of the members from the same family to register 
and vote on the behalf of the other family members. 801 This reform was initially the 
official reason for the postponement of the parliamentary elections in 2001. The 
government announced that to implement the amendments it needed at least ten 
months. 802 
The transport of ballot boxes had caused criticism earlier, as there had been claims 
that the transport would enable the boxes to be tampered with. According to the 
797 McDermott (2003), p. 2. 
798 Sawalha (2001), p. 8. 
799 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 20; Massad (2001), pp. 54-55. The 1947 electoral law the right to 
vote was guaranteed to citizens aged 18, and then raised to 21 in 1960. 
800 Instructions Governing The Election Identity Card, 1986, Articles 2 and 4. 
801 Constitution, Chapter 6. 
802 Jordan Times, July 24th 2001; Jordan Times, July 25th 2001. 
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1986 law, after the balloting centre has closed, the ballot boxes were moved to the 
constituency headquarters where the votes will be counted. 803For instance, there 
have been accusations that transporting the boxes has taken more time than it 
should have, giving reason to expect election fraud. 804 The temporary law 2001 has 
changed this practice and for the first time in the 2003 elections the votes were 
counted at the ballot stations. 805 The ballot boxes are opened by the central 
committee in the presence of the candidates and their delegates. Candidates are 
entitled to be present during the canvassing of the votes. The results will be 
announced "openly in the presence of the candidates or their delegates". 806 
Previously the Ministry of Interior has announced the election results within two days 
of receiving the results. 807 The 2001 law improves the transparency of the elections 
by defining the judiciary as the body in charge of supervising the elections, instead of 
the Ministry of Interior. Judges will also be responsible for declaring the validity of the 
elections instead of the deputies themselves. 808 However, only one judge will be 
appointed to each supervising committee because there are currently not enough 
judges in Jordan. Deputy Prime Minister Khleifat points out the problem: there are 
6000 balloting centres and a 3-member committee supervising in each. Thus in total 
18,000 judges are needed to have judges-only committees. Khleifat reminds us that 
there are currently only 430 judges in Jordan. 809 
A real controversial reform was the disputed women's quota. The implementation of 
the women's quota failed to meet the expectations of the promoters. Jordanian 
women's groups were actively promoting the quota for female deputies (or "positive 
discrimination") since the 1997 elections. The women's groups saw the quota only as 
a temporary measure for next three to four elections. Unlike many other quota 
models, in Jordan no demands were made to place a minimum requirement for the 
803 Law of Election to the House of Deputies 1986, Article 48 C. 
804 Naffa, Interview in Amman June 2003 and Faisal, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
805 Jordan Times, July 24th 2001; Sawalha (2001), p. 13. 
806 Law of Election to the House of Deputies 1986, Article 56. 
807 Law of Election to the House of Deputies 1986, Article 9. 
808 Sawalha (2001), p. 13 
809 Jordan Times 2001. 
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number of female candidates . 
810 The supporters of the quota aimed at twenty 
percent of the seats at first, but then reduced the demand to 12 seats, and finally to 
eight seats. 81 Thus the quota of six seats was a compromise and to some a 
disappointment. According to the quota, there are six seats reserved for female 
candidates who are not elected through the ordinary process. The votes gained by 
each female candidate are counted as a percentage of the votes given in her 
constituency, then compared nationally. The six candidates with the highest 
percentage of votes will be elected. This way of counting is criticised by many, 
because the more women who run from the same district the smaller their chances 
are in the national comparison. 812 In addition to the way the votes are counted, 
another controversial element of the quota is the involvement of the government. In 
contrast to the counting of the `ordinary' votes, the Ministry of Interior, and not the 
judiciary, count the votes given to the female candidates and also announce the 
results. Thus counting the votes of the female candidates lacks transparency. 813 
Emily Naffa, a prominent left wing politician, decided to boycott the 2003 elections to 
show her disapproval of the way the quota is implemented. The procedure whereby 
female candidates are chosen based on the proportion of the total vote obtained 
within their constituency is argued to favour those candidates who run in districts with 
smaller population. 814 According to the calculation by Sean Dunne, candidate A with 
4,000 votes from the total of 10,000 votes cast in a district of 12,000 registered 
voters might have fewer chances than the candidate B with 450 votes from the total 
of 1,000 votes from a district of 1,500 registered votes. Candidate B has 45 percent 
of the votes from her district, while candidate A has 40 percent. 815 This prediction 
seems to be accurate, as all six women elected in 2003 elections were outside 
Amman. Tafilef with 20,000 inhabitants is represented by two women, whereas 
Amman by none. However, it must be acknowledged that the woman with the 
highest percentage, Hayat Massimi (an Islamic Action Front candidate from Zarqa) 
almost succeeded in winning an ordinary seat with 7,133 votes (compared with the 
810 IDEA website, Drude Dahlrup, (2003). http: //www. guotaproject. org/discuss. cfm 
81 Salwa Nasser, Interview in Amman May 2003; Lamis Nasser, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
812 Jordan Times, February 14,2003. http: //www. mordanembassyus. org/02142003004. htm 
813 Dunne (2003). 
814 Naffa, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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7,174 votes of Salameh Ghweiri). 816 It is worth noting here that when the election 
results were announced there was no indication of the number of votes gained by 
percentages of the six female deputies. 
817 
The election campaign was considered as `lame' or uninteresting. After the series of 
disappointments, argues Hourani, it was difficult for the government to win people's 
trust. 818 The turnout of 45.7 percent was lower than in the 1993 elections. 819 Yet 
making comparisons is not that straightforward, as the election age was lowered to 
eighteen years. In Jordan such a change is remarkable as it is estimated that nearly 
60 percent of the population is less than 19 years of age. 820 Again there were 
regional differences between the turnouts, the voters in Amman being the least 
active. Seventeen deputies succeeded in renewing their mandates. The majority of 
the new deputies were conservative tribal figures. Islamic Action Front got 25 seats 
and the first quota seat for women. According to Mustafa Hamarneh, the outcome of 
the 2003 elections shows the citizens are becoming more aware and mature in 
political matters. 821 
Once again claims of election fraud were made. There were claims of an election 
card machine found in a southern district, and clashes in Karak. 822 Yet one of the 
greatest controversies of the 2003 elections occurred before the balloting day. The 
government rejecting Toujan Faisal's candidacy can be considered as such. The 
2001 law makes a minor but significant distinction to `electoral disqualification'. Both 
the 1986 law and the current constitution state that Jordanians will be disqualified as 
voters and candidates if they have been convicted for a non-political crime and not 
815 Dunne (2003), p. 2. 
816 Jordan Times, June 19`h (2003). "Tribal, independent figures win most of Lower House seats". Alia 
Shukri and Dina al Wakeel. 
817 Jordan Times 19 June (2003), Election 
Results. htti): //www. jordanembass uy s. org/06192003002. htm 
818 Hourani, Interview in Amman June 2003; Shteiwi, Interview in Amman June 2003; Samhouri, 
Interview in Amman June 2003. 
819 According to the government, there were 2,843,483 eligible voters and 2,326,496 of them 
registered. It was announced that 58.5 percent of registered citizens cast their votes. Then there 
would be 1,360,415 citizens voting. That would make the turnout 47.8 percent of the eligible citizens. 
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820 Dunne (2003), p. 5. 
821 Jordan Times, June 1 9"' (2003). 
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pardoned. 823 The 2001 elections law disqualifies citizens when convicted of a non- 
political crime and who subsequently received a `special' pardon by the king. 824 The 
case of Toujan Faisal presented in the previous chapter shows how such a tiny 
amendment can actually create great judicial and political dilemmas. According to 
article 38 of the constitution, the king can "grant a special pardon or remit any 
sentence, but any general pardon shall be determined by a special law". 825 Thus the 
king has wider freedoms (more independence) to grant `special' pardons, as the 
special pardon is issued though the legislative channels. Not to let Faisal compete 
was perhaps one of the unwisest decisions made by the government, as it gave the 
opposition free ammunition against the government. Whether the reason to reject 
Faisal's candidacy was made entirely on judicial basis, or whether it was an 
'extrajudicial' punishment or an attempt to obstruct her political activism is debatable. 
Whatever the motive behind the decision is, it is also an indication of unpredictability 
within the system. The decision by the appeal judge to declare it beyond his 
jurisdiction to interpret constitutionality in Faisal's case, makes the case appear more 
political than judicial. 
To sum up, it is worth noting here that the election results and the interpretations 
given are a confusing matter. The turnout of the elections since 1989 seems to bring 
no surprises: 41 percent in 1989,51 percent in 1993,47 percent in 1997 and 47.8 
percent in 2003.826 There is a slight increase in the turnout since the 1989 elections. 
Yet it must be remembered that the turnout should also reflect the 4-percent annual 
demographic growth. In 1993 there was also an influx of 300,000 citizens returning 
from the Gulf. Moreover, in the 2003 elections the voting age was lowered making 
comparisons complicated. There were 647 candidates in 1989,534 in 1993,524 in 
1997 and 765 in 2003.827 Analysing these figures as such indicates that political 
developments since 1989 have not encouraged the Jordanians to participate. The 
increase in the amount of the female candidates, however, is remarkable. There 
822 Samhouri, Interview in Amman June 2003; Faisal Interview in Amman June 2003. Jordan Times, 
June 19th (2003); Star June 19`h (2003). 
823 Constitution, Article 75C; Elections Law (1986). 
824 Jordan Times May 20th (2003). "161 candidates registered in capital for 5th District; 2 rejected" 
ýý age 3); Law of Election to the House of Deputies (No. 22/86), Articles 4 and 5. 
5 Constitution, Article 38. 
826 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 207. 
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were 12 candidates in 1989, three in 1993, seventeen in 1997 and 47 in 2003. The 
increase is primarily a consequence of the women's quota. 
827 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 208. htto: //www. iordanernbassyus. orq/06182003002. htm 
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8.2. ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE 
8.2.1. Political Parties 
According to the constitution, citizens are free to found and join political parties and 
societies "within the limits of law". 828 Nevertheless, since 1958 political parties were 
banned until the early 1990s. The first elections of the `new era' were held although 
political parties were illegal. The Political Parties Law was passed in 1992, three 
years after the 1989 elections. 829 The main elements of the Political Parties Law 
were already agreed within the framework of the National Charter published a year 
before. The political environment has been changing since the promulgation of the 
Political Parties Law. Yet this law is the least changed element of the Jordanian 
political system. 
According to the Political Parties Law (1992), Jordanian citizens are free to found 
parties and join them. In order to found a political party, there have to be at least fifty 
founding members. A `founding member' has to be at least 25 years old, to have 
been a Jordanian citizen for at least ten years, and not to have dual citizenship, to 
live permanently in the country, to have no criminal convictions (with the exception of 
political crimes) and to belong to no other party. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
constitution, members of armed forces, security forces or the civil defence, as well as 
judges, do not qualify as founding members. 830 They do not qualify as voters or 
candidates when in the office, thus forbidding active role in political parties is in line 
with the requirement of political neutrality of people holding special posts. The same 
criteria are applied for any one who wants to join an existing party, with the exception 
of age. Anyone who is eighteen or above can hold party membership. 831 
All the offices (headquarters and branches) of political parties have to be within the 
national borders to ensure that political parties remain independent. Parties are also 
828 Constitution, Article 16 
829 Riedel (1994), p. 59. 
830 Political Parties Law, Articles 4-5. 
http: //www. jordanembassyus. org/new/aboutjordan/politicalpartieslaw. shtmI 
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responsible for keeping the records of their funding public, and must not receive any 
funding from outside Jordan. Donations can be given only by Jordanian citizens and 
cannot exceed 5000 Jordanian Dinars a year per person. 832 These stipulations are 
aimed to protect political parties "from foreign subservience and manipulation". 833 
The reason for this has its foundation in the developments in the 1950s and 1970s. 
In the 1950s, at the height of the Pan-Arabism, the Ba'th party, Arab Socialist party 
and Communist party received support from the counterparts from other Arab 
countries, mainly Egypt and Syria. The PLO has also been supporting some 
Jordanian political groups. The government also wanted to minimise the involvement 
of the PLO in `domestic politics'. 834 Parties cannot work from the premises of any 
"public, private, charitable, religious, productive or educational institution", nor can 
they allow any of such institution use their premises. 835 These stipulations are aimed 
at limiting the Islamic Action Front and Muslim Brotherhood type of co-operation. It is 
easier to control actors in an environment where actors have precise roles and 
functions. The popularity of the Islamic Action Front is largely due to the work done 
within the Muslim Brotherhood. The Political Parties law guarantees the immunity of 
the premises of the party and the confidentiality of their records. According to article 
18, raids at the party premises are authorised only by a judicial order. 836 
In the early 1990s, after their legalisation, political parties mushroomed in Jordan. 
There are currently thirty political parties registered. 837 This could be partly explained 
by the small number of funding members (50) required. It is often argued that the 
political parties are weak, relatively ineffective and badly organised. 838 The long 
absence from active participation in political life has left its legacy. The only party 
whose organisation resembles the western idea of political party is the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF). While political parties were banned IAF was able to work under the 
umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood. 839 The small size of the political parties is a 
831 Political Parties Law, Article 16. 
832 Political Parties Law, Article 18. 
833 http: //www. mordanembassyus. org/new/aboutiordan/ph4. shtmi 
834 Singh (2002), p. 69 and p. 71. 
835 Political Parties Law, Articles 6 and 14. 
836 Political Parties Law, Article 18. 
837 http: //www. jordanembass uY s. org/l 1242003003. htm 
838 Mahafzah (2001), p. 356. 
839 Brynen (1998), p. 87. 
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factor explaining their ineffective organisation. Political (party) activism is not very 
popular in Jordan. In 2001 less than 9000 Jordanians belonged to a political party 
(25 parties). 84° From the 80 deputies of the 13th parliament only 23 openly 
represented political parties. Quite telling is the fact that 16 out of these 23 party 
candidates were members of the National Constitutionalist Party, pro-government 
party and the second most represented party was IAF. 841 Curiously, neither the list of 
deputies on the government's website nor that published in the main (English) 
newspapers indicates the political affiliation of the elected deputies. As shown 
earlier, the lower house is dominated by independent deputies. Hence the members 
of the lower house belong to political 'blocs' rather than parties. 
After a long period of political activism being illegal it is not surprising that citizens do 
not consider political parties as attractive or even necessary. According to the 
surveys (Democracy in Jordan 2003 and Democracy in Jordan 2000) conducted by 
the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan (CSS), the majority of 
Jordanians feel that they cannot participate in political opposition activities without a 
risk of discrimination directed against themselves or their family. This fear of being 
punished for political activism has been a growing tendency: in 1999 70.9 percent of 
the interviewees, in 2000 73.5 percent and 77.4 in 2003. &`2 According to Leith 
Shubeilat, even people with indirect connections to opposition politics will not be 
recruited to public sector posts, including the public universities. He argues that his 
son-in-law has encountered difficulties finding employment only owing to his father- 
in-law's political activism. 843 Some Jordanians go even further arguing that 
Jordanians are generally move interested in prosperity than in political ideals. For 
many the economy and the prices of basic commodities are more interesting that 
political rights. Also the frustration about the corruption in Jordan and the 
government's inability to improve the lives of ordinary citizen is perceived to make 
840 Jordan Times 2001 
841 Hourani and Yassin (1998), pp. 203-206. 
842 The Center for Strategic Studies: Democracy in Jordan 2003, Democracy in Jordan 2000; 
Democracy in Jordan 1999. http: l/www. css-iordan. org/polls/democracy/2003/index. html and 
http: //www. css-jordan. org/polls/democracy/2000/index. html . 843 Shubeilat, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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citizens generally disinterested in anything political. As they cannot see anything 
changing or benefiting their lives they simply are not interested in politics. 844 
Ahmad Shunnaq from the National Constitutional Party ('the pro-government party') 
points out that regardless of the legalisation of political parties people are still afraid 
to join. Yet currently more people joining now (in 2003) than in ten years ago. Thus 
Shunnaq seems to suggest that the people are slowly learning to trust government's 
sincerity. There are others who agree with the view of people being wary of 
joining. 845 The Jordanian Communist Party, for example, to encourage people to join 
does not publicise the names of its members. 846 According to CSS surveys, only 2 
percent of Jordanians are even considering joining a political party. The intention to 
join a political party has remained very low throughout the 1990s. 847 According to 
Mahafzah, the local media is partly responsible for the lack of Jordanians to join 
political parties. The media, controlled and largely owned by the government is 
delivering messages that political activism is not good, that "politics is not good", 
argued Mahafzah. This has its roots in the political crisis of 1957848 It is claimed by 
some observers that the conservative elements in the 1950s were used to ruling the 
country without political parties and since the al-Nablusi days have considered the 
political parties as unnecessary obstacles. 849 
Jordanian political parties are not attracting the citizens because their programmes 
are perceived as lacking tangible goals. Parties are criticised for offering only 
slogans, not genuine programmes or agendas. Parties also have a tendency to come 
alive only during the election campaigns. The surveys by the CSS indicate that 
Jordanians do not have an interest in political parties; they do not even recognise the 
parties. The Islamic Action Front is the most recognised party, recognised by 44 
percent of the interviewees. The second known party was the Arab Ba'th Socialist 
Party with 12.1% and the National Constitutional Party with 10.2%. The majority of 
e4' Mahafzah (2001), pp. 358-559. 
845 Shunnaq, Interview in Amman June 2003; Naffa, Interview in June 2003; Sweis, Interview in 
Amman June 2003; Shteiwi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
846 Naffa, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
847 httD: //www. css-lordan. orq/polls/democracy/2003/index html 
848 Mahafzah (2001), p. 386. 
849 Interviews in Amman 2003 
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the thirty registered parties were hardly recognised at all. 850 In all fairness it has to be 
said that during the 2003 campaign the IAF got more press coverage than the other 
parties. This is partly to due to interest in their decision to participate after the 1997 
boycott. 851 The fragmented political field is also placing a challenge for journalists. 
Journalist Jamil Nimri argues that the great number of political parties makes giving 
the parties equal media coverage a complicated task. More, the media is largely 
owned by the state and impartiality of the coverage is more complicated issue. 
Mansour alleged that in the 1997 elections the media coverage on the political 
parties were unbalanced. The pro-regime National Constitutional Party (NCP) is 
claimed to have received more attention than the other parties. 852 
Some see parties as concentrating too much on international matters at the expense 
of domestic issues. 853 Ahmad Shunnaq accuses some parties of importing `alien' 
ideologies to Jordan, ideologies that do not suit the Jordanian context. Shunnaq 
characterises his own party, the National Constitutional Party, as being an 
"unideological party" offering practical reforms instead of empty slogans. According 
to Shunnaq, the weakness of the political parties in Jordan is directly related to these 
imported "revolutionary" ideas. 854 Others argue the political agendas presented are 
elitist, and thus do not attract the ordinary Jordanians. The only exception is the 
Islamic Action Front, which has been active in the social field within the framework of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. 855 Political activism, argues Shteiwi (Professor of Sociology, 
University of Jordan), whether within a political party, professional syndicate or NGO, 
is still an upper-class activity. 856 According to the CSS surveys, only a small number 
of Jordanians are satisfied with the work the political parties have done. In 1997 only 
2.3 percent considered the work done by the political parties as very successful. 
Membership of other associations is more popular than political activism: 10.1 
850 The Center for Strategic Studies, 2003. Democracy in Jordan 2003. htti): //www. css- 
lordan. orq/polls/democracy/2003/index. htmI Jordan Times and Star. 
852 Al-Wakeel, Experts say media can play valuable role in elections(2002), p. 1; Human Rights 
Watch/Middle East (1998), p. 3. 
853 Rantawi, Interview in Amman May 2003; Hourani, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
854 Shunnaq, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
855 Shteiwi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
856 Shteiwi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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percent of the population belongs to other associations, while only a tiny minority 
carries a party membership, 857 
Not all political parties ceased to exist when banned in the 1960s, some simply went 
underground. According to opposition politicians, associational life in Jordan has 
naturally become easier since 1989. There are fewer restrictions and parties are 
more tolerated. The situation, however, has got worse since the peace negotiations 
and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. There are restrictions on 
organising conferences and seminars; even the size of demonstrations is controlled. 
Some even argue that working underground was easier, as the government did not 
have so many ways and channels to interfere. 858 The problems related to the political 
parties in Jordan are widely acknowledged within Jordanian society. The `Jordan 
First' initiative has made recommendations to encourage political activism (within 
organised political parties) including double-vote formula, funding for parties and new 
monitoring body to replace the Ministry of Interior. 859 
857 The Center for Strategic Studies, 1997. Democracy in Jordan. http: //www. css- 
orda n. org/poll s/dem ocracy/97/index . 
htm l 
58 58 Opposition politicians interviewed in Amman May-June 2003. 
859 Jordan First, Recommendations (2002). 
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8.2.2. Other Associations 
Besides political parties, professional associations are significant political actors in 
Jordanian society, offering an alternative forum for citizens to express their views. 
Their current significance is a `relict' of the martial law period. Political parties being 
illegal, professional syndicates acted as substitutes. According to Hourani, 
professional associations had an advantage over other political groups, as they 
"monopolized huge material and moral resources, including free head offices in the 
main cities, organizational structures and communication capabilities". 860 Syndicates 
have also been powerful due to "the position at the top of the employment 
pyramid". 861 The members of the professional associations are the "technocratic 
elite, 862 of the country, educated people with an interest in political matters. All 
qualified professionals (e. g. engineers, doctors, journalists, dentists) have to be 
members of their professional association in order to able to practice their 
profession. 863 When compared with political parties the importance of the 
professional associations lies in the depth of their membership: there are roughly 30 
parties with 9,000 members, while the Jordanian Engineers Association (JEA) alone 
has 55,000 members. 
The active role of the associations in political life has been a matter of growing 
concern for the executive over the last years. The leaders of the syndicates have 
often been among the most popular political figures in Jordan, particularly former and 
current presidents of the Jordanian Engineers Association, Leith Shubeilat being 
one. The successful female candidate of IAF elected in 2003 had an active 'career' in 
the pharmacists association before joining the election campaign. 864 It is possibly not 
the popularity of the syndicate activists but their ideological affiliations that have 
made the executive worried. The Islamists have been the dominant political group in 
the professional syndicates since the mid-1980s, and leftist groups before that. This 
860 Hourani, The Development of the Political Role of the Professional Associations: A Historical 
Survey 1950-1989(2000), p. 58. 
"' Hurani (2000), p. 55. 
862 Dietench (2002), p. 139. 
863 Hourani (2000), p. 55. 
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has proved extremely challenging to the government, as many syndicates have 
been, and still are, actively expressing 'anti-normalisation' views. Syndicates have 
protested against the normalisation plans by treating the members of the West Bank 
as equal to the rest of the Jordanians. 865 According to Hourani, after the 1989 
elections the professional associations were warned not to engage themselves in 
political matters, as it is the task of the political parties. The syndicates affirmed the 
government that their extended role in politics would only be temporary while the 
things would fully back to normal. Yet, argues Hourani, this promise has not been 
kept. On the contrary, the involvement of the syndicates has grown steadily in the 
1990s. 866 Shteiwi argues that the double agenda of the professional syndicates has 
been their downfall; focusing on both professional and political matters has divided 
the resources and weakened the syndicates. 867 Shteiwi, however, provides no 
evidence of the syndicates becoming weaker. His view of the role of the syndicates 
has a resemblance to the view of the government that appears still to be concerned 
with the power of the syndicates. It has to be acknowledged that the re-emergence of 
political parties is about to alter the political environment, at least providing the 
members of syndicates pursue their ideals through other channels. 
The professional associates themselves argue that is not always possible to limit 
their activities to apolitical ones. The legitimate task of the syndicates, as stressed by 
the executive, is to promote professional matters. Yet the syndicates are not entirely 
happy with the opportunities to do so. Wael Saqqa, the President of the JEA, points 
out that there are no formal channels for the associations to express their views on 
professional matters. The syndicates can make suggestions on work related matters 
to the government. Yet there are no time limits for the government to move on the 
proposals, nor are there any guarantees that the government will do something. It 
can take months, even years, before anything happens. Sometimes the government 
does absolutely nothing after receiving the suggestion. 868 Thus the syndicates are 
forced to use other forums. In a parliamentary system contacting the legislative 
864 Mumseini, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
865 Anderson (1997), p. 62. 
866 Hourani (2000), p. 59. 
867 Shteiwi, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
868 Saqqa, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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should be an appropriate channel. On the other hand the activists within syndicates 
do not see it as possible always to make distinctions between `political' and 
`professional' matters when active within the conventional political life. 
The changes in the legislation since the 1989 have had an impact on civil society as 
whole. There has been a significant increase in the number of NGOs in Jordan. 
According to El-Khatib, the president of the General Union of Voluntary Societies 
(GUNS), the number of NGOs has doubled since the early 1990s. 869 It has to be 
noted here that the increase is not as natural as it might appear. There are many 
newly-founded government-controlled organisations, royal NGOs (RONGOs) and 
governmental NGOs (GONGOs). The increase in civil society activities seems to 
have made the government more anxious to control the NGOs. All Jordanian NGOs 
have to belong to the GUYS, an umbrella organisation for civil society organisations. 
Centralising the civil society activities through the GUVS enables the government to 
extend the control over the increasing number of the NGOs. The GUVS has a 
significant role, as it is involved in providing licenses for NGOs with the Ministry of 
Social Development. The GUVS also has financial significance as it has the 
responsibility for allocating funding to the members. 870 The intention of the executive 
to define clear spheres/activities for each type of actors is clearly expressed in the 
Association Law. As Wicktorowicz points out, the Association Law (1996) states that 
the NGOs cannot be aiming at financial, personal or political gains. Also according to 
the Associations Law, NGOs are not allowed to use `partisan' organisations to use 
their premises or resources for `partisan purposes'. 871 
The Jordanian executive has many ways for making sure that NGOs stay within the 
allocated political space. NGOs have to produce annual reports detailing all the 
elements of their associational existence (funding, activities, leadership). The 
Association Law entitles the government to send any official to the NGOs' premises 
to make inspections. The government officials also attend the elections of the NGOs 
boards. The legislation authorises the government to close organisations if they 
869 EI-Khatib, Interview in Amman May 2003. 
870 Wicktorowicz, Embedded Authoritarianism: Bureaucratic Power and the Limits to Non- 
Governmental Organisations in Jordan(2002), p. 88. 
Wicktorowicz (2002), p. 83. 
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violate the association laws. The government is also entitled instead of dissolution to 
re-organise NGOs and change the leaders. 872 Samhouri, the president of the 
Jordanian Society for Citizens' Rights (JSCR), argues that the JSCR was dissolved 
in 2002, as it defied the unspoken rule that NGOs should not touch on sensitive 
issues. Among other things the JSCR demanded that the upper house of parliament 
should be elected and it also criticised the nationality laws. The formal reason for the 
closure of the JSCR were the violations of association laws: annual reports were not 
being delivered on time. Samhouri denies these accusations; he sees this 
requirement as not applicable as the JSCR was registered as a non-charitable 
organisation. He stresses that even if there had been any violations the law gives 
societies one month to `reform', to correct the mistakes made. Samhouri argues that 
there are other NGOs who violate the laws but they are not working on sensitive 
issues, thus their violations are ignored. 873 
Sae'da Kilani argues that the biggest obstacle facing the (real) NGOs is the lack of 
funding, as there are no official domestic sources. The existence of RONGOs and 
GONGOs makes the situation more complicated, as the competition for international 
funding has got harder. The names of the RONGOs and GONGOs imitate the names 
of the 'original' NGOs and this might confuse the donors. The funding has become 
more divided, as there are more groups applying for the same funding. 874 Not only 
have the RONGOs better channels to lobby for international funding, but the 
legislation limiting the ordinary NGOs does not always apply to them. Wicktorowicz 
stresses that while NGOs are required to elect their board members, the board of the 
RONGOs is appointed by the Hashemite family. Furthermore, the two biggest 
RONGOs define lobbying as one of their primary activities, despite the clear 
stipulation of the association law. 875 According to Wicktorowicz, the RONGOs and 
GONGOs serve two purposes. It is easier for the government to control the civil 
society as such and more specifically helps them to dominate setting the agendas. A 
sign of the significance of the RONGOs is that the biggest 'civil society' organisations 
in Jordan are RONGOs. This is particularly evident within the women's organisations. 
872 Wicktorowicz (2002), p. 84. 
873 Samhouri, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
874 Kilani, Interview in Amman April 2003. 
875 Wicktorowicz (2002), p. 86. 
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Women's RONGOs dominate the debate on women's rights in Jordan. There were 
claims that the Princess Basma-led organisation is placing pressure on the smaller 
ones not to independently pursue matters that outside the set agenda. 876 In March 
2004 a group of women's organisations were threatening not to attend a conference 
organised under the protection of the government. They claimed the document 
drafted by the organisers did not represent the views of Jordanian women. Many 
central demands were excluded from the final document. Those reforms were the 
establishment of a constitutional court, cancelling state security courts and reviewing 
the Law on the Supreme Court. 877 Interestingly in this case the group of dissatisfied 
organisations were RONGOs, the biggest women's group in Jordan and the 
conference was organised under the auspices of Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI) 
whose Coordinator was then the government's spokesperson Asma Khader. 
To conclude it has to be said that currently NGOs are involved in drafting a new law 
on civil society organisations. No significant progress has been made. 873 The 
Association Law was issued in 1996, and as stated before many of its central 
elements are criticised by the NGOs. 
876 Wicktorowicz (2002), p. 87. 
877 Jordan Times March 22nd (2004). 
878 Interviews in NGO representatives in Amman May-June 2003. 
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8.3. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The constitutional right to express opinions is guaranteed to citizens and for the 
press and publications, as long as such acts do "not violate the law". The freedom of 
expression covers newspapers, publications, books and broadcasts. The constitution 
guarantees the press freedom from censorship as long as "provisions of the law" are 
not violated. The right will be restricted if national security so requires, or if martial 
law is declared. 879 The constitution leaves all the practical details of the 
implementation of the freedom of expression unanswered. The Press and 
Publications Law deals with the implementation. 880 
In the aftermath of the 1989 riots King Hussein made a promise to liberalise the 
press along with the announcement of parliamentary elections. The previous Press 
and Publications Law originated from the year 1973 and included several restrictions 
due to the martial Iaw. 881 In 1993 a new Press and Publications law was passed to 
meet the needs of the `political opening'. The law was amended in 1997 and 1998. 
The current law (1999) was passed soon after King Abdullah II ascended to the 
throne. The 1999 law does not differ much from the 1997 and 1998 laws. There are 
some improvements, but many problematic issues have remained unresolved, in the 
minds of the subjects at least. 
The 1993 Law 
The 1993 law was a contradictory piece of legislation. It was definitely a positive step 
bringing significant changes, but it did not meet the expectations of all journalists. 882 
The 1993 Press and Publications Law entitled private people to own and publish 
newspapers, as well to contest government's decisions contradicting general press 
ethics. In addition, the right of the government to suspend and close down 
newspapers was cancelled. In case of violations the newspaper in question would 
not face an automatic closure but would be taken to a court. Also a limit was placed 
879 Constitution, Article 15. 
880 When analysing the Press Laws this study has used the translations made by Sai'da Kilani (See 
Kilani, 2002), as they were the only (translations of) laws available. 
881 Wardam, Civil Society and Press in Confrontation with the Press and Publications Law(1999), p. 3. 
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on the state's ownership of newspapers; state ownership could not exceed thirty 
percent. 883 The limitation on the ownership was a great achievement, as in 1986 a 
"major assault" on the press freedoms was made by forcing private newspapers to 
sell shares to the government. 884 On the other hand the law introduced penalties for 
journalists whose articles were endangering "the security of the state" or criticising 
heads of the friendly states. There was also a ban on publishing confidential 
governmental statements or reviewing any decision by the senate on licensing 
matters. The list of forbidden topics included also the royal family, the army and 
security forces. 885 
The 1997 Law 
In 1997 a temporary law was issued by al-Majalli government, as a great surprise to 
many. Yet it was a `rational' step from the executive's perspective. Liberalising the 
press legislation had created a freer environment for the press. It is argued that King 
Hussein was particularly uncomfortable at the negative press coverage of the 
Jordan's involvement in the peace negotiations. King Hussein heavily criticised the 
newspapers before and after signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Prime 
minister al-Majalli who introduced the law was also one of the chief peace 
negotiators. 886 
The amended law cancelled many of the improvements made in 1993 and many 
stipulations of the law were made stricter. Most importantly, the government was 
again authorised to suspend and close down newspapers. The government was 
authorised to close down a publication for 3-6 months if it repeated a violation in five 
years time. The newspapers' capital requirements were raised from 50,000 to 
600,000 Jordanian dinars for daily papers and from 15,000 to 300,000 JDs for 
weekly ones. Publications were given three months (May to August) to meet this 
requirement. 887 The law also introduced much harsher penalties. The previous law 
defined the maximum penalty for publishing details of court cases or matters defined 
882 Najjar, The Ebb and Flow of the Liberalization of the Jordanian Press: 1985-1997(1998), p. 130. 
883 Kilani (2002), p. 6; Sharif, Opposition in the Print Media(1995), p. 14. 
884 Sharif (1995), p. 12. 
885 Najjar (1998), p. 132 and p. 139, fn. 
886 Wardam (1999), p. 5. 
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as forbidden as a thousand Jordanian dinars, while breaking article 44 (receiving 
local or foreign funding) brought a penalty of 6,000 JDs. For all these violations the 
minimum penalty in the 1997 law was 15,000 JDs and the maximum 50,000 JDs. 
The law would be applied to "any published news, news analysis, commentaries or 
cartoons that infringe on the royal family, national unity, general ethics, religion, 
security apparatus, and the head of Arab and friendly states". The list of forbidden 
subjects was thus expanded from the 1993 law. 888 The Press and Publications Law 
was be applied also to the publications of political parties. Earlier these publications 
were exempt from the requirement to obtain a license. Under the new law only 
Jordanians permanently residing in the country would qualify as editors, after ten 
years of working full-time as a journalist. This requirement, stresses Najjar, was 
included in the 1973 law not in the 1993 one. 889 It was argued that the primary aim of 
this stipulation was to replace Nabeel al-Sharif, the editor of the ad-Dustur. Sharif 
was not the government's favourite due to his liberal editorial policy. 890 The article 
(19d) limiting the state's ownership on newspapers was cancelled. Interestingly when 
the 30-percent limit on the state's ownership was placed in 1993, the state was given 
four years to reduce its ownership. However, just before the time limit ended in 1997, 
the entire restriction was omitted. 891 
The immediate reaction to the 1997 amendments was strikes and demonstrations. 
Some journalists taking part in the demonstrations were beaten and arrested. 
International human rights organisations condemned the amendments, al-Majalli was 
even named as one of the archenemies of the free press in the world by Journalists 
without Frontiers. In despite of the protests the government went ahead with 
implementing the law. Thirteen small (private) newspapers were closed down as 
their capital was not sufficient enough under the new legislation. 892 Surprisingly the 
government decided to close down the newspapers only nine days prior to the 1997 
elections. 893 Seven newspapers facing the severe requirements of the law took the 
887 Wardam (1999), p. 5; Najjar (1998), p. 132. 
888 Kilani (2002). 
889 Najjar (1998), p. 133. 
890 Wardam (1999), p. 6. 
891 Najjar (1998), p. 133; Sharif (1995), p. 12. 
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temporary Press and Publications Law to the Supreme Court of Justice. The court 
decided that the strict censorship measures were justified only in situations which 
qualified as force majeure, not just in any circumstances. The court also saw the 
retrospective implementation of the law as unconstitutional. The requirement for 
greater capitals of newspapers should have been implemented in the 6-month 
transition period as described in the law. Thus suspending publications in three 
months was against the law. 894 The government did not welcome the decision. King 
Hussein even warned against the court making any similar decisions in the future. 895 
It is widely believed that the decision made by the court is the reason why Chief 
Justice Farouq Kilani was forced to retire early in February 1998. The Supreme 
Court made the decision in January 1998. Farouq Kilani was not directly involved in 
making the decision; he had left a recommendation to the judges dealing with the 
case. 
The 1998 Law 
It was not long after the government had formally accepted the ruling of the Supreme 
Court when a new draft law was proposed. The law was passed in 1998 after a 
controversial lobbying process. The lower house rejected the draft in its first session, 
after which the law was taken to the National Guidance Committee to be amended. 
At this stage, it is claimed, the executive pressured the deputies strongly and 
stressed the wish of the king to see the law to be passed. Lobbying was successful 
and the law was eventually passed in both houses. 896 The reaction to this was not 
unexpected. The Journalists Association refused to accept the law and many 
organisations criticised the law. According to Wardam, the 1998 law was "identical" 
to the previous one. Sae'da Kilani argues that although it was "in letter and in spirit" 
similar to the 1997 one some of the stipulations were even harder. The 1998 
included an article giving the court to right to suspend publication while its case is 
pending. 897 
894 Wardam (1999), p. 3. 
895 Kilani (2002), p. 15. 
8% Wardam (1999), p. 7. 
897 Wardam (1999); Kilani (2002), p. 15. 
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Wardam points out that unexpected developments in 1998 improved the press 
freedoms. No improvements were made or amendments cancelled, the government 
simply got more urgent matters to deal with. In the summer rumours of King 
Hussein's illness started to spread around and there were concerns about the future 
of the country. In addition, during the hottest summer season Ammanites were facing 
a water pollution scandal. It was the independent press that revealed the water 
pollution crisis despite the denials of the government. The al-Majalli government was 
forced to resign due to the unsuccessful cover-up attempts. The new government 
appointed was occupied with sorting out the water crisis and the 1998 Press Law, or 
the strictest stipulations, was never fully implemented. It is also claimed that the new 
liberal prime minister Tarawneh was not very eager to implement the press law 898 
The 1999 Law 
The press freedoms seemed to be taking steps in a positive direction when Abdullah 
II came to the throne. He expressed his determination to liberalise the press in 
Jordan, even attending meetings with the representatives of the Press Association. A 
progressive draft law was proposed but the new government elected in 1997 did not 
take this draft any further. Instead, the Rawabdeh government issued a temporary 
Press and Publications Law in September 1999.899 The 1999 law is considered an 
improvement in relation to the 1997 and the 1998 laws, yet not as progressive as 
wished for by journalist and civil society. 
It is worth noting at this point that regardless of the various comments made on the 
significance of the free press by Abdullah II, there have been very few practical steps 
taken to prove the king's commitment to the development of an independent, free 
press in Jordan. King Abdullah II abolished the Ministry of Information in November 
2001. The Higher Council for the Media was directed to work for the nation, instead 
of the government. However, the members appointed in December 2001 were not 
representative. There were no women, no journalists from the private newspapers or 
from foreign publications. 900 
898 Wardam (1999), p. 9. 
899 Kilani (2000), pp. 18-20. 
900 Kilani (2002), p. 37. 
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The current law still requires publications to apply for licences from the Council of 
Ministers. 901 Publishing books is not possible without a permit from the Ministry of 
Information. 902 The capital required to receive a license is 500,000 JDs for a daily 
newspaper and 50,000 JDs for a non-daily publication. 903 The capital requirement 
was not abolished, yet the amounts required are slightly smaller than in the 1997 
law. Publications of political parties as well as specialised publications are exempted 
from license fees. 904 The fines for breaking the press and publications law remain 
relatively harsh, considering that the journalist's monthly income is below the 
Jordanian average. 905 According to the current law, the minimum fine for violating the 
article 38 is 500 JDs and the maximum 1,000 JDs. 906 The fine for violating the article 
43 is 100-1,000 JDs. 907 Publication operating without an appropriate license will be 
given fine of 5,000-10,000 JDs. 908 Jordanian publications as well as educational and 
research institutions are not allowed to accept funding from foreign sources. 909 Kilani 
claims that the government has applied this stipulation selectively. Small private 
research centres have not received permits to conduct joint research projects funded 
by local and foreign sources. Yet the government research institutions have been 
permitted to do so. More, research centres accepting foreign funding are accused of 
compromising national security. In 2000 and 2001 four journalists (Nidal Mansour, 
George Hawatmeh, Mahasen Imam and Bilal Tal) were facing disciplinary measures 
for accepting foreign funding for their research centres. Kilani argues that the press 
and private research centres are stigmatised for accepting foreign funding. Yet there 
are NGOs and government's projects receiving foreign funding. 910 
While the freedom of expression is guaranteed to all citizens and all citizens have the 
right to found publications, under the 1999 law journalists have to belong to the 
Journalists Association, and no one of foreign nationality is allowed to practice 
901 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 11c. 
902 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article, 35. 
903 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 13a-b. 
904 Press and Publications Law (1999), Articles 13d and 14. 
905 Shukkeir, Status of Press Freedom in Jordan(2003). 
906 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 45c. 
907 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 46a. 
908 Press and Publications Law (1999). 
909 Press and Publications Law (1999), Articles 39-40. 
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journalism in Jordan. 911 Foreign correspondents require a permit from the ministry in 
order to work in Jordan. 912 The requirements for editors are currently less strict. The 
requirement of 10-year work experience was reduced to four years. There can be 
only one editor, and an editor can work only at one publication. 913 Sae'da Kilani 
criticises the strict criteria placed on journalists. In order to be a journalist one has to 
have a university degree or have trained at a Jordanian newspaper for three years, 
as well as belong to the Jordan Press Association. To become a member one has to 
make an oath in the presence of the Minister of Information. It is argued that to make 
such an appointment is subject to the Minister's busy schedule and it can take weeks 
or months. 914 Kilani also points out these criteria have been a permanent element of 
the press laws in Jordan, and it is remarkable that there has been no discussion in 
parliament to abolish them. 915 
Most content bans were cancelled by the current law. 916 According to the 1999 law, 
the banned contents are only matters that are classified as anything that "conflicts 
with the principles of freedom, national responsibility, human rights, and values of the 
Arab and Islamic nation". 91 However, publishing details of criminal investigations, 
unless authorised by public prosecutor, is forbidden. Covering court sessions is 
allowed, unless particularly banned. Foreign news correspondents are exempted 
from the ban of covering investigations. 918 The elements that were left out of the 
current press and publications law are interesting as well. There were no guarantees 
of journalists' basic rights, nor was the pre-trial detention forbidden. The requirement 
for the state to reduce its ownership in the newspapers was included in the 1993 law, 
but excluded from all the press laws issued since. The state still owns 60 percent of 
the al-Ra'l, the main Arabic newspaper and over 30 percent of the second daily 
910 Kilani (2002), pp. 23-24. 
911 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 2-3. 
912 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 9. 
913 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 23a. 
914 Kilani (2002), p. 21. 
915 Kilani (2002), p. 22. 
916 Kilani (2000), p. 20. 
917 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 9. 
918 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 38. 
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newspaper ad-Dustur. Sae'da Kilani argues that the exclusion was done regardless 
of King Abdullah's promises to privatise Jordanian TV and radio. 919 
There are two important aspects of all the amendments made since the early 1990s. 
All of the amendments were temporary laws. The early laws also coincidenced with 
the parliamentary elections, or rather preceded them. The 1993 law was issued in 
April and the 1993 elections were held in November 8th. The 1997 amendments were 
issued in May and the elections in November 8tn 920 Furthermore, the 1997 
temporary law was issued by "exploiting the expiration of the constitutional term of 
the office of the Lower House of the Parliament". 921 Also, as shown earlier, less than 
two weeks before the elections in 1997 the government suspended thirteen 
publications on the basis that they could not meet the new financial requirements. 922 
The Penal Code was amended the by All Abu Ragheb's government in October 8th 
2001, after the September 11 attacks. Sae'da Kilani points out the amendments were 
made without any public or parliament debate. 923 The amendments included several 
restrictions on the press and the freedom of expression, as well as harsher penalties. 
According to article 150a, anyone who publishes documents that "harm the national 
unity, incite the perpetration of crimes, sow the seeds of hatred and spite and 
dissension among individuals, incite racial discrimination, harm the dignity of 
individuals, their reputation and their personal freedoms, or shake the society's 
political situation through promoting delinquency or immorality or through spreading 
false and libellous information, inciting demonstrations and sit-ins or public meetings 
in a way that is contradictory with effective legislation or any action that infringe on 
the country's dignity and standing, its reputation and its dignity, will be 
imprisoned". 924 Despite the reforms made in 1999 for the Press and Publications Law 
the amended Penal Code was a major setback. Journalists violating the press laws 
are sanctioned with fines, but when applying the penal code in all cases journalists 
are facing imprisonment. Generally speaking the often-changing press legislation is 
919 Kilani (2000), p. 22. 
920 Hourani and Yassin (1998), p. 48. 
921 Wardam (1999), p. 5. 
922 Najjar (1998), p. 135. 
923 Kilani (2002), p. 24. Article 15 of the Penal Code 2001. 
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one of the biggest challenges the Jordanian journalists are facing. Jamil Nimri 
stresses that it is very challenging for journalist to keep pace with the ever-changing 
legislation. This has increased the wariness of journalists. 925 
One of the main obstacles for journalists is the lack of reliable information. The article 
8 of the press law guarantees the right of journalists to information. The government 
must "facilitate" and provide the information needed. 926 Regardless of this stipulation, 
there are no formal sources of official information, so journalists rely on secondary 
sources and personal connections when reporting on governmental decisions. 
Certain journalists are not allowed to enter ministries and ministries refuse to work 
with certain journalists. 927 In 1999 prime minister Rawabdeh notified all ministries not 
to co-operate with journalists who do not belong to JPA. Faleh Nasser, Minister of 
Health forbade anyone in the ministry to make statements to the press. 928 Journalists 
argue that the government is `penalising' the private press by not inviting them to the 
government's briefings. The government have also `deprived' the private press of 
advertising income, as no official adverts are published in the independent press. 929 
More, it is claimed that instead of informing the local newspapers of the domestic 
developments the government has informed the foreign media instead. The local 
press was prevented from covering the medical condition of King Hussein. The CNN 
was the first to report Hussein's fight against cancer and the French news agency 
AFP announced that Abdullah would be the next king. Jordanian journalists consider 
this as a sign of distrust in the local media. Also they being unaware of the true 
developments, or unable to tell the truth, were "broadcasting false denials". 930 
Another incident was when Mossad attempted to assassinate a Hamas chief in 1998. 
The government insisted that the incident was of a private nature, even when Israeli 
and international media were reporting the truth. 931 The censorship on foreign media 
was lifted in 1999 while it remained for the local media. 932 It is also argued that it is 
924 Kilani (2002), p. 24. Italics added. 
925 Nimri, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
926 Press and Publications Law (1999), Article 8. 
927 Shukkeir (2003), p. 4. 
928 Kilani (2002), p. 26. 
929 Kilani (2002), p. 26. 
930 Kilani (2002), p. 29. 
931 Kilani (2002), p. 28. 
932 Kilani (2002), p. 29. 
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easier for the English language newspapers (Jordan Times and Star) to get articles 
published. The government considers the audience marginal and these papers less 
harmful. Also the liberal newspapers give a liberal image of the country to the non- 
Jordanian readers. 
933 
It is not only the likelihood of being prosecuted for breaking the law but also the 
constant monitoring that is restricting journalists. There have been accusations of the 
security services placing their officers (infiltrators) in the newsrooms to observe and 
to report back to the security apparatus. The editor of Jordan Times have admitted 
that the governmental presence at the newsrooms. Journalists on the senior posts 
have been working (or still are) for the government or the royal court. Not only have 
the executive placed their representatives in the newspapers, but there is movement 
into the opposite direction. Difficult journalists have been appointed to administrative 
posts, to the royal court or to television to "tame" them. 934 According to journalists, it 
is not that uncommon to get high-level visitors at the newsrooms. The constant threat 
from the executive guiding Jordanian journalists is making self-censorship 
fundamental part of their work. 935 Protests by the journalists on the 1999 press law 
disappeared when the prime minister personally visited newsrooms to explain the 
reasons for the law. 936 Shukkeir argues that the executive's influence can easily be 
spotted when reading the editorials, as they are surprisingly uniform. 937 Moreover, 
prime minister Rawabdeh is said to have checked headlines of newspaper articles by 
himself. Even when he was cleared from corruption charges all the newspapers 
published the news with an identical headline. 938 Sae'da Kilani implies that a 
consequences of the press restrictions is the stream of (opposition) journalists 
emigrating from Jordan. 
Shukkeir argues that the government (so far) has not guaranteed the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of press, but the judiciary has. 
939 There are several 
933 Journalists Interviewed in Amman May-June 2003. 
934 Kilani (2002), pp. 29-30. 
935 US State Department, 11. Interviews in Amman May-June 2003. 
936 Kilani (2002), p. 25. 
937 Shukkeir (2003), p. 2. 
938 Kilani (2002), p. 19. 
939 Shukkeir, Interview in Amman 2003. 
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cases to support this view. For instance, between 1996 and 1997 150 journalists 
were charged for violations of the press law. According to Jamil Nimri, a fellow 
journalist, 90 percent of the cases were discharged. 940 Shukkeir also refers to the 
decision (No. 226/97) made by the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the 
1997 press law. Regardless of the decision made by the Supreme Court, the 
government insisted the temporary law to be discussed in the lower house. It was 
argued by the Minister of Information Samir Mutawi that the destiny of this temporary 
law would be in the hands of the legislative. 941 Thus Mutawi appears to be 
suggesting that the constitutional powers of the judiciary would be ignored and 
transferred to the parliament. 
It is not only the government that has been opposing the press freedoms. The 
Islamist movement has repeatedly attacked the independence of the media for 
"corrupting the local morals". In 1997 an article published in al-Bilal on sexual 
practices among old married couples caused uproar among the conservative 
sentiments of the society. The author of the article had used the court cases as 
sources, yet there was no understanding for the article. Journalists close to the 
government, conservative deputies and JPA attacked the publication and the author. 
It was argued by islamists that ethics in the society are far more important than press 
freedoms. Finally, it was promised by the weeklies that sensitive issues like sexual 
relations will not be covered in the future. 942 There are also other taboo topics. The 
unpopularity of Nabil Sharif is due to the articles on tribalism in Jordan he published 
in ad-Dustur. 943 Sae'da Kilani considers the al-Bilal incident as a turning point in the 
history of press freedoms in Jordan. The case proved that in a conservative society 
free press is still an "ambiguous" concept. In Jordan there are still many placing 
ethics before press freedoms. 944 The Free Media Zone project in Jordan was 
terminated by the conservatives who claimed that free media has a corrupting impact 
940 Nimri, Interview in Amman May 2003. 
941 Shukkeir, Interview in Amman 2003; 
http: //www. 6ordanembassyus. orq/012798001 htm. htm. 
942- Kilani (2002), p. 27. 
943 Kilani (2002), p. 28. 
944 Kilani (2002), p. 28. 
Shukkeir (2003). See also 
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on the Jordanian society. 945 It is these sentiments that governments have used 
wisely to restrict press freedoms for political purposes. 946 
945 Kilani (2002), p. 37. 
946 Wardam (1999), p. 3. 
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Summary 
The Jordanian constitution guarantees the citizens a number of political rights: the 
right to elect and be elected, and freedom of association and of speech, to name the 
central ones. Central to this study is not to list the rights that might be missing from 
the constitution, but to examine the implementation of the rights since 1989. It could 
be argued that since the promulgation of the constitution political rights are the least 
implemented element of the constitution due to the long absence of democratic 
practices. The parliamentary elections of 1989, and almost regular elections since, 
seem to suggest that the executive is showing its commitment to the implementation 
of political rights. The aim here was to examine whether this was just an appearance 
or whether there have been genuine respect for political rights of Jordanians since 
the late 1980s. 
Significant changes have been made in the legislation covering political participation 
between the years 1989 and 2003. This is not surprising considering that political 
parties were founded, elections held and deputies elected after a long absence of 
political participation. The surprising element is, however, the identity of the 
`legislator'. Regardless of the elected legislators at work, together with the appointed 
senate, many of the amendments made are not products of ordinary legislative 
processes. The amendments have been made without the lower house being 
present, as temporary laws. The amendments on Elections Law and Press and 
Publications Laws have been made by the executive as temporary laws without a 
public or parliamentary debate. Interestingly, these laws are the most amended 
pieces of the legislation dealing with political rights. 
The timings of the amendments are also telling; often made prior to parliamentary 
elections. Since the 1989 elections there have been no elections without 
controversies over the election laws. The election law was amended before the 1989 
elections, again prior to the 1993 elections and then again in 2001. The timing of the 
amendments is particularly significant regarding the nature of the elections law. The 
election law only really matters once every four years, a few weeks prior to the 
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election day. The intention of the executive seems rather evident: to restrict the 
political freedoms of the citizens without fully denying them. Amending the election 
law has a resemblance to amending the chapters of the constitution dealing with the 
legislative: both seem to be motivated by the reluctance of the executive to work 
together with unrestricted legislators. It is not far-fetched to argue after examining 
legal texts and the amendments, as well as the ways in which they were made, that 
electoral engineering has occurred in Jordan since 1989. The executive has justified 
their actions as essential for the national security and/or fundamental to the morals of 
Arab society. 
Since the beginning of the political opening the crucial flaws (the disproportionate 
representation of the Palestinians and the overrepresentation of the ethnic 
minorities) have been permanent elements of the election legislation, as has been 
the voting formula encouraging tribal loyalties. These flaws are widely acknowledged 
by the opposition and by the voters, even by the executive. There have been several 
promises from the direction of the executive to reform the registration, and demands 
made by the monarch to improve election legislation to promote equal political 
opportunities. Yet very little has been done so far. The commitment of the executive 
to reform the election legislation appears not to be the most genuine kind. Over the 
last decade more has been done regarding the electoral procedures (electoral 
registration, voting cards, transport of votes) than regarding the most controversial 
elements such as the disproportionate representation. It is not only the contents of 
the election laws, but also the way they have been dealt with. Based on the election 
turnouts of the four parliamentary elections it is justified to say that political opening 
has made it possible for the citizens to participate through elections but it has not 
been able to encourage the participation. Also the lower houses elected have been 
criticised as being "shopacracies", parliaments with representatives are primarily 
interested in private gains. 
Curiously, there is one law that has not been amended: the Political Parties issued 
as an ordinary law in 1992. This makes sense when bearing in mind that political 
parties are relatively insignificant political actors in Jordan. In spite of the large 
number of political parties registered, the Islamic Action Front is the only genuinely 
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significant actor in the country. The press laws on the other hand have been a 
subject to various amendments. Therefore, it is evident that the political elite is aware 
of it biggest threats. Based on the attempts to control the media through legislation 
and informal channels it is obvious that the political elite consider the media as a 
greater evil than the political parties. The media remains largely controlled and 
owned by the government. Thus the availability of alternative information is 
questionable. Restraining other civil society organisations, such as professional 
syndicates and NGOS is an attempt to limit their number. Simply the smaller the 
number of possible dissidents the easier it is to control them. 
The strategy of the elite has been to keep the roles of the other actors strictly defined 
to make them controllable and more predictable, and most importantly aiming to stop 
political parties becoming meaningful opposition forces like the socialist in the 1950s. 
The political elite have been able to do this, because the constitutionality does not 
exist in Jordan. Also the judiciary is too weak to guarantee the constitutionality in the 
country. Even since the political opening the Jordanian political system is managed 
by a few instead of the many. There are no of signs of dissolution of the non- 
democratic elite, nor are there any signs of transfer of power. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
The Rule of Law and Jordan 
After examining the rule of law - through constitutionality and the independence of 
the judiciary - it is argued here that the rule of law is not an embedded part of political 
reality in Jordan. It is also claimed that the political opening in 1989 has had no great 
impact on the rule of law. There is no evidence showing that Jordanians are better 
protected from the arbitrary behaviour of the state powers, or that the law 
enforcement increases the predictability of socio-political affairs in Jordan. 
There are weaknesses in both the design and the implementation. The constitution 
when promulgated in 1952 was not perfect but included all elements necessary for 
the designs of the rule of law and political democracy. The constitution 
acknowledges the three state actors and their separate powers as well legal and 
political rights of the citizens. Since its promulgation the Jordanian constitution has, 
however, been bent and broken, both prior to and since 1989. The king who was 
already provided with an extensive set of powers and judicial immunity has 
broadened his powers through numerous constitutional amendments. This has 
clearly made the constitutional design unbalanced. Instead of being a parliamentary 
system headed by the monarch the Jordanian system has become a monarchy with 
occasional parliamentary practices. 
The constitution, the original and the amended, has thus not constrained the rulers. 
Whenever the constitution has proved too constraining, more flexibility has been 
created through amendments or creative interpretation. Therefore, it is not justified to 
talk about constitutionalism in the context of the Hashemite kingdom. Also the 
constitutionality of these actions, (e. g. reinstating the dissolved house to rubber- 
stamp amendments or passing temporary laws in absence of force majeure 
circumstances), is questionable. It has to be stressed that the constitution has not 
been an insignificant document; it has functioned as a source of legitimacy, again 
before and after the political opening of 1989. The case of Jordan is another example 
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of Arab Constitutionalism: the constitution is used primarily, or solely, to augment 
political authority, a tool defining the roles and responsibilities of the key actors. 
Though it could be argued that there is not much Arab or cultural specificity in this 
constitutional practice; the colonial powers used the same approach. The 
Hashemites seem to have adopted from the British the practice of excluding 
themselves from the constitutional constraints while manipulating all the others 
through the constitution. 
During the last decade there have been improvements in the working conditions of 
the judges; the number of judges, both male and female, is increasing, better office 
infrastructure has been built, and appropriate compensation is guaranteed. It is 
debatable whether these changes are consequences of the political changes. 
Furthermore, the most important element is still missing: the independence of the 
judiciary. It is worth noting that the Jordanian constitution provides the judiciary with 
independence and the citizens with judicial equality. Unfortunately the existing 
structure of the legal system, including elements such as tribal law and state security 
courts, does not support these aims. Both structural and decisional extrajudicial 
interference exists within the system. At this point it must be stressed that structural 
and decisional independence are interrelated. Deficiencies in structural 
independence make the judiciary more vulnerable to decisional interference. In 
Jordan the executive is in charge of recruitment and appointing of judges, as well as 
of monitoring activities. This enhances the eagerness of the judiciary to listen to 
extrajudicial `recommendations'. It is worth noting that the existing legislation 
enabling the executive to influence the judicial decision-making is unconstitutional. 
Defining the true extent of the interference is not possible based on the number of 
the judges interviewed. There is nevertheless evidence of extrajudicial interference 
existing within the legal system in Jordan. The reluctance of the Jordanian judiciary 
to monitor constitutionality supports this claim. It has been claimed that during the 
early years of the independence the Jordanian judiciary was reluctant to monitor 
constitutionality. It is argued here that this did not stop in the 1960s, but has 
continued until to date. An appeal court judge to declare not to have the authority to 
review constitutionality in the case of Toujan Faisal's candidacy in the 2003 elections 
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supports this argument. A reason could be, as Anis Qassim claims, that the 
Jordanian judiciary is currently a part of the government: "reduced to be a 
department of executive power". 947 This would explain the disinclination of the legal 
experts to point the finger at the guilty ones (the executive in this case), particularly 
when criticising the royal family is illegal in Jordan and criticising the members of the 
inner circle might take the critic to a state security court. The lack of willingness of 
the judiciary to review constitutionality reveals the core of the problem. The matter is 
more political than merely judicial. 
It would require more comprehensive analysis of judicial decisions and interviewing a 
larger number of judges to be able to argue that the judiciary has had absolutely no 
role in political development in Jordan. However, it can be claimed, based on the 
data available, that the judiciary in Jordan has not had a great impact on political 
development. Not to make injustice to the vocal exceptions, it has to be 
acknowledged that some concerns of unconstitutional practices have been 
expressed. Nevertheless these judges still remain a minority. In this sense there 
seems to be differences among the Arab Middle Eastern states. In some countries, 
like Egypt and the Gulf states, the judiciary has fought hard to defend its rights to 
review constitutionality, and succeeding occasionally. The Jordanian judiciary as a 
whole has not worked as a counter force to constrain the executive. 
Interestingly the Jordanian constitution, although acknowledging a special status of 
the Shariah, does not define it as the source for legislation. There has been, unlike in 
Egypt, no substantial trends towards islamisation of the constitution. Thus it can be 
claimed that Islam as such has had no special role in the legal development, or 
underdevelopment, in Jordan. Some cultural practices, e. g. tribal law, seem to have 
more significance in this context. 
If anything the case of Jordan highlights the political nature of the rule of law and 
thus shows the central weakness of currently popular technical approaches to the 
rule of law. Technical programmes are attractive both to donors and the political 
authority providing speedy results without threatening the foundation of the political 
947 Qassim, Interview in Amman June 2003. 
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rule. Nonetheless they do not work as long as the executive is not constrained. 948 
The number of IT equipment or improved administrative procedures make little 
difference, as long as the judicial independence is not guaranteed. There are no 
quick-fix solutions; embedding the rule of law is a time-consuming exercise. 
948 In Jordan USAID together with the Jordanian Ministry of Justice "is improving the civil court system 
through creating case management systems to increase transparency and efficiency". 
htto: //www. usaid. gov/locations/asia near east/countries/iordanl 
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Democratisation and Political Changes in Jordan 
In relation to political participation the shortcomings within the rule of law in Jordan 
are equally apparent. There has been no significant transfer of power as a 
consequence of the political changes. The executive is still the dominant law-maker, 
regardless of the representative government guaranteed in the constitution. The 
executive headed by the king drafts laws and decides the degree of involvement of 
elected representatives, regardless of the separation of powers described in the 
constitution. Regardless of the elected legislators, the most important decisions 
about the kingdom have been made outside the parliament (e. g. the peace treaty 
with Israel, election laws and constitutional amendments). The influence of the 
political elite extends itself to the judicial sphere as well; through state security courts 
and unofficial `recommendations'. 
There is only one conclusion to draw. The political changes that have taken place in 
Jordan since 1989 cannot be correctly understood as indicating a process of 
democratisation. Since the late 1980s there have been no substantial developments 
in relation to either political or legal development. The constitution has been both 
bent and broken; the independence of the judiciary compromised and political 
participation `managed' by the executive. This is in accordance with Nathan Brown's 
argument of the impact of Arab Constitutionalism on the state agencies. The 
executive has been able to use the constitution as a vehicle to strengthen its power 
by weakening the legislative and the judiciary. The existence of informal patronage 
networks has contributed to the absence of the rule of law and suffocated any 
attempts for citizens' genuine participation. Consequently, in order the political 
system to change into a more balanced one a substantial degree of transfer of 
political power is required; the executive to share the power with citizens, if not pass 
it over entirely. 
How then can the differing opinions on the political changes in Jordan explained? A 
few reasons are suggested here; both common to democratisation literature and to 
the Middle Eastern studies. Studying democratisation has been contagious, although 
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democratisation itself has not. 9 Eagerness to study democratisation might have 
caused some scholars to see signs of democratisation everywhere. In the case of 
Middle Eastern Studies the eagerness to study democratisation has occasionally 
been fuelled by efforts to prove the exceptionalism argument false. As all the 
regimes studied have not been democratising, it has been a challenge of the 
"democratization industry"950 to find appropriate labels to describe `transformations'. 
In addition to the use of inappropriate terms, there has been an increase in sub- 
categories, and in "hybrid democracies". 951 The crucial question is whether labeling 
imperfect `democracies' each with their own label is an improvement or a burden to 
students of democratisation. 
In relation to the Arab Middle East at least the excess supply of sub-types and 
attributes seems unreasonable when compared to the actual political developments 
taken place. In case of the political changes in Jordan, a fair number of descriptions 
were offered. For example, the only analytical difference between "managed 
liberalization" and "negotiated transition" in the context of Jordan seems to be the 
degree of optimism included in the latter label. In spite of the recent political changes 
classifying Jordan as `transitional' is a misuse of the term. The political power is still 
in the hands of the political elite. There is no evidence of even partial transfer of 
power taking place. On the contrary, in spite of some doubts King Abdullah II has 
been able to consolidate his position as the head of the Hashemite rule. Abdullah 
has done this like the other Hashemite rulers before him, by controlling the security 
establishment and maintaining broadly based political elite. There are no doubts that 
the most persistent element of the Jordanian political system is the political elite 
managed by the king. This group of people has been the one to decide when the 
citizens are granted `political concessions' and when not. It is suggested here that 
the political elite appears to be if not only then the main channel for external 
influence on the Jordanian politics. As it has been argued by a domestic observer, 
the foreign allies do not welcome democracy if it might shake the regional status 
949 Kienle (2000), p. 200. Only a few transitions that started in the 1990s have actually reached 
consolidation phases. More importantly, authoritarian regimes have survived "without too many 
difficulties". 
950 Shlumberger (2002), p. 5. 
951 Diamond (2002), p. 23; Sadiki (2004), p. 376. 
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quo. 952 In addition, maintaining the strength of the Hashemite rule will not be possible 
without external support in some form. 
Some fashionable terms have been imported without placing enough consideration 
for the intellectual foundation of the imports. The popularity of transition school has 
made the t-word a permanent element within democracy discourse generally as well 
as within the literature on political developments in the Arab Middle East. One author 
writes: "although no Arab country has become a full-fledged democracy, some 
countries have moved closer to democracy than others. This is why we speak of 
democratization as transitional process toward fulfilment of some criteria of 
democracy". 953 For analytical purposes, however, it is crucial to know how to 
measure this movement towards some criteria of democracy. When is a state 
justifiably moving closer to democracy? Eberhard Kienle accuses transition studies 
of reliance on the assumption of "inescapable transition" eventually leading to 
democracy. 954 Thus, it could be argued that no system, no state stays the same all 
the time, and therefore all states are `transitional' at some point. Within 
democratisation studies the term `transitional' implies that democratisation has 
begun. To argue that a state is heading to a stage where the existing regime might 
(or might not) be replaced by a democratic one is merely wishful thinking and has no 
analytical value. The idea of transition is problematic and thus the term `transition' 
should be used with caution within democracy studies if used at all. 
Ignoring the basic element of democratic transition, the regime change, suggests 
that some observers have failed to recognise what is actually transforming. In some 
cases changes are only "non-systemic" adjustments, not "systemic transition". 955 It is 
not the political system that is transforming into another political system, but the 
authoritarian regime is adapting to the world around. Regimes, like Jordan, create 
some "democratic" features around the same, unchanged authoritarian core. 
956 
Perhaps this is the true impact of global era of democracy. Schlumberger argues that 
952 Mahafzah (2001), pp. 359-360. 
953 Ghadbian (1997), p. 5. Italics added 
954 Kienle (2000), p. 199. 
955Schlumberger (2002a). 
956Schlumberger (2002b), p. 37. 
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scholars studying political systems in the Middle East have "failed to grasp the 
structural patters of Arab regime change", which differs from global trends. It is 
"liberalised autocracies" that are in crease, not democracies. 957 The case of Jordan 
supports this view. Thus based on this study it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions on other pre/requisites to democratisation, in addition to the rule of law. 
It is also not justified either to make conclusions about the order of the development; 
whether the rule of law is required to precede democratisation. In the case of Jordan, 
however, it seems apparent that the rule of law would destroy the informal patronage 
networks preventing political development. 
957 Schlumberger (2002b), p. 12. 
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Future Research 
Suggesting further avenues to explore is not complicated owing to scarcity of 
empirical research on legal development in Jordan or elsewhere in the Arab world, or 
on the rule of law in particular. In relation to Jordan logical next steps would be to 
analyse judicial decisions, the temporary laws passed between 2001 and 2003, and 
the judicial reform programme announced by the current government958. It would be 
also useful to know more about the working conditions of the judges at the 
courthouses and of the legislators at parliament, as well as the perceptions of the 
citizens on legal services. 
In matter of fact, any area of the rule of law requires further attention: the 
bureaucracy, corruption and wasta, the police and the army, victim support, 
defendants' perceptions. Political developments since 1989 in Jordan have received 
rightly attention. An interesting question related to the political reality in Jordan is the 
existing power structures, including the tribal support base. 
958 http: //www. iordanembassyus. org/new/me/reformagenda. shtml 
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